DocketNumber: No. 31172
Citation Numbers: 140 Neb. 671, 1 N.W.2d 289
Judges: Chappell, Eberly, Ellis, Messmore, Paine, Simmons, Yeager
Filed Date: 12/12/1941
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/9/2022
In this case the defendant, Willard Behrens, prosecutes error from the judgment and sentence of the district court for Scotts. Bluff county determining him guilty of a violation of section 39-1159, Comp. St. Supp. 1939, and ordering
Section 39-1159, Comp. St. Supp. 1939, which reads as follows: “(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury - or death to any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident and any person violating this provision shall upon conviction be punished as provided in section 56 (Comp. St. Supp. 1939, sec. 39-1187) of this act. (b) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to property shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident and any person violating this provision shall upon conviction be punished as provided in section 54 (Comp. St. Supp. 1939, sec. 39-1185) of this act. (c) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to property shall also give his name, address and the registration number of his vehicle and exhibit his operator’s or chauffeur’s license to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying of such person to a physician or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person.”
Section 39-1187, Comp. St. Supp. 1939, which provides penalties for an infraction of the previous provisions, and section 39-1190, Comp. St. Supp. 1939, relating- to the in
These provisions were originally enacted as a part of chapter 110, Laws 1931, an act entitled “An act relating to motor vehicles and regulating the operation of vehicles on the highways,” etc. In Bainter v. Appel, 124 Neb. 40, 245 N. W. 16, it is stated: “This legislation evidences the substantial adoption by Nebraska of the provisions of the ‘Uniform act regulating the operation of vehicles on highways’ as recommended and approved by the commissioners on uniform state laws in 1926, and which since that time has been, in effect, adopted by the legislatures of seventeen of the states of the Federal Union, in addition to our own. Section 59 of this chapter 110 provides: ‘This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact similar legislation.’ In the construction of similar enactments adopted for the purpose of securing uniformity and certainty in certain laws throughout this nation, this jurisdiction is committed to the view that each of such statutes should be so construed, in the light of the cardinal principles of the act itself, as to give effect to this design. Peter v. Finzer, 116 Neb. 380; International Milling Co. v. North Platte Flour Mills, 119 Neb. 325. See, also, Commercial Nat. Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U. S. 520.”
The incident forming the basis of this prosecution occurred on Sunday, July 28, 1940. On that afternoon and evening, a party of four young people, composed of the defendant, Willard Behrens, aged 19 years, who lived near Gering, his friend, Reuben Herdt, whose home was east of Scottsbluff, out over the Overland Drive, Elizabeth Giesel, aged 17 years, who lived in Gering, and Irene Margheim, whose home was in southeast Scottsbluff. The party indulged in an automobile ride. They then spent some two and a half hours at a skating rink, following which lunch was had. Then the Giesel girl was taken to her home in Gering. The remainder of the party, with Behrens at the
A serious question presented is, does the record before us sustain the conviction of the defendant?
“In this state (Nebraska) all public offenses are statutory ; no act is criminal unless the legislature has in express terms declared it to be so; and no person can be punished for any act or omission which is not made penal by the plain import of the written law.” Lane v. State, 120 Neb. 302, 232 N. W. 96. See, also, State v. De Wolfe, 67 Neb. 321, 93 N. W. 746; State v. Pielsticker, 118 Neb. 419, 225 N. W. 51.
So too, the defendant pleading not guilty is clothed with the presumption of innocence which stands as evidence in his favor, until the state by its proof shows him to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Bourne v. State, 116 Neb. 141, 216 N. W. 173; Flege v. State, 90 Neb. 390, 133 N. W. 431.
Section 39-1159, Comp. St. Supp. 1939, is a penal statute and is interpreted in accordance with the rule above set forth, and proof of offenses charged thereunder must conform in degree to that prescribed for the establishment of commission of crimes. “Criminal liability does not attach in all cases where a literal application of the language of the statute might be made.” 9-10 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th ed.) 179, sec. 103. Such section 39-1159 should be so construed as to render it a consistent, harmonious whole. In other words, a statute should be so construed as to make all its parts harmonize with each other and to render them consistent with its general scope and object. Jones v. York County, 47 Fed. (2d) 837; State v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353, 58 N. W. 172.
It is also true that the proper rule of construction appears
“It is to be presumed that all the subsidiary provisions of an act harmonize with each other, and with the purpose of the law; if the act is intended to embrace several objects, that they do not conflict. Therefore it is an elementary rule of construction that all the parts of an act relating to the same subject should be considered together, and not each by itself.” 2 Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed.) 659, sec. 344.
“A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears.” 2 Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed.) 758, sec. 399.
The foregoing are but instances of the application of the well-established canons of construction: “Noscitur a sociis” (the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it). 2 Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed.) 803, sec. 414; and “Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio”. (a passage is best interpreted by reference to what precedes and what follows it). Broom’s Legal Maxims (10th ed.) 389. See, also, Hamilton v. Thrall, 7 Neb. 210.
The subject of this legislation quoted, and of each of the three sentences which together comprise it, is “any vehicle involved in an accident.” These words we find employed in the three sentences which together contain the full expression of the legislative intent with reference thereto. Such expressed intent as a consistent and harmonious whole is necessarily controlling. This controlling intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over that of a
Under the undisputed evidence in this case, it is not established that the deceased was struck or injured by the automobile, but rather that she voluntarily jumped from the moving vehicle and was. injured in alighting', without in any manner coming in contact with defendant’s automobile. This accident resulting in her death was not therefore one in which the automobile of which the defendant was then the driver was “involved” as that term is employed in section 39-1159, Comp. St. Supp. 1939.
The question of lack of knowledge on part of the accused as affecting his criminality is also presented by this record. As to this it may be said that under this statute an automobile driver is not criminally liable for failure to stop and failure to render aid to an injured person when he does not know that an accident has happened, an injury has been inflicted, or a death has occurred. People v. Rallo, 119 Cal. App. 393, 6 Pac. (2d) 516; People v. Ely, 203 Cal. 628, 265 Pac. 818; Scott v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. 100, 233 S. W. 1097.
Further, lack of such knowledge constitutes a proper defense. Olson v. State, 36 Ariz. 294, 285 Pac. 282. It is a question of fact and not of law. Although we have
The judgment and sentence of the trial court being erroneous, the same are reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed.