Lewis v. Lewis

132 Nev., Advance Opinion 419
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
WESLEY ALLEN LEWIS, No. 66497
Appellant,
vs.
MARIA DANIELA LEWIS, ATK/A
FILED
MARIA DANIELA PERDOMO, JUN 3 0 2016
Respondent. RIC IE IC LINDEMAN
un nsupRznsE CO
BY
4/ 11 CLERK
Appeal from district court orders modifying child \cUstody and
holding appellant in contempt. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family
Court Division, Clark County; Gayle Nathan, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, and Tami D. Cowden, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Fine & Price Law Group and Frances-Ann Fine, Henderson,
for Respondent.
BEFORE HARDESTY SAITTA and PICKERING, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, SAITTA, J.:
The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel applies only to
criminal proceedings. Thus, in deciding whether that right applies to
contempt proceedings, the question is whether the contempt is civil or
criminal in nature. This opinion addresses whether a contempt order is
required to contain a purge clause, which gives the defendant the
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opportunity to purge himself of the contempt sentence by complying with
the terms of the contempt order, in order to be considered civil in nature
and avoid invoking the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.
We hold that a contempt order that does not contain a purge
clause is criminal in nature. Because the district court's contempt order in
this case did not contain a purge clause, appellant's constitutional rights
were violated by imposing a criminal sentence without providing appellant
with counsel. We further hold that the district court abused its discretion
by improperly basing its decision to modify custody on appellant's failure
to comply with a court order and by failing to consider and set forth its
findings as to the NRS 125.480(4) (2009) factors for determining the
child's best interest.'
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Wesley Allen Lewis and respondent Maria Daniela
Lewis divorced in 2011. They had one minor child at the time of the
divorce. The divorce decree awarded Wesley and Maria joint physical
custody of the child and imposed upon Wesley an obligation to pay child
support to Maria.
In 2013, Maria filed a motion seeking to hold Wesley in
contempt of court for lack of payment of child support, among other things.
After a hearing, the district court issued an order on October 14, 2013,
determining that Wesley had child support arrearages in the amount of
$9,012.38. The district court also held Wesley in contempt of court for his
failure to pay child support and ordered him to pay $500 for each month
1-NRS 125.480(4) has since been repealed, and the statutory factors
for determining the child's best interest have been moved to NRS Chapter
125C.
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that he had failed to pay child support, for a total of $5,500. The contempt
order further included a jail sentence of ten days for each month that he
had failed to pay child support, but the sentence was stayed contingent
upon Wesley making all future payments. The district court also found
Wesley willfully underemployed and determined Wesley's imputed gross
monthly income based on what he would make if fully employed. Based on
his imputed income, the district court ordered Wesley to pay child support
of $91 per month, $50 per month for one-half of the child's health
insurance, and $100 per month for child support arrearages. Lastly, the
order required Wesley to take the child to tutoring classes on Mondays
after school and to pay one-half of the cost of the tutoring.
In 2014, Maria filed a motion to modify custody and enforce
the 2013 order. After a hearing at which Wesley represented himself, the
district court entered an order awarding Maria primary physical custody
of the child. The order also adopted prior findings from the 2013 order
that Wesley was willfully underemployed, and it used Wesley's imputed
gross monthly income from that order as the basis to modify his child
support obligation subsequent to the modification of the custodial
arrangement. The district court's order further required Wesley to
continue taking the child to tutoring classes and to pay one-half of those
costs. Finally, the district court held Wesley in contempt of court for his
failure to pay three months of child support and take the child to tutoring
classes over the summer The district court sentenced Wesley to 20 days
in jail for each missed payment and 20 days for the missed tutoring
classes, for a total of 80 days. The district court then stayed the contempt
sentence on the condition that Wesley "follow the Orders of the Court."
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Wesley raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the
district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by not
appointing him counsel before holding him in criminal contempt,
(2) whether the district court abused its discretion by modifying the child
custody arrangement, and (3) whether the district court abused its
discretion by ordering Wesley to continue to pay for half of the child's
tutoring expenses.
DISCUSSION
Wesley's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the district
court's contempt order
Wesley argues that because the district court's order of
contempt was criminal in nature, he had a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel during the proceedings before the district court. We normally
review an order of contempt for abuse of discretion. In re Water Rights of
the Humboldt River, 118 Nev. 901, 907, 59 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2002).
However, we review constitutional issues de novo. Jackson v. State, 128
Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012).
The district court's contempt order was criminal in nature
[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
counsel applies only in criminal .prosecutions.
Whether a contempt proceeding is classified as
criminal or civil in nature depends on whether it is
directed to punish the contemnor or, instead,
coerce his compliance with a court directive.
