Judges: WRITTEN BY: Don Stenberg, Attorney General Lauren L. Hill, Assistant Attorney General
Filed Date: 1/11/1996
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
REQUESTED BY: Senator C. N. "Bud" Robinson Nebraska State Legislature You have requested an opinion from this office regarding the constitutionality of two proposals which are now being drafted in legislative form. The first proposal would require participation by an unspecified percentage of the registered voters in a particular school district for approval of the issuance of school bonds. The other proposal would eliminate the ability of school districts to call a special election for the purpose of voting on school bonds. As we have not been provided with a draft of any legislation which you are contemplating, our opinion as to the constitutionality of your proposals is necessarily limited to a review of issues arising from the general concepts as set forth above, rather than a review of specific legislation.See Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-004 (January 18, 1995); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-214 (March 15, 1982).
Pertinent Statute Enactment History
The Nebraska Constitution mandates that "[a]ll elections shall be free; and there shall be no hindrance or impediment to the right of a qualified voter to exercise the elective franchise." Neb. Const. art.
The statute pertinent to your inquiry provides:
The question of issuing school district bonds may be submitted at a special election or such question may be voted on at an election held in conjunction with the statewide primary or statewide general election. No bonds shall be issued until the question has been submitted to the qualified electors of the district and a majority of all the qualified electors voting on the question have voted in favor of issuing the same. . . .
Neb. Rev. Stat. §
In 1879, legislation was originally1 enacted to vest school districts with the power to issue bonds for limited purposes. 1879 Neb. Laws § 1, p. 170. A two-thirds majority of the qualified electors present and voting was required in order to approve a bond issue. 1879 Neb. Laws § 2, p. 170. The two-thirds majority required for school bond approval was later amended to a three-fifths majority requirement. 1917 Neb. Laws, c. 9, § 1, p. 65. No legislative history is available to ascertain the Legislature's reasoning in establishing either of these voting percentage requirements.
In 1949, the percentage requirement was again altered — from a three-fifths majority to a 55 percent requirement. 1949 Neb. Law, c. 13, § 2, p. 75. The principal introducer of the 1949 legislation indicated that the 55 percent majority provision was developed as a compromise figure which would apply to bond issue elections of all school districts. Committee Recordson LB 2, 61st Neb. Leg. (January 25, 1949) (Hearing Minutes). Institution of the 55 percent majority requirement coincided with the repeal of former Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-2530, which had authorized, for school districts in cities with populations in excess of 1,000, bond measures upon approval of 51 percent of qualified electors.2 The 55 percent approval requirement remained in effect for twenty-six years, until the 1971 enactment of legislation which codified the current requirement that a simple majority of voters casting ballots at a particular election approve the school district bond issue. See 1971 Neb. Laws LB 534, § 7.
Issues Surrounding Simple Majority and Supermajority Requirements
At the time of the Legislature's 1971 enactment of the current simple majority standard, a national debate was being waged on the issue of whether, in various contexts, supermajority requirements could constitutionally be imposed by state legislatures. See Comment, Extraordinary MajorityVoting Requirements, 58 Georgetown L. J. 411 (1969); Note,Extraordinary Majority Requirements and the EqualProtection Clause, 70 Columbia L. Rev. 486 (1970); Recent Cases, 83 Harvard L. Rev. 1911 (1970). Lawsuits challenging a variety of supermajority voting requirements had been filed in California,3 Idaho,4 Iowa,5 Minnesota,6 Missouri,7 and West Virginia.8 Debate surrounding the 1971 Nebraska enactment indicates that the Legislature was aware of that litigation. CommitteeRecords on LB 534, 82nd Neb. Leg. (February 11, 1971) (Hearing Minutes); Floor Debate on LB 534, 82nd Neb. Leg., 339 (February 23, 1971) (Statement of Senator Luedtke).
