Judges: WRITTEN BY: Don Stenberg, Attorney General Fredrick F. Neid, Assistant Attorney General
Filed Date: 10/6/1997
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
REQUESTED BY: Fernando Lecuona, III, Commissioner Department of Labor
You have requested the opinion of the Attorney General concerning the constitutionality of a financing arrangement under federal law that authorizes the State to borrow funds from the federal government to fund payment of benefits provided in the Employment Security Law, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§
State unemployment agencies may receive "advances" from the federal government for payment of benefits upon application of the Governor of the State under the provisions of
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
You indicate the constitutional question arises because the Commissioner of Labor is charged with the duty of determining the rate of combined tax applicable to each employer under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§
Federal statutes authorize the states to receive "advances" from the federal government for payment of unemployment compensation benefits.
(a)(1) Advances shall be made to the States from the Federal unemployment account in the Unemployment Trust Fund as provided in this section, and shall be repayable, with interest to the extent provided in section 1322(b) of this title, in the manner provided in sections 1101(d)(1), 1103(b)(2), and 1322 of this title. An advance to a State for the payment of compensation in any 3-month period may be made if —
(A) the Governor of the State applies therefor no earlier than the first day of the month preceding the first month of such 3-month period, and
(B) he furnishes to the Secretary of Labor his estimate of the amount of an advance which will be required by the State for the payment of compensation in each month of such 3-month period. . . .
Federal statutes further provide for the method of repayment of the loans and for loan interest amounts.
(a) Repayment by State; certification; transfer
The Governor of any State may at any time request that funds be transferred from the account of such State to the Federal unemployment account in repayment of part or all of that balance of advances, made to such State under section 1321 of this title, specified in the request. The Secretary of Labor shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the amount and balance specified in the request; and the Secretary of the Treasury shall promptly transfer such amount in reduction of such balance.
(b) Interest on loan
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, each State shall pay interest on any advance made to such State under section 1321 of this title. Interest so payable with respect to periods during any calendar year shall be at the rate determined under paragraph (4) for such calendar year. . . .
The Federal unemployment account in the Unemployment Trust Fund is the funding source for "advances" to states. The account is established under the provisions of
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATIONS
The Nebraska Constitution limits the amount of state indebtedness and prohibits continuing legislative appropriations. Article XIII, sec. 1 in pertinent part states:
The state may, to meet casual deficits, or failures in the revenue, contract debts never to exceed in the aggregate one hundred thousand dollars, and no greater indebtedness shall be incurred except for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, or defending the state in war, and provision shall be made for the payment of the interest annually, as it shall accrue, by a tax levied for that purpose, or from other sources of revenue, which law providing for the payment of interest by such tax shall be irrepealable until such debt is paid. . . .
(Emphasis added).
Various legislative enactments and financing plans authorized by those acts have been determined to be violative of Article XIII, sec. 1 by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The issue is whether the act and the financing arrangements authorized result or may result in the contraction of debt or the incurrence of an indebtedness within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. A purpose of the constitutional limitation upon state indebtedness is to prevent the anticipation of revenue by the creation of an obligation to be paid from revenue in future fiscal periods. Obligations which are to be paid from revenue subject to appropriation by future legislatures are subject to the state debt limitation provisions.
In State ex rel. Douglas v. Thone,
We believe the question, whether borrowing funds from the federal government is constitutionally offensive, is for the most part addressed by State ex rel. Meyer v. Steen,
In finding the financing arrangement unconstitutional, the Court stated:
If the Legislature is free to authorize unlimited indebtedness payable from special funds derived from excise taxes, it is apparent that the constitutional limitation upon indebtedness is ineffective.
Id. at 300,
Similarly, we believe the borrowing mechanism authorized by the federal statutes would constitute indebtedness of the state payable from special fund taxes that is offensive to Article
We further do not think that the fact that the state would be borrowing funds from the federal government would serve to vitiate in some fashion the constitutional prohibition against indebtedness of the state. It has generally been held that a state cannot avail itself of loans available under federal statutes, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, because of state constitutional provisions limiting state indebtedness.See, Re Opinion to Governor,
In summary, we conclude that borrowing funds from the federal government by the state under the facts you present would likely offend the constitutional limitations regarding indebtedness of the state.
Sincerely yours,
DON STENBERG Attorney General
Fredrick F. Neid Assistant Attorney General
Approved By:
Don Stenberg Attorney General