In Re: The Chao-Te and Liu Jui-Kwa Chen Trust

 Using those funds, decedent purchased land located in Las Vegas to start
a motel business, taking title as "a married man." At some point,
appellant joined decedent in Las Vegas with their children.
Subsequently, decedent established the "Chao Te and Liu Jua-
Kwa Chen Trust," naming appellant as the sole beneficiary and successor
trustee upon decedent's death. Decedent then purchased a house in Las
Vegas using community funds, taking title in a joint tenancy with
appellant. Thereafter, decedent transferred the titles of the house and the
motel to the Trust without respondent's knowledge or consent.
Then, in 2005, respondent initiated a divorce action against
decedent in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada. In response,
decedent filed an action in the Taiwan Taipei District Court to declare
decedent and respondent's customary marriage invalid.' That court
addressed arguments and evidence submitted by both parties, made
findings, applied Taiwanese law, and concluded that decedent and
respondent's marriage was valid. After considering decedent's appeal, the
Taiwan High Court affirmed the lower court's decision. Finally, the
Supreme Court of Taiwan denied decedent's appeal. As a result of these
proceedings, the Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior updated its records to
reflect that respondent was decedent's wife and that appellant was his
"bigamy wife."
After the family court proceedings recommenced in Nevada,
decedent passed away, divesting the family court of jurisdiction.
Appellant then filed a certificate of incumbency with the Clark County
'The Nevada district court stayed its proceedings pending the
outcome of the Taiwanese action.
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Recorder's Office to confirm her appointment as successor trustee of the
Trust. Thereafter, respondent filed an action for quