State v. Valadez

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
03/31/2023 09:06 AM CDT
- 902 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. VALADEZ
Cite as 313 Neb. 902State of Nebraska, appellant, v.
Luis A. Valadez, appellee.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed March 31, 2023. No. S-22-026.
Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: Nathan
B. Cox, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Gage R. Cobb, Deputy Sarpy County Attorney, for appellant.
James K. McGough, of McGoughLaw, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Papik, J.
The State initiated this exception proceeding following
a trial in which Luis A. Valadez was acquitted of use of a
weapon to commit a felony and second degree assault. While
conceding that we lack the power to undo the acquittal, the
State asks us to nonetheless find that the district court should
not have provided the jury with instructions on self-defense
and defense of property. We find that the issues presented are
not appropriate for resolution in this exception proceeding and
therefore dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
The charges arose from an incident outside Valadez’ home
in the very early morning hours of April 22, 2020. At that
time, Valadez saw a vehicle stop in front of his house. When
- 903 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. VALADEZ
Cite as 313 Neb. 902two people exited and began trying to open doors to vehicles
owned by Valadez and his neighbor, Valadez grabbed a pock-
etknife and went outside. Valadez yelled at the trespassers and
later engaged in a physical struggle with one of them in the
street. That struggle eventually made its way to the vehicle in
which the individuals had arrived. There, according to Valadez,
he saw both individuals “reach towards the center console,” at
which point he “pushed away with both hands.”
The vehicle then proceeded a few blocks down the road
before crashing. The driver was found dead. An autopsy later
revealed that the cause of death was a stab wound to the chest.
The State initially charged Valadez with manslaughter and use
of a weapon to commit a felony but later amended the man-
slaughter charge to second degree assault.
Valadez testified in his own defense at trial. Relevant to
the issues presented here, he testified on direct examination
that he did not have any intention of hurting or killing any-
one, that he did not remember he had his knife in his hand
when he pushed away, and that he did not even know that his
knife contacted anyone. On cross-examination, he testified
that he did not make a “conscious choice” to “push off,” but
instead that his actions were “involuntary” and that “it was
an accident.”
At a jury instructions conference after the close of evidence,
the State objected to the district court’s instructing the jury
on self-defense and defense of property. The district court
instructed the jury on both affirmative defenses.
The jury acquitted Valadez on both counts.
The State applied for leave to docket an exception proceed-
ing. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2315.01 (Cum. Supp. 2022). The
Nebraska Court of Appeals granted the application, and we
subsequently moved the case to our docket.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The State assigns that the district court erred in instructing
the jury on self-defense and defense of property.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. VALADEZ
Cite as 313 Neb. 902ANALYSIS
The State offers multiple reasons why the jury should not
have been instructed on self-defense or defense of property.
With respect to self-defense, it contends that such an instruc-
tion was unwarranted because the evidence showed that
Valadez was the initial aggressor and because Valadez testified
that his actions were unintentional. With respect to defense of
property, it contends that the instruction should not have been
given because there was no evidence showing an attempt to
dispossess Valadez of his property or a felonious theft for pur-
poses of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1411(6) (Reissue 2016). Having
considered these arguments, we conclude that the application
for leave to docket an exception proceeding should not have
been sustained.
There is no dispute in this case that Valadez was “placed
legally in jeopardy” in the district court, for purposes of Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-2316 (Reissue 2016), and, consequently, we
have no power to alter the district court’s judgment. See State
v. Larkins, 276 Neb. 603, 755 N.W.2d 813 (2008). The most
we can do is provide guidance that may be of assistance in
future cases. See State v. Stanko, 304 Neb. 675, 936 N.W.2d
353 (2019). We have recognized, however, that some exception
proceedings do not present us with an opportunity to provide
such guidance and therefore are properly dismissed.
For example, in Larkins, supra, we dismissed an exception
proceeding that asked us to determine whether a district court
erred by dismissing witness tampering charges for insufficient
evidence. We noted that the only issue presented was whether
“the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evi-
dence would have been sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id.
at 604, 755 N.W.2d at 815. We observed that this issue was
“limited to the facts of [the] case,” that no statutory interpreta-
tion was required, and that there was no “other issue . . . on
which a decision would be helpful in future cases.” Id.Here, the State contends that, given the evidence in this
record, established legal principles precluded the district
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
STATE V. VALADEZ
Cite as 313 Neb. 902court from instructing the jury on self-defense and defense
of property. The State correctly points out that we have prec-
edent holding that a defendant who is the initial aggressor is
not entitled to a self-defense instruction. See State v. Eagle
Thunder, 201 Neb. 206, 266 N.W.2d 755 (1978). See, also,
State v. Miller, 281 Neb. 343, 347, 798 N.W.2d 827, 830-
31 (2011) (“Eagle Thunder thus stands for the rule that a
defendant who is the initial aggressor is not entitled to a self-
defense instruction”). It also observes, again correctly, that we
have precedent holding that a self-defense instruction is war-
ranted only when the use of force at issue is purposeful. See,
State v. Brown, 220 Neb. 849, 374 N.W.2d 28 (1985); State
v. Canby, 217 Neb. 461, 348 N.W.2d 900 (1984). Finally, the
State accurately notes that, by statute, use of deadly force is
justifiable in the defense of property only under certain enu-
merated circumstances. See § 28-1411(6).
Valadez does not challenge the legal principles upon which
the State relies. And, while the State may disagree with the
district court’s decision to provide the instructions at issue,
the State does not direct us to anything in the record tend-
ing to show that the district court questioned or ignored those
principles. Instead, it appears the district court—rightly or
wrongly—concluded that even when those principles were
considered, the instructions were warranted given the evidence
introduced at trial. Further, as the State emphasized at oral
argument, the facts of the case are “unique.”
In other words, all that we could do is review the district
court’s application of settled law to a set of unique facts. Such
a determination would necessarily be, in the words of Larkins,
“limited to the facts of this case.” 276 Neb. at 604, 755 N.W.2d
at 815. Because we can discern no issue “on which a decision
would be helpful in future cases,” id., we find that the appeal
should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.