Floyd (Zane) v. Dist. Ct. (State)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ZANE MICHAEL FLOYD, No. 83167
Appellant,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK;
AND THE HONORABLE MICHAEL
FILED
VILLANI, DISTRICT JUDGE, FEB 2 4 2022
Respondents, ELIZABETh A. BROWN
CLERK 91 SL1PREME COURT
and BY
5 .
THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEPUlY CLERK
Real Party in Interest.
ORDER DENYING PETITION
This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenges the authority and jurisdiction of Department 17 in the Eighth
Judicial District Court to issue an order or warrant of execution for
petitioner Zane Floyd and to consider Floyd's postconviction habeas
petition.
"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, or to control a manifest abuse or an arbitrary or capricious exercise
of discretion." Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175
P.3d 906, 907-08 (2008) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and alterations
omitted); see also NRS 34.160. The petition presents a pure legal issue. And
although Floyd has an adequate remedy to challenge Department 17's
authority to resolve a postconviction habeas petition challenging his
conviction or sentence—he can appeal from any adverse decision on that
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
(0) 1947A 40.
petition, see NRS 34.575(1)—it does not appear that he has another
adequate remedy to challenge Department 17's authority to issue an order
or warrant of execution. We therefore elect to exercise our discretion to
consider the merits of Floyd's petition for a writ of mandamus. See Walker
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 476 P.3d 1194 (2020).
Floyd argues that Department 5 in the Eighth Judicial District
Court is the only court permitted to hear any postconviction matters and to
issue an order and warrant of execution because it is the court where the
conviction and death sentence were obtained and where previous
postconviction habeas petitions were considered. In support of his position,
Floyd points to language from three provisions in NRS chapter 176
addressing new orders to execute a judgment of death that has not yet been
executed as well as language in NRS 34.730.
'Floyd alternatively argues for a writ of prohibition, but his
arguments do not implicate the district court's jurisdiction. See United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("[T]he term jurisdiction
means . . . the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district courts have
jurisdiction over felonies and gross misdemeanors and over postconviction
habeas petitions filed by persons held in custody or convicted in their
respective districts. See Nev. Const., art. 6, § 6 (providing that district
courts have jurisdiction over, among other things, cases excluded from the
original jurisdiction of the justice courts and the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus); NRS 34.738 (delineating where certain postconviction
habeas petitions must be filed); Kimball v. State, 100 Nev. 190, 1981, 678
P.2d 675, 676 (1984). And the judges within a district "have concurrent and
coextensive jurisdiction within the district." NRS 3.020. Thus, Department
17 has as much jurisdiction over the execution of Floyd's death sentence and
his postconviction habeas petition(s) as any other department in the
district. We therefore deny Floyd's petition for a writ of prohibition.
SUPREME COURT
Or
NEVADA
2
(0) 1)47A 414.
We disagree with Floyd's narrow interpretation of "the court"
as used in NRS 176.495 and NRS 176.505(1) and (2)—that it refers
specifically and narrowly to the department in which the conviction or
sentence was obtained. The statutes plain language lends itself to a
broader interpretation, encompassing an entire judicial district, not a
specific department within the judicial district. See Gathrite v. Eighth
Ju,dicial Dist. Court, 135 Nev. 405, 408, 451 P.3d 891, 894 (2019)
(recognizing that this court will consider questions of statutory
interpretation de novo, beginning with the text of the statutes). This
broader interpretation is consistent with how the term is used in other
statutes. See, e.g., NRS 1.235(5)(a) (referencing the transfer of a "case to
another department of the court, if there is more than one department of
the court in the districe); NRS 32.120 (defining "court" as a district court in
Nevada for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Real Estate Receivership
Act); NRS 132.116 (regarding wills and estates, "'District court' or 'court'
means a district court of this State sitting in probate"); NRS 166A.060
("Court' means a district court of this State" for the Nevada Uniform
Custodial Trust Act); NRS 176.211(8)(a) (defining "court" as a district court
of Nevada for the purpose of deferring judgment); NRS 176A.030 ("Court'
means a district court of the State of Nevade for purposes of probation and
suspension of sentence); see also 1967 Nev. Stat., Ch. 523, § 246, at 1434 (a
statute added at the same time, and as part of the same bill, as NRS 176.495
that defined "court" as "a district court of the State of Nevade but not
specifically applying that definition to NRS 176.495).2 We are unpersuaded
2Additional1y, court rules demonstrate a similar understanding of the
word "court." See, e.g., N.R.Cr.P. 2(1) (describing cases being "randomly
assigned to a department of the court"); EDCR 1.12(c) ("Court' means the
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
()) 1947A OS0
by Floyd's reliance on Rainsberger v. State, 85 Nev. 22, 449 P.2d 254 (1969),
as the since-repealed statutory provision at issue in that case used
materially different language than the statutes cited by Floyd in this case.
See Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) C[W]hen [the
Legislature] includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another—let alone in the very next provision—this Court
presumes that [the Legislature] intended a difference in meaning." (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Accordingly, the plain meaning
of "the court" in NRS 176.495 and NRS 176.505(1) and (2) is the district
court where the conviction or death sentence was obtained and is not limited
to a specific department within that court. Floyd's case is being heard in
the court in which his conviction and sentence were obtained, the Eighth
Judicial District Court, thus satisfying NRS 176.495 and NRS 176.505.
Floyd's related argument involving NRS 34.730(3)(b) is
similarly without merit. The statute plainly contemplates that there may
be circumstances when a postconviction habeas petition will not be
"assigned to the original judge or court." NRS 34.730(3)(b) (stating a
postconviction habeas petition challenging the validity of a conviction or
sentence must be, "Whenever possible, assigned to the original judge or
coure (emphasis added)). And in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the
chief judge can "assign or reassign all cases pending in the district." EDCR
1.60(a). Moreover, EDCR 1.30(b)(15) allows the chief judge to "[r]eassign
cases from a department to another department as convenience or necessity
requires." See also N.R.Cr.P. 2(1)(B) (requiring a case to remain in the same
department until final disposition unless the chief judge assigns the case as
district court."); WDCR 20 (Prospective jurors who have been assigned for
service in a department of the court . . .").
4
part of "a plan of court-wide case management"). Given the plain language
of NRS 34.730(3)(b), Floyd has not shown that his postconviction habeas
petition(s) must be heard in Department 5.
Because we conclude that Floyd has not shown that the district
court is required as a matter of law to transfer his criminal case and
postconviction case(s) to Department 5 of the Eighth Judicial District Court,
we
ORDER the petition DENIED.
Par aguirre
• 1 •
Cum.
elf....et Er .4 , J. J.
Hardesty Stiglich
Cadish Silver
Pickering Herndon
cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
5