Las Vegas Dev. Group, Llc. v. The Bank Of New York Mellon C/W 82266

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, No. 81961
LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
FILED
F/K/A THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS FEB 7 2022
TRUSTEE FOR THE A. aROWN
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWABS, EME COUR'
INC., ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, DEPUTY CLERK
SERIES 2006-7, A NATIONAL
BANKING ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT GROUP, No. 82266
LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
F/K/A THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS
TRUSTEE FOR THE
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWABS,
INC., ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2006-7, A NATIONAL
BANKING ASSOCIATION,
Res s onclent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
These are consolidated appeals from a district court judgment
following a bench trial in an action to quiet title (Docket No. 81961) and a
post-judgment award of attorney fees and costs (Docket No. 82266). Eighth
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Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mark R. Denton, Judge. We review
the district court's factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal
conclusions de novo, Weddell v. H20, Inc., 128 Nev. 94, 101, 271 P.3d 743,
748 (2012), and affirm.'
The district court determined that the HOA's 2011 foreclosure
sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust because, among other reasons,
respondent's predecessor (via the predecessor's agent, Miles Bauer) was
excused from making a superpriority tender.2 In so doing, it determined
that respondent was not time-barred from asserting its "tendee defense
because statutes of limitations do not apply to affirmative defenses.
Appellant contends that "Nevada law specifically provides for
various statutory presumptions that favor buyers at foreclosure salee and
that "[i]f an interested lien holder disputes these presumptions, it is
required to timely file an action within the appropriate period of limitations
to prove that its interest was unaffected for some reason." From this,
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted in this appeal.
2In so doing, the district court determined that Miles Bauer's actual
tender, which equaled nine months worth of HOA dues, did not satisfy the
superpriority portion of the HOA's lien because the HOA imposed its dues
on an annual basis. We have since held that a nine-month tender satisfies
the superpriority portion of an HOA's lien even when dues are imposed
annually, Anthony S. Noonan IRA, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat7 Ass'n EE, 137
Nev., Adv. Op. 15, 485 P.3d 206, 209 (2021), and we therefore conclude that
Miles Bauer's actual tender was sufficient to cure the superpriority default,
cf. Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d
1198, 1202 (2010) (recognizing that this court may affirm the district court
on any ground supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district
court).
2
appellant appears to contend that an "affirmative defense such as tender
necessarily is "nothing more than a time-barred claim masquerading as a
defense," such that this court should either ignore or overturn our
longstanding holding that Iljimitations do not run against defenses,"
Dredge Corp. v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 80 Nev. 99, 102, 389 P.2d 394, 396 (1964).
We decline to do so, at least under the facts of this case.
Contrary to appellant's contention, there is no Nevada law providing a
presumption that an HOA foreclosure sale has extinguished a first deed of
trust. Appellant is correct insofar as it observes that a presumption exists
in favor of the record title holder, see Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Saticoy Bay
LLC Series 2227 Shadow Canyon, 133 Nev. 740, 746, 405 P.3d 641, 646
(2017) (citing Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 112 Nev. 663, 669, 918
P.2d 314, 318 (1996)), and that NRS 116.31166(1) (1993) provides for
various presumptions when a foreclosure deed contains certain recitals.3
However, a superpriority tender does not conflict with any of those
presumptions, as respondent was not seeking to question the validity of
appellant's title to the subject property but was simply asserting that
appellant's title remained subject to the first deed of trust as a matter of
3Appellant also relies on this court's seminal opinion in SFR
Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 130 Nev. 742, 758, 334 P.3d
408, 419 (2014), wherein we held that "NRS 116.3116(2) gives an HOA a
true superpriority lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first
deed of trust." We do not construe this holding as standing for a
presumption that an HOA foreclosure sale has extinguished a first deed of
trust. See Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. 147, 151, 321 P.3d 875,
877 (2014) (reviewing de novo the interpretation of this court's previous
dispositions).
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law.4 See Saticoy Bay LLC Series 133 McLaren v. Green Tree Servicing LLC,
136 Nev., Adv. Op. 85, 478 P.3d 376, 379 (2020) (While a court's authority
to look beyond a foreclosure deed in a quiet title action is an inherent
equitable power, a valid tender cures a default 'by operation of law'—that
is, without regard to equitable considerations." (internal citation omitted));
cf. Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. 604, 611, 427 P.3d
113, 120-21 (2018) (rejecting the notion that a deed of trust beneficiary must
file a court action to validate a tender).
Thus, at least under the facts of this case, we are not persuaded
that there were any common-law or statutory presumptions that obligated
respondent to proactively assert a quiet title claim. Accordingly, respondent
timely asserted "tendee as an affirmative defense, see Dredge Corp., 80
Nev. at 102, 389 P.2d at 396, and the district court correctly determined the
assertion of that defense was not time-barred, cf. Holcomb Condos.
Homeowners' Assn v. Stewart Venture, LLC, 129 Nev. 181, 186-87, 300 P.3d
124, 128 (2013) ([T]he application of the statute of limitations is a question
of law that this court reviews de novo.").
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court's judgment
in Docket No. 81961. And because appellant's argument for reversing the
attorney fee and cost award in Docket No. 82266 is premised solely on the
4In this respect, we note that the subpriority portion of the HONs lien
remained in default even after the superpriority default was cured, meaning
that the foreclosure deed's recitation of there being a "defaule remained
accurate. Relatedly, the foreclosure deed's recitals made no representation
regarding whether a superpriority tender had been made.
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propriety of the judgment challenged in Docket No. 81961, we necessarily
affirm that award as well.
It is so ORDERED.5
arraguirre
vest,42-N, , J. Sr. J.
Hardesty
cc: Hon. Mark R. Denton, District Judge
Stephen E. Haberfeld, Settlement Judge
Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd.
Akerman LLP/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
5The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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