At the center of the various state lawsuits — as well as at the Nebraska Legislature's consideration of the 1971 legislation — was the issue of whether supermajority voting requirements were violative of the "one-man, one-vote" principle announced by the United States Supreme Court in Gray v.Sanders,
The Court's holdings in Gray andReynolds have commonly been denoted as the "one-man, one-vote" rule. Until the late 1960s, the "doctrine had been restricted to reapportionment cases, in which legislative districts were required to accurately reflect their relative populations in order to avoid denying qualified voters equal protection in electing their representatives." Comment,Extraordinary Majority Voting Requirements, 58 Geor. L. J. 411 (1969-70). However, litigation arising in several states9 sought to extend application of the "one-man, one-vote" principle in order to invalidate constitutional and statutory provisions which required approval by a supermajority of eligible voters.
The debate in the 1971 Nebraska Legislature echoed the arguments being made in the various state lawsuits. Senator Roland Luedtke, principal introducer of the 1971 measure argued that any form of supermajority approval standard infringed upon the concept of majority rule. The Senator asserted: "the majority is defeated by the minority when you have a 55 percent or 60 percent requirement. . . ." Floor Debateon LB 534, 82nd Neb. Leg. 339 (February 23, 1971) (Statement of Senator Luedtke). Opponents of the measure expressed concerns regarding the level of bonded indebtedness of local government,10 maintaining taxpayer control over local spending decisions,11 and ensuring balanced opportunities between opponents and proponents of particular bond issues.12 Three months after enactment of Nebraska's current statute, the issue of whether the "one-man, one-vote" rule applied to supermajority voting requirements was resolved by the United States Supreme Court inGordon v. Lance,
Significance Application of the Gordon Decision
Your first proposal would require that the number of registered voters casting ballots on a school bond issue be at or exceed an unspecified percentage of the total qualified electors in the school district. In Gordon, the Supreme Court found that, for purposes of constitutional analysis, there is no distinction between your proposal and the supermajority approval requirement which was under consideration in that case.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the three-fifths voting requirement at issue "made it more difficult for some kinds of governmental actions to be taken. Certainly any departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority." Id. at 5-6. The Court, however, found that "there is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue." Id. at 6. In matters of finance and taxation, the Court noted:
It must be remembered that in voting to issue bonds voters are committing, in part, the credit of infants and of generations yet unborn, and some restriction on such commitment is not an unreasonable demand. That the bond issue may have the desirable objective of providing better education for future generations goes to the wisdom of an indebtedness limitation: it does not alter the basic fact that the balancing of interests is one for the State to resolve.
Id. at 6-7. Therefore, the Court held that so long as such supermajority provisions do not discriminate against any identifiable class they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 7. The Court further concluded that there exists "no independently identifiable group or category that favors bonded indebtedness over other forms of financing. Consequently no sector of the population may be said to be `fenced out' from the franchise because of the way they will vote." Id. at 5.
That language has been construed "as standing for the proposition that, unless they are in some manner otherwise identified, the proponents of a bond issue are not themselves such an `identifiable class,' or a `discrete and insular minority.'" Matter of Contest of a Certain SpecialElection,
The Gordon Court expressly found "no constitutional distinction between the 60% requirement in the present case and a state requirement that a given issue be approved by a majority of all registered voters."
the latter requirement would be far more burdensome than a 60% requirement. There were 8,913 registered voters in Roane County in 1968, of whom 5,600 voted in the referendum at issue. If a majority of all eligible voters had been required, approval would have required the affirmative votes of over 79% of those voting.