Criminal sanctions are punitive in that they serve
the purpose of preserving the dignity and
authority of the court by punishing a party for
offensive behavior. In contrast, civil contempt is
said to be remedial in nature, as the sanctions are
intended to benefit a party by coercing or
compelling the contemnor's future compliance, not
punishing them for past bad acts. Moreover, a
civil contempt order is indeterminate or
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conditional; the contemnor's compliance is all that
is sought and with that compliance comes the
termination of any sanctions imposed. Criminal
sanctions, on the other hand, are unconditional or
determinate, intended as punishment for a party's
past disobedience, with the contemnor's future
compliance having no effect on the duration of the
sentence imposed.
Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 798, 804-05, 102 P.3d
41, 45-46 (2004) (citations omitted). In Rodriguez, the district court issued
a contempt order for Rodriguez to spend 25 days in jail for failing to pay
child support, with the possibility of early release upon his payment of the
outstanding arrearages. Id. at 804, 102 P.3d at 45. The Rodriguez court
reasoned that the contempt order was civil in nature because "[t]he
district court's intent was to compel Rodriguez's compliance with the
support order for the benefit of his daughter, not to punish him for any
ongoing noncompliance." Id. at 805, 102 P.3d at 46. Therefore, the court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply to the
proceedings. Id.However, the United States Supreme Court has identified an
additional factor in determining whether a contempt order is civil or
criminal—that is, in order for a contempt order imposing a determinate
sentence to be civil in nature, it must contain a purge clause. Hicks v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 640 (1988). A purge clause gives the defendant the
opportunity to purge himself of the contempt sentence by complying with
the terms of the contempt order. Id.Here, the district court issued a contempt order against
Wesley for failing to (1) pay child support, and (2) take the child to her
tutoring classes, pursuant to a previous court order. The order directed
Wesley to serve 80 days in jail, but it stayed the jail sentence contingent
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upon Wesley following all future court orders. Thus, like Rodriguez, it
appears that the district court's intent was to compel Wesley's compliance
with the support order for the benefit of his daughter, not to punish him
for any ongoing noncompliance. However, the order failed to contain a
purge clause that would allow Wesley to purge himself of the contempt
sentence. Thus, if the stay was lifted due to a missed payment by Wesley,
he would have no way to purge his sentence to avoid or get out of jail.
While it is possible that the district court intended for Wesley to be able to
purge himself of his sentence and get out of jail in such a situation by
paying any missed payment, the order does not so state. Therefore, we
hold that because the district court's contempt order did not contain a
purge clause, it was criminal in nature and Wesley's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was violated when the contempt order was entered after
proceedings in which he was not represented by counse1. 2
The district court abused its discretion in its order modifying child custody
This court reviews modifications of child custody under an
abuse of discretion standard. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d
239, 241 (2007). "[A] modification of primary physical custody is
warranted only when (1) there has been a substantial change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best
interest is served by the modification." Id. at 150, 161 P.3d at 242.
However, when modifying joint physical custody, it is only necessary to
2Because we are vacating the district court's contempt order and
remanding with instructions that Wesley be provided with counsel during
any further criminal contempt proceedings if he is found to be indigent, we
do not reach the other issues raised by Wesley regarding the contempt
order.
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consider whether the modification is in the child's best interest. Rivero v.
Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 430, 216 P.3d 213, 227 (2009). 3
The district court's order stated that it was modifying custody
because it was in the child's best interest "based on [Wesley's] conduct
over the past ten (10) months." The order failed to specify which conduct
it was referring to, although the district court did make factual findings in
the order that Wesley had child support arrearages and had not followed
the court's order to pay half of the child's medical insurance. The district
court also (1) found that Wesley was not credible when he testified that he
spent two hours a night going over the child's homework, (2) had concerns
about Wesley not charging the child's phone so that Maria could have
daily contact with the child, and (3) was concerned that Wesley was not
taking the child to her tutoring classes. Lastly, the order stated that the
district court found Wesley to be in contempt for failing to pay child
support and half of the tutoring costs.
The district court also made oral pronouncements as to the
best interest of the child, stating:
You know, Mr. Lewis, in the space of ten
months, you demonstrated to The Court by your
own behavior in this—your own conduct, I should
say, that it's in the best interest of the minor child
that I change the custodial arrangement, from not
paying your support to not taking her to
[tutoring], to ignoring her medical needs, to not
making yourself available with a voicemail, to not
following my Court orders, even so far as making
sure your child's phone stay plugged in and
3 Appellantdoes not question the use in Nevada caselaw of differing
requirements for modifying joint physical and primary physical custody.
Therefore, we do not address that issue here.
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charged so that Mom can have access to her, and
to the tardies and the absentee record, especially
the tardies and the absentee records. Those are
significant factors The Court looks at.
