Frudden v. Pilling

 sued WCSD; Roy Gomm's principal, respondent KayAnn Pilling; and other
defendants in federal court. The Fruddens alleged multiple claims,
including First Amendment violations, violations of NRS Chapter 241,
breach of a special relationship, negligent misrepresentation, and failure
to comply with Nevada's education laws. The federal district court
dismissed the Fruddens' First Amendment and tort claims with prejudice
and declined to take jurisdiction over their other state law claims.
Frudden v. Pilling, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270-71, 1282 (D. Nev. 2012),
reu'd, 742 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the dismissal of the Fruddens' First
Amendment claims. Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir.
2014).
The Fruddens then filed the present lawsuit in the state
district court, originally naming only WCSD and Pilling as defendants.
The Fruddens argued that the PFA's Uniform Committee violated NRS
Chapter 241's open meeting requirements when preparing Roy Gomm's
uniform policy and that WCSD and Pilling violated multiple Nevada
education statutes by enforcing the uniform policy.
Instead of filing an answer, WCSD and Pilling filed a motion
for summary judgment against the Fruddens' claims. After WCSD's and
Pilling's motion was briefed, but before it was decided, the Fruddens filed
an amended complaint in which they restated their allegations against
Pilling and WCSD and added the PFA as a defendant. The amended
complaint sought (1) a declaration that the uniform policy was void and (2)
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compensatory and punitive damages.' The district court granted WCSD
and Filling's motion for summary judgment. The district court found that
the PFA was not a public body under NRS 241.015 and thus was not
subject to NRS Chapter 241's open meeting requirements. The district
court also found that the Fruddens did not have an implied private right of
action for the alleged violations of Nevada's education statutes. 2
1 To the extent that the Fruddens sought declaratory relief under the
theory that the uniform policy was void for a lack of authority, their claim
is without merit because they failed to demonstrate that any Nevada law
or WCSD policy prohibited Pilling from enforcing a uniform policy at Roy
Gomm that WCSD did not impose. See, e.g., NRS 392.415 (permitting a
school district's board of trustees to establish a uniform policy without
limiting a principal's authority to enforce a school's uniform policy). Nor
have they demonstrated that enforcement of a school uniform policy that
was not created by WCSD was outside Filling's express or implied
authority as principal of Roy Gomm. See, e.g., Ronnow v. City of Las
Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 342-43, 65 P.2d 133, 136 (1937) (providing that a
municipal entity has both express and implied powers).
2 The district court did not err in making this determination. The
Fruddens failed to demonstrate that the pertinent statutes, legislative
history, policies, and/or the underlying purposes of the legislative schemes
afford them an implied private right of action under NRS 386.365, NRS
388.070, NRS 392.415, NRS 392.457, NRS 392.4575, NRS 392.463, NRS
392.4644, WCSD Board Policy 5039, or WCSD OSP-P002. See Baldonado
v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 124 Nev. 951, 958-59, 194 P.3d 96, 100-01 (2008);
see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Nor have the Fruddens shown
that NRS 126.036, which codifies the fundamental right to raise one's
child, allows them to challenge Roy Gomm's policies. See Blau v. Fort
Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381,395-97 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the fundamental right to raise one's child does not include a right to
control the application of a public school's policies to one's child who
attends the school).
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Nine days after the district court granted WCSD's and
Pilling's motion for summary judgment, the Fruddens obtained a clerk's
entry of default against the PFA for the PFA's failure to respond to the
Fruddens' amended complaint. NRCP 55(a). WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA
then filed a motion to vacate the entry of default. The Fruddens filed
motions to vacate and revise the district court's summary judgment order.
The district court denied the Fruddens' motions and granted
WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA's motion. The district court explained that its
original summary judgment order applied to the Fruddens' claims against
the PFA. In doing so, the district court set aside the entry of default
against the PFA "because [the Fruddens] did not inquire about [VVCSD's,
Pilling's, and the PFA's] intent to proceed or respond and did not satisfy
the notice requirements as required under NRCP 55(b)(2)." The Fruddens
now appeal, challenging the district court's orders granting summary
judgment and vacating the entry of default.