The Court also cited favorably to a decision on this issue which had been rendered by the South Carolina Supreme Court inClay v. Thornton,
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected an argument that the practical effect of the constitutional requirement was "to add the `non-votes to the negative votes cast' . . . thereby diluting the votes of those persons voting for incorporation."Id. The court found that such an argument was based upon the "one-man, one-vote" principles of Reynolds v.Sims,
As noted in Gordon, an appeal of the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in the Clay case was dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Turner v.Clay,
Based upon the decision rendered in Gordon v.Lance, the Supreme Court's favorable citation to Clayv. Thornton, and the Court's affirmance ofBrenner, we find that the Legislature has the authority to impose a reasonable provision to require more than a simple majority of those votes cast at an election for approval of a school bond issue. The federal district court'sBrenner decision has been recognized as "a long and scholarly opinion"13 to which we direct your further review for an exhaustive analysis of the significant, competing policy concerns arising from the imposition of supermajority voting requirements. Review of the constitutional and statutory provisions of other states which mandate supermajority approval requirements may also be useful in your consideration of this issue.14 Issues Surrounding the Elimination of Special Elections
We now address your second proposal which would "simply eliminate the ability of school districts to call a special election for the purpose of voting on bonds. That is, if a school district wanted to pass a bond, it would have to be voted on at a general or primary election." While significant policy considerations arise in such a proposal, we find no legal impediment to the Legislature's ability to restrict voting on school district bond issues to ongoing primary or general elections.
Our conclusion is based upon several legal tenets. First, as previously discussed, the Legislature may regulate elections so long as any conditions it imposes do not conflict with the fundamental right to vote or any other provisions of the federal or state Constitutions. Cf. State ex rel. CreightonUniversity v. Smith,
These principles have been applied by the supreme court to a controversy involving a taxpayer's challenge of a bond issue which had been approved by his school board. McCord v.Marsh,
[t]he maintenance of schools is a governmental function, and it was clearly within the power of the legislature to authorize the issuance of bonds for school purposes upon any conditions it might see fit to impose. It could direct that the bonds be issued by a vote of the electors, or by petition, or by the mere action of the board itself.
Id. at 728,
Conclusion
We find no legal impediment to your proposal to require a certain level of participation by voters in elections to approve the issuance of school bonds15 or to your proposal to eliminate the ability of school districts to call a special election for the purpose of voting upon a school bond issue.
Sincerely,
DON STENBERG Attorney General
Lauren L. Hill Assistant Attorney General
cc: Patrick J. O'Donnell Clerk of the Legislature
Approved:
Don Stenberg
joellyn-gray-christopher-m-smith-malcolm-hall-jr-beekman-v-beavers , 927 F.2d 69 ( 1991 )
William C. Hall, on Behalf of Himself and All Others ... , 445 F.2d 834 ( 1971 )
Westbrook v. Mihaly , 2 Cal. 3d 765 ( 1970 )
Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. ... , 11 Cal. 4th 220 ( 1995 )
Adams v. Fort Madison Community School District , 182 N.W.2d 132 ( 1970 )
Rimarcik v. Johansen , 310 F. Supp. 61 ( 1970 )
State Ex Rel. Creighton University v. Smith , 217 Neb. 682 ( 1984 )
Orleans Ed. Ass'n v. SCH. DIST. OF ORLEANS , 193 Neb. 675 ( 1975 )
School District of Seward Education Ass'n v. School District , 188 Neb. 772 ( 1972 )
School Dist. of Waterloo v. Hutchinson , 244 Neb. 665 ( 1993 )
State Ex Rel. School District v. Board of Equalization , 166 Neb. 785 ( 1958 )
Ratigan v. Davis , 175 Neb. 416 ( 1963 )
Lenstrom v. Thone , 209 Neb. 783 ( 1981 )
Brenner v. School District of Kansas City, Missouri , 315 F. Supp. 627 ( 1970 )
Gordon v. Lance , 91 S. Ct. 1889 ( 1971 )
Turner v. Clay , 397 U.S. 39 ( 1970 )
Gray v. Sanders , 83 S. Ct. 801 ( 1963 )
Reynolds v. Sims , 84 S. Ct. 1362 ( 1964 )
Evans v. Cornman , 90 S. Ct. 1752 ( 1970 )
Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the ... , 97 S. Ct. 1047 ( 1977 )