Kassow (Randolph) v. State

 for an abuse of discretion). Moreover, even assuming error occurred,
appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice, as he exercised a peremptory
strike against the prospective juror and has not shown that any seated
juror was biased. Id. at 796, 121 P.3d at 578 ("If the jury actually seated
is impartial, the fact that a defendant had to use a peremptory challenge
to achieve that result does not mean that the defendant was denied his
right to an impartial jury.").
Appellant next contends that the district court abused its
discretion by rejecting his Batson' challenge to the prosecutor's
peremptory strike of an African-American juror on the ground that he
failed to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent.
Determining whether the prosecutor's peremptory challenge against a
juror was discriminatory involves a three-step analysis—the first step
being that appellant must make a prima facie showing of discriminatory
intent. See Diomampo ix State, 124 Nev. 414, 185 P.3d 1031 (2008)
(identifying the three steps of a Batson analysis). A prima facie showing
requires the proponent of the challenge to demonstrate "that the totality of
the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose."
Batson, 476 -U.S. at 93-94; see Watson v. State, 130 Nev., Adv. Op 76, 335
P.3d 157, 166 (2014). Here, appellant argued that the prosecutor violated
Batson because there was "no valid reason other than the fact that [the
challenged prospective juror] was African-American." Because appellant
proffered no facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his Batson challenge.
See Watson v. State, Nev., Adv. Op. 76, 335 P.3d 157, 166 (2014)
'Batson u. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
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(observing that "the mere fact that the State used a peremptory challenge
to exclude a member of a cognizable group is not, standing alone, sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson's first
step").
Appellant further argues that the State committed misconduct
during voir dire by using the word "victim" and asking prospective jurors
whether crime victims deserve a fair trial. "To determine if prejudicial
prosecutorial misconduct occurred, the relevant inquiry is whether a
prosecutor's statements so infected the proceedings with unfairness as to
result in a denial of due process." Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511, 516,
118 P.3d 184, 187 (2005). "A prosecutor's comments should be viewed in
context, and 'a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the
basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone." Knight v. State, 116
Nev. 140, 144-45, 993 P.2d 67, 71 (2000) (quoting United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). We conclude that the prosecutor's single reference
to whether crime victims deserve a fair trial and infrequent use of the
word "victim" during voir dire did not render the proceedings unfair
Therefore no relief is warranted on this claim.
Appellant next argues that the district court abused its
discretion by rejecting three proffered jury instructions. His first proffered
instruction concerned witness credibility and was based on a California
instruction. 2 While his instruction was more robust in its description of
2 Appellant proposed the following instruction regarding witness
credibility:
The credibility or believability of a witness
should be determined by anything that reasonably
tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of
continued on next page . .
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what matters jurors should consider in weighing a witness' credibility, the
district court's instruction included many elements of the proffered
. . . continued
that testimony. Among the factors that you may
consider are the witness's ability to see, hear, or
otherwise perceive things about which the witness
testified; the witness's ability to remember and
describe what happened; the witness's behavior
while testifying; whether the witness understood
the questions and answered them directly;
whether the witness's testimony was influenced by
a factor such as bias or prejudice, a personal
relationship with someone involved in the case, or
a personal interest in how the case is decided; the
witness's attitude about the case or testifying;
whether the witness made a statement in the past
that is consistent or inconsistent with his or her
testimony; whether the witness's testimony was
reasonable when considering all the other
evidence in the case; whether other evidence
proved or disproved any fact about which the
witness testified; whether the witness admitted to
being untruthful; the witness's character for
truthfulness; whether the witness has been
convicted of a felony; whether the witness engaged
in conduct that reflects on his or her believability;
and was the witness promised immunity or
leniency in exchange for his or her testimony.
If you do not believe a witness's testimony
that he or she no longer remembers something,
that testimony is inconsistent with the witness's
earlier statement on that subject.
If you believe that a witness has lied about
any material fact in the case, you may disregard
the entire testimony of that witness or any portion
of his testimony which is not proved by other
evidence.
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instruction and appellant has not identified any prejudice resulting from
the omission of his instruction. 3 Therefore, we conclude that no relief is
warranted in this regard. Appellant's second and third proffered
instructions advised the jurors about evidence that is susceptible to two
interpretations. 4 We have considered similar instructions and concluded
3 The district court gave the following instruction regarding witness
credibility:
The credibility or believability of a witness
should be determined by his/her manner upon the
stand, his/her relationship to the parties, his/her
fears, motives, interest or feelings, his/her
opportunity to have observed the matter to which
he/she testified, the reasonableness of his/her
statements and the strength or weakness of
his/her recollections.
If you believe that a witness has lied about
any material fact in the case, you may disregard
the entire testimony of that witness or any portion
of his testimony which is not proved by other
evidence.
4Appellant proposed the following instruction regarding evidence
susceptible to two interpretations:
If the evidence in this case is subject to two
constructions or interpretations, each of which
appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which
points to the guilt of the Defendant, and the other
to the Defendant being not guilty, it is your duty
to adopt the interpretation which will admit of the
Defendant's being not guilty, and reject that which
points to guilt.
You will notice the rule applies only when
both of the two possible opposing conclusions
appear to you to be reasonable. If, on the other
hand, one of the possible conclusions should
continued on next page . . .
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that it is not error to reject such instructions where the jury is properly
instructed on reasonable doubt. Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924, 927, 604
P.2d 115, 117 (1979); Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 97, 545 P.2d 1155, 1156
(1976). Because the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. See
Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005).
Finally, appellant contends that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. In particular,
he contends that the evidence shows corporal punishment, not child abuse.
Our review of the record on appeal, however, reveals sufficient evidence to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier
of fact. See Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378,
1380 (1998); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Testimony was
introduced showing that appellant struck the victim in the face
repeatedly, causing her head to hit a cabinet and her nose to bleed. The
jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that he was guilty
of child abuse, despite his claim that he merely disciplined the victim, no
medical treatment was necessary, and no lasting harm resulted. See NRS
200.508(1). It is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to
give conflicting testimony, and the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on
appeal where, as here, substantial evidence supports it. See Bolden v.
. continued
appear to you to be reasonable and the other to be
unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to
the reasonable deduction and to reject the
unreasonable, bearing in mind, however, even if
the reasonable deduction points to the Defendant's
guilt, the entire proof must be beyond a reasonable
doubt to support a verdict of guilty.
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State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also McNair v. State, 108
Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992).
Having considered appellant's claims and concluded that they
lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
, C.J.
Hardesty
J.
—C2CM6S6er
Parraguirre
saaut-ct. 14-3 J.
Douglas
cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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