Windisch, M.D. v. Hometown Health

 We conclude that the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of Hometown Health on both causes of action.
See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
First, Dr. Windisch's wrongful termination claim, which was
premised upon a theory of tortious discharge, fails as a matter of law. Per
the Agreement, Dr. Windisch did not have an employer-employee
relationship with Hometown Health. See, e.g., Wayment v. Holmes, 112
Nev. 232, 236, 912 P.2d 816, 818 (1996) (stating that tortious discharge
occurs in the context of an employer-employee relationship). Further, the
nature of Dr. Windisch's relationship with Hometown Health does not
warrant upending the Agreement's provision which specifically states that
they do not have an employment relationship. See Kaldi v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 278, 21 P.3d 16, 20 (2001) ("It has long been the
policy in Nevada that absent some countervailing reason, contracts will be
construed from the written language and enforced as written." (internal
quotations omitted)).
Second, Dr. Windisch's breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claim fails as a matter of law. Dr. Windisch
attempts to replace the Agreement's existing express no-cause termination
provision with an implied for-cause provision, which is prohibited. See
Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 122 Nev. 479, 483, 133 P.3d 251, 254
(2006) ("[W]e [will not] attempt to increase the legal obligations of the
parties where the parties intentionally limited such obligations." (internal
quotations omitted)); Kaldi, 117 Nev. at 281, 21 P.3d at 21 ("We are not
free to modify or vary the terms of an unambiguous agreement"); see also
Kucharczyk v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 946 F. Supp. 1419, 1432 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (explaining that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
may not be used to imply a term that is contradicted by an express term of
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(Colo. App. 1999) (holding that in a contract between a doctor and a health
maintenance organization, where the "termination clause expressly set[]
forth the right of both parties to terminate the contract for any
reason[,] . . . the physician cannot rely on the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing to circumvent terms for which he expressly bargained").
Although the district court erred by applying the wrong law, its error is
inconsequential.' See Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126
Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010) ("This court will affirm a
district court's order if the district court reached the correct result, even if
for the wrong reason.").
Finally, Dr. Windisch requests that this court "carv[e] out a
narrow exception to Nevada's wrongful termination doctrine as it relates
to without cause terminating [sic] clauses in healthcare provider
agreements" because of the unique relationship between a healthcare
provider and a managed care organization, similar to the courts in Harper
v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996) and Potvin v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 2000). We decline to provide any special
exception to the relationship between a healthcare provider and a
managed care organization, because such a policy decision is more
'The district court relied upon the proposition from Dillard Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 376, 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999), that
"[t]he at-will rule gives the employer the right to discharge an employee
for any reason, so long as the reason does not violate public policy."
However, Dillard does not mention the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and the law the district court applied refers only to the
requirements of tortious discharge. Public policy need not be breached for
a viable good faith and fair dealing claim to exist.
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appropriately considered by the Legislature. 2 We instead opt to exercise
judicial restraint, like the court in Pannozzo v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 787 N.E.2d 91 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). See Hamm v. Carson City
Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 101, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969) ("Judicial restraint
is a worthwhile practice when the proposed new doctrine may have
implications far beyond the perception of the court asked to declare it");
Sw. Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 601, 668 P.2d 261, 265 (1983) ("The
legislature is best equipped to discern the public pulse through extensive
hearings, analyses and debate involving multi-faceted groups having
specific interests in the subject."). 3 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 4
, C.J.
Hardesty
CCherry
Gibbons
2 We reject the suggestion that NRS 695G.410 provides a basis for
relief because Windisch did not state a cause of action under the statute.
3 We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude
that they are without merit.
4The Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.
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cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge
Margaret M. Crowley, Settlement Judge
Whatley Kallas, LLP/Georgia
Whatley Kallas, LLP/Alabama
Bradley Drendel & Jeanney
Littler Mendelson/Las Vegas
Littler Mendelson/Reno
Washoe District Court Clerk
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WINDISCH VS. HOMETOWN HEALTH PLAN NO. 64020
DOUGLAS, J., concurring:
I concur as to result only.
J.
Douglas
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