As we explain below, we conclude that the district court (1)
erred in finding that the PFA was not a "public body" under NRS
241.015(3)(a) before July 1, 2011; (2) did not err in finding that the PFA
was not a "public body" under NRS 241.015(3)(a) after the 2011
amendment to this statute took effect on July 1, 2011; and (3) correctly
vacated the clerk's entry of default against the PFA but did so for the
wrong reason. 3
3 We have considered the parties' remaining arguments, including
those regarding whether the district court erred by (1) not addressing the
Fruddens' breach of fiduciary duty claim and (2) sua sponte granting
summary judgment to the PFA. These contentions are without merit.
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The PFA could have been a public body under NRS 241.015(3)(a) before
July I, 2011; however, it was not a public body under the amended version
of NRS 241.015(3)(a) on and after July 1, 2011
NRS Chapter 241 establishes Nevada's open meeting law. It
states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by specific statute, all meetings
of public bodies must be open and public, and all persons must be
permitted to attend any meeting of these public bodies." NRS 241.020(1)
(2009); see also NRS 241.020(1) (2011) (stating the same). If the PFA was
a public body prior to the 2011 amendments, its meetings should have
been open and public as provided for by NRS 241.020.
Until July 1, 2011, NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009) defined a public
body for purposes of NRS Chapter 241 by the entity's identity and
function:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
"public body" means:
(a) Any administrative, advisory, executive
or legislative body of the State or a local
government which expends or disburses or is
supported in whole or in part by tax revenue or
which advises or makes recommendations to any
entity which expends or disburses or is supported
in whole or in part by tax revenue, including, but
not limited to, any board, commission, committee,
subcommittee or other subsidiary thereof and
includes an educational foundation as defined in
subsection 3 of NRS 388.750 and a university
foundation as defined in subsection 3 of NRS
396.405.
In 2011, the Legislature amended NRS 241.015(3)(a) by
adding the qualifier that a public body is created by one of seven
authorities listed in sub-subparagraphs 1-7, thereby narrowing the
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definition of a public body. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 383, § 4, at 2385-86 This
amendment became effective on July 1, 2011. 4 Id. at § 8, at 2390. Though
at least some of the PFA's meetings occurred before the 2011 amendment
became effective, the parties do not address which version applies in the
present case or whether it matters. The Fruddens argue that the PFA is,
and has been, a public body subject to the open meeting law because it is
an educational foundation as defined in NRS 388.750 and is thus
expressly included in the statute. WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA argue that
the PFA was never a public body because it was not created by one of the
authorities listed in NRS 241.015(3)(a)(1)-(7) (2011).
Standard of review
We review de novo a district court's order granting summary
judgment and view "the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn
from it, . . . in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Wood v.
Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
We also review de novo a district court's interpretation of a
statute. Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010).
When interpreting a statute, legislative intent "is the controlling factor."
Robert E v. Justice Court of Reno Twp., Washoe Cnty., 99 Nev. 443, 445,
664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983). "When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not
resort to the rules of construction." Cromer, 126 Nev. at 109, 225 P.3d at
790. "In assessing a statute's plain meaning, provisions are read as a
4The definition of public body is now located at NRS 241.015(4); no
relevant substantive changes have been made to this definition since 2011.
2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 193, § 6, at 727-29.
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whole with effect given to each word and phrase." City of Las Vegas v.
Evans, 129 Nev. „ 301 P.3d 844, 846 (2013).