The district court abused its discretion by improperly basing its
decision on Wesley's failure to pay child support, medical insurance
costs, and tutoring costs
"This court has made it clear that a court may not use changes
of custody as a sword to punish parental misconduct; disobedience of court
orders is punishable in other ways." Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1149,
865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993).
Here, the district court appeared to base its order modifying
child custody, at least in part, on the fact that Wesley failed to pay child
support, his portion of the medical insurance for the child, and his portion
of the tutoring costs in violation of a previous court order. The written
order stated that the custody modification was in the child's best interest
because of Wesley's actions in the months prior to the order, which
included his failure to follow the court's order. In its oral pronouncement
as to the best interest of the child, the district court specifically spoke of
Wesley's failure to pay child support and his failure to follow court orders
as factors that it considered. Because Wesley's failure to follow court
orders may not be considered as a factor in determining the child's best
interest during a modification of custody, we hold that the district court
abused its discretion.
The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the NRS
125.480(4) (2009) factors in determining the child's best interest
"In determining the best interest of the child, the court shall
consider and set forth its specific findings concerning, among other
things," the factors set out in NRS 125.480(4), NRS 125.480(4) (2009)
(emphasis added). "Specific findings and an adequate explanation of the
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reasons for the custody determination are crucial to enforce or modify a
custody order and for appellate review." Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev., Adv.
Op. 45, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Without them, this court cannot say with assurance that the custody
determination was made for appropriate legal reasons." Id.Here, other than Wesley's failure to follow the court's order,
the district court based its determination of the best interest on the
finding that Wesley did not attend to the child's medical needs, was not
accessible by phone or voicemail, and failed to make the child available to
Maria by phone when in Wesley's custody. The district court also
considered the child's school tardiness and absentee record while in
Wesley's custody, and Wesley's failure to participate in child therapy
sessions set up by Maria. While these findings could correspond to some
of MRS 125.480(4) (2009)'s factors, the district court nonetheless failed to
adequately set forth its specific findings as to each factor, and it is unclear
from the district court's order and oral findings when read together
whether every NRS 125.480(4) (2009) factor was considered. Therefore,
we hold that the district court abused its discretion by failing to set forth
specific findings as to all of MRS 125.480(4) (2009)'s factors in its
determination of the child's best interest during a modification of custody.
Because the district court abused its discretion by improperly considering
Wesley's failure to comply with court orders and failing to enter specific
factual findings as to each of the statutory best-interest-of-the-child
factors, we reverse the district court's order modifying child custody. 4
4 Because the order modifying child support was based upon the
order modifying child custody, the order modifying child support is also
reversed and should be addressed on remand.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Wesley to
continue paying for tutoring classes
Wesley argues that because the minor child tested at or above
grade level on the Clark County School District's CRTs and received As
and Bs at school, she had completed the conditions of the district court's
2013 order regarding additional tutoring classes. Wesley further argues
that there was no evidence to support a finding that the minor child had
continuing special education needs, see NRS 125B.080(9), and that
therefore the district court abused its discretion by ordering Wesley to pay
for additional tutoring classes.
The district court's 2013 order stated, in relevant part, that
the minor child "shall continue to receive tutoring services until she is
testing at or above grade level as tested by [the tutoring school]."
Although she was found to be at or above grade level on the Clark County
School District's CRTs and received As and Bs at school, she still tested
below grade level in math as tested by the tutoring school. Therefore, we
hold that the conditions of the district court's 2013 order were not satisfied
and the district court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing its 2013
order requiring Wesley to continue to pay for half of the tutoring expenses.
CONCLUSION
If a contempt order does not contain a purge clause, it is
criminal in nature and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies.
Because the contempt order in this case did not contain a purge clause, we
hold that Wesley's constitutional rights were violated when the contempt
order was entered against him when he was unrepresented by counsel at
the contempt proceedings. Therefore, we vacate the district court's
contempt order and order that Wesley be appointed counsel if he is found
to be indigent and not already otherwise represented.
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We further hold that the district court abused its discretion by
improperly considering Wesley's failure to comply with court orders in
modifying custody and by failing to specifically set forth specific findings
regarding all of NRS 125.480(4) (2009)'s factors. However, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Wesley to pay for additional
tutoring classes for the minor child. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 5
Saitta
We concur:
Aa.-t
Hardesty
tet,g; J.
5 Wesley also raises the issue of whether judicial bias denied him a
right to a fair trial. Because our review of the record does not indicate
that a reasonable person would harbor doubts about the district court
judge's impartiality, we hold that Wesley was not denied his right to a fair
trial. In re Varain, 114 Nev. 1271, 1278, 969 P.2d 305, 310 (1998) ("The
standard for assessing judicial bias is whether a reasonable person,
knowing all the facts, would harbor reasonable doubts about [a judge's]
impartiality." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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