DocketNumber: No. 28183
Citation Numbers: 122 Neb. 779
Judges: Day, Dean, Eberly, Goss, Paine, Rose
Filed Date: 3/18/1932
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/9/2022
As a resident taxpayer of the city of Omaha, plaintiff brought this action to enjoin the issuance of bonds by the city to pay for real estate acquired by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, for the purpose of an addition to the city municipal airport.
In effect, plaintiff alleged that the city was limited by its charter provisions to an issuance of bonds to the extent of $50,000 in any one year, for the purpose of paying for real estate for an airport, and that the city had exhausted its power by previously issuing bonds to that amount in the same year. A general demurrer to the petition was sustained. Plaintiff refused to further plead, and the action was dismissed. Plaintiff has appealed. The controversy depends upon the proper interpretation of certain provisions of the city’s home rule charter.
The city of Omaha previously and during the same year had issued bonds to the extent of $50,000, under the provisions of section 17-A, art. IV of the charter (hereinafter referred to as section 17-A), and at the commencement of this action was about to issue bonds to the extent of $23,150, pursuant to the. provisions of section 57, art. Ill of the charter (hereinafter referred to as section 57).
Plaintiff contends that section 17-A was enacted as an amendment to the charter, modifies or amends section 57, and, in effect, limits the power of the city to issue bonds to pay for lands for an airport, or an addition thereto, to the sum of $50,000 in any one year.
It is contended that section 17-A imposes a limitation on the authority granted by section 57; that the latter section is a general provision and the former a special and therefore controls the general. Section 17-A does not purport to amend, modify or repeal section 57 or any of its provisions. The latter section authorizes the issuance of bonds, to pay for lands acquired for an airport, in an amount largely in excess of that provided by section 17-A. The amount so authorized is solely for the purpose of paying for the land, and not for any improvement thereof as an airport.
A charter provision, in the home rule charter has the same force and effect as a statute. In Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed.) sec. 363, it is said: “If a statute Is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent.
While the language of section 17-A, which provides that the proceeds from the bonds “shall not be used for any other purpose than to acquire lands for use as an aviation field and to. improve lands acquired and used as an aviation field,” may seem to imply a limitation of the power to pay for lands acquired for an air field, yet, when we take into consideration the purpose of its enactment, which was undoubtedly to provide for an additional fund with which to improve an air field, it would seem clear that the intent in the enactment of that section was not to curtail or limit the power given the council by the provisions of section 57.
We believe that the purpose and intent in enacting section 17-A was to give to the council a power additional to that granted in section 57, and not to limit the power granted by that section. It seems to be conceded that the defendant city and its officials have complied with every requisite of section 57 in the issuance of the bonds in question. We conclude that the city had the power which it sought to exercise, and that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to plaintiff’s petition.
It follows that the judgment of the district court should be and is
Affirmed.