The 2011 amendment to NRS 241.015(3)(a) only applies
prospectively
A preliminary issue in our analysis concerns which version of
NRS Chapter 241 applies. The district court concluded, without reference
to authority, that because the Fruddens filed their first federal complaint
after the effective date of the 2011 amendment to NRS 241.015, the
amended version of the law applied to this case. The district court's
conclusion that the date on which the Fruddens filed their first complaint
dictates which version of the statute applies is incorrect because NRS
Chapter 241's substantive requirements govern how public bodies conduct
meetings and not subsequent litigation that may arise about them. See
NRS 241.020 (establishing requirements for open meetings). Therefore,
the version of NRS 241.015 that existed at the time of a meeting applies to
the meeting unless later amendments to the statute apply retroactively.
The 2011 amendment does not discuss whether it was
intended to apply retroactively. "[VV]e generally presume that [newly
enacted statutes] apply prospectively unless the Legislature clearly
indicates that they should apply retroactively or the Legislature's intent
cannot otherwise be met." Valdez v. Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 123 Nev. 170,
179, 162 P.3d 148, 154 (2007). The Legislature's intent, as articulated by
NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011)'s plain meaning, was to identify which entities
must comply with the open meeting law. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 383, § 4, at
2385-86. We conclude that the 2011 amendment to NRS 241.015(3)(a)
applies prospectively. Therefore, we hold that the pre-amendment version
of NRS 241.015(3)(a) applied before July 1, 2011, and the amended version
of NRS 241.015(3)(a) applied on and after July 1, 2011.
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There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the PFA is an
educational foundation pursuant to NRS 388.750
One type of entity that is identified in both versions of NRS
241.015(3)(a)'s definition of "public body" is an "educational foundation."
Therefore, if the PFA is an educational foundation and meets the other
requirements of NRS 241.015(3)(a), it is a public body subject to the open
meeting law.
NRS 388.750(3) defines an educational foundation as:
[A] nonprofit corporation, association or
institution or a charitable organization that is:
(a) Organized and operated exclusively for
the purpose of supporting one or more
kindergartens, elementary schools, junior high or
middle schools or high schools, or any combination
thereof;
(b) Formed pursuant to the laws of this
State; and
(c) Exempt from taxation pursuant to 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
To be an educational foundation, an entity must meet all three elements
set out in NRS 388.750(3).
NRS 388.750 does not define the phrase "purpose of
supporting" as is used in NRS 388.750(3)(a). Therefore, "we give effect to
the plain and ordinary meaning of [those] words" when interpreting this
phrase. Cromer, 126 Nev. at 109, 225 P.3d at 790. "Supporting" is the
gerund form of the verb "support" which means "[t]o provide for or
maintain, by supplying with money or necessities" and "[t]o aid the cause,
policy, or interests of." The American Heritage Dictionary 1804 (3rd ed.
1996). Thus, "support" is a broad term which encompasses both providing
resources to and serving the interests of another. However, the use of a
broad term in a statute does not necessarily create ambiguity. See Fourth
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St. Place, LLC. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 127 Nev. , 270 P.3d 1235,
1243 (2011) (holding that a contract's use of a broad term did not make the
contract's provision ambiguous). Therefore, to meet the first element of
NRS 388.750(3), an entity must act to further its exclusive objective or
goal of providing resources to or otherwise promoting a school or its
mission.
With respect to the PFA's objective goal, the Fruddens
proffered evidence showing that the PFA's objectives were to (1) "promote
the welfare of children and youth in the home, school, and community"; (2)
enhance the educational environment"; (3) "educate its members about
legislation or local issues related to the care and protection of children and
youth"; and (4) "bring the home and school into closer relation so that
parents and teachers may cooperate intelligently in the education of
children and youth." In addition, the VVCSD and Pilling proffered
evidence that the PFA "support[ed] a number of education-related
activities at Roy Gomm."
Of these proffered objectives, the PFA's goal of "educat[ing] its
members about legislation or local issues related to the care and
protection of children and youth" has the least apparent focus on
supporting a school. Since we view the evidence and draw reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121
P.3d at 1029, we draw the reasonable inference that educating parents,
faculty, and other PFA members "about legislation or local issues related
to the care and protection of children and youth" could support Roy Gomm
because the well-being of children can affect the work of the school and the
education it provides to its students. Thus, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the PFA was "[o]rganized and operated
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exclusively for the purpose of supporting one or more" schools or if it has
an objective other than to support a school. NRS 388.750(3)(a).
In addition, WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA proffered a printout
from the Nevada Secretary of State's website which identifies the PFA as
a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Nevada. The
Fruddens proffered a printout of an Internal Revenue Service website that
identifies the PFA as a tax-exempt organization. Though the record shows
that WCSD and Pilling objected to some evidence produced by the
Fruddens in opposition to WCSD's and Pilling's motion for summary
judgment, there was no objection to the admission of either printout.
Evidence provided without objection to a district court in conjunction with
briefing about a motion for summary judgment may be used to evaluate
the court's order granting summary judgment. Whalen v. State, 100 Nev.
192, 195-96, 679 P.2d 248, 250 (1984). Because there is evidence in the
record which suggests that the PFA met each element of NRS 388.750(3),
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the PFA was an
educational foundation. If the PFA was an educational foundation and it
meets the requirements of NRS 241.015(3), then the PFA was a public
body prior to the 2011 amendments.
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the PFA was a
public body under NRS 241.015(3)(a) before July 1, 2011
Before July 1, 2011, NRS 241.015(3) contained both identity
and function requirements. The identity requirement was that the
organization be one of the types of entities identified in NRS 241.015(3)(a).
These included "board[s], commission[s], committee[s], subcommittee[s] or
other subsidiadies] thereof and includes an educational foundation as
defined in subsection 3 of NRS 388.750." NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009)
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(emphasis added). Thus, if an entity was an educational foundation, it
met the identity requirement of NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009).
Since there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the PFA is an educational foundation, there also remains a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether it fulfilled the identity prong of a public
body under NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009). The Fruddens proffered evidence
that the Uniform Committee was part of the PFA. Thus, there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Uniform Committee was a
"committee, subcommittee or other subsidiary" of the PFA and thus was
subject to any obligation that the PFA had under NRS Chapter 241.
To meet the function requirement of NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009),
an entity was required to either (1) "expend[ ] or disburse[ ] or [be]
supported in whole or in part by tax revenue" or (2) "advise[ ] or make[
recommendations to any entity which expends or disburses or is supported
in whole or in part by tax revenue." There is no dispute that the PFA does
not expend, disburse or is supported by tax revenue. There is an issue,
however, as to the scope of its advice and recommendations to Roy Gomm,
an entity which is supported by tax revenue. To advise means to give
advice, which is defined as "[g]uidance offered by one person. . . to
another." Black's Law Dictionary 59 (8th ed. 2004); see also State v. Webb,
772 A.2d 690, 696 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (stating that "the term 'advise'
means to give advice to. . . counsel. . caution, warn. . . recommend. . . to
give information or notice to: inform, apprise" (internal quotations
omitted)). To make a recommendation is to recommend, which means "to
urge or suggest as appropriate, satisfying, or beneficial." Webster's College
Dictionary 1086-87 (2nd ed. 1997).
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WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA argue that an entity that is not
supported by and does not expend tax revenue is only a public body if it
advises about the expenditure or use of tax revenue, and the PFA does not
involve itself in such matters. However, this argument is unpersuasive
because it imposes a subject matter limitation on the advice an entity
gives that is not included in NRS 241.015(3)(a). The statute's function
requirement describes the entity as one "which advises or makes
recommendations to any entity which expends or disburses or is supported
in whole or in part by tax revenue." NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009). NRS
241.015(3)(a) (2009) limits its scope based on the recipient of the advice,
not the subject matter of the advice. Thus, an entity meets the function
requirement for NRS 241.015(3)(a) if it offers guidance, information, or
suggestions to an entity supported by or spending tax revenue.
The Fruddens proffered evidence suggesting that the PFA or
Uniform Committee advised or made recommendations to Pilling. This
evidence includes an email from Pilling to Mary Frudden stating that the
Uniform Committee was "preparing [its] written report/policy" regarding
uniforms at Roy Gomm and a document stating that the Uniform
Committee "will be responsible for implementing and evaluating the
school uniform policy." Considering this evidence in a light most favorable
to the Fruddens, the nonmoving party, there is a genuine issueS of material
fact as to whether the PFA met the function requirement of NRS
241.015(3)(a) (2009) by advising Roy Gomm prior to July 1, 2011.
Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the
Fruddens' open meeting law claim with regard to purported meetings
which occurred before this date.
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The PFA was not a public body under NRS 241.015(3)(a) on or after
July 1, 2011
The 2011 amendment preserved the requirements set out in
the prior version of NRS 241.015(3)(a) but added a requirement that an
entity be created by one of seven enumerated methods. 2011 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 383, § 4, at 2385-86. NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011) states:
Any administrative, advisory, executive or
legislative body of the State or a local government
consisting of at least two persons which expends
or disburses or is supported in whole or in part by
tax revenue or which advises or makes
recommendations to any entity which expends or
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by
tax revenue, including, but not limited to, any
board, commission, committee, subcommittee or
other subsidiary thereof and includes an
educational foundation as defined in subsection 3
of NRS 388.750 and a university foundation as
defined in subsection 3 of NRS 396.405, if the
administrative, advisory, executive or legislative
body is created by:
(1) The Constitution of this State;
(2) Any statute of this State;
(3) A city charter and any city ordinance
which has been filed or recorded as required by
the applicable law;
(4) The Nevada Administrative Code;
(5) A resolution or other formal designation
by such a body created by a statute of this State or
an ordinance of a local government;
(6) An executive order issued by the
Governor; or
(7) A resolution or an action by the
governing body of a political subdivision of this
State.
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Thus, the plain meaning of NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011) provides that being
created by one of these seven enumerated methods is a necessary
condition for an entity to be subject to the open meeting law
re quirements. 5
There is no evidence in the record that the PFA was created by
one of the seven methods enumerated in NRS 241.015(3)(a)(1)-(7) (2011).
Accordingly, the PFA was not a public body subject to the open meeting
law after the 2011 amendment. There is, however, evidence in the record
to suggest that it was an educational foundation within the meaning of
NRS 388.750(3)(a). Thus, the PFA could have been a public body under
NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009).
Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment regarding the PFA's status as a public body under NRS
241.015(3)(a) (2009) before July 1, 2011. It did not err in granting
summary judgment regarding the PFA's status as a public body under
NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011) on and after July 1, 2011.
5 Inadvocating a result that is contrary to the statute's plain
meaning, the Fruddens make arguments which we conclude are without
merit. First, they contend that NRS 388.750 requires educational
foundations to have open meetings. This argument misconstrues NRS
388.750(1)(a)'s provision that lain educational foundation. [s]hall
comply with the provisions of chapter 241 of NRS" which only requires
that an educational foundation comply with the open meeting laws if it
was a public body as defined by NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011). Second, they
contend that an educational foundation is exempt from NRS
241.015(3)(a)(1)-(7) (2011)'s creation requirement because it is not an
"administrative, advisory, executive or legislative body." This argument is
incorrect because NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011) identifies an educational
foundation as a type of "administrative, advisory, executive or legislative
body" and thus subjects an educational foundation to NRS
241.015(3)(a)(1)-(7) (2011)'s creation requirement.
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The district court abused its discretion in vacating the clerk's entry of
default, but this abuse does not warrant reversal
The Fruddens argue that the district court abused its
discretion in setting aside the clerk's entry of default because the PFA
failed to show good cause and committed inexcusable neglect by failing to
respond to the Fruddens' amended complaint. WCSD, Pilling, and the
PFA argue that the district court properly exercised its discretion because
the Fruddens did not renew their inquiry about whether the PFA would
defend the lawsuit.
"[We] review [ ] a lower court's decision to set aside an entry of
default for an abuse of discretion." Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. ,
251 P.3d 163, 171 (2011). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the district
court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law
or reason." Am. Sterling Bank v. Johnny Mgmt. LV, Inc., 126 Nev. ,
245 P.3d 535, 538-39 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). A district
court abuses its discretion by applying an incorrect interpretation of law.
Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 674, 856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993).
However, "[we] will affirm a district court's order if the district
court reached the correct result, even if for the wrong reason." Saavedra-
Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d 1198, 1202
(2010). Furthermore, "the district court may amend a judgment nunc pro
tune if the change will make the record speak the truth as to what was
actually determined or done or intended to be determined or done by the
court." McClintock v. McClintock, 122 Nev. 842, 845, 138 P.3d 513, 515
(2006) (internal quotations omitted).
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NRCP 55(a) provides that the clerk shall enter a default
"[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought
has failed to plead or otherwise defend" against the claim. Before seeking
an entry of default, "a party must inquire into the opposing party's intent
to proceed." Landreth, 127 Nev. at , 251 P.3d at 172. Landreth does
not require a party to renew its inquiry unless the party granted its
opponent extra time to respond to the pleading. Id. The three-day written
notice requirement set out in NRCP 55(b)(2) for seeking a default
judgment does not apply when a party seeks only an entry of default. Id.A district court may vacate an entry of default "[for good
cause shown." NRCP 55(c). Here, the Fruddens obtained an entry of
default against the PFA after the PFA did not respond to the amended
complaint. The record does not demonstrate that the Fruddens granted
the PFA additional time to respond to the amended complaint. Upon
WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA's motion, the district court vacated the entry
of default because it found that the Fruddens failed to inquire into
whether the PFA intended to defend the lawsuit or give the PFA three-
days' notice before seeking the entry of default. This conclusion was
incorrect because the uncontested evidence in the record demonstrated
that Mary Frudden emailed the law firm representing the PFA to inquire
about the PFA's intent to defend the lawsuit. Thus, the Fruddens
complied with Landreth's inquiry requirement. Since NRCP 55(13)(2) does
not apply to an entry of default, the Fruddens' purported non-compliance
with its three-day notice requirement cannot establish good cause to
vacate the entry of default. Because the district court applied an incorrect
legal standard and made factual findings that were inconsistent with
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uncontested evidence in the record, it abused its discretion in vacating the
entry of default against the PFA.
This abuse of discretion, however, was without legal
significance because the district court's order vacating the entry of default
stated that the PFA was a party to the prior order granting summary
judgment. Thus, this order merely clarified the prior order to reflect that
the district court had intended to grant summary judgment to WCSD,
Pilling, and the PFA. As a result of the entry of summary judgment in its
favor, the PFA had no duty to answer the Fruddens' amended complaint
at the time that the clerk's default was entered.
Even though the district court abused its discretion in
vacating the entry of default, its nunc pro tune order provided an
independent legal basis to vacate the entry of default. Therefore, we
affirm the district court's order vacating the entry of default because it
reached the correct result for the wrong reason.
Conclusion
The district court erred in applying NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011)
retroactively. Since there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the PFA was a public body under NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009), the district
court erred in granting summary judgment regarding the PFA's status as
a public body before July 1, 2011. However, the district court did not err
in granting summary judgment regarding the PFA's status as a public
body on and after July 1, 2011. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the PFA had a duty to comply with NRS Chapter 241's
open meeting requirements when the uniform policy was created. Finally,
the district court properly vacated the entry of default against the PFA
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because its nunc pro tune order applied its earlier grant of summary
judgment to the PFA. Therefore, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN
PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the
district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
C.J.
Gibbons
1 AAA.t J.
Pickering Hardesty
J. J.
Parraguirre Douglas
Saitta
cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge
Mary L. Frudden
Washoe County School District Legal Department
Maupin, Cox & LeGoy
Washoe District Court Clerk
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(0) 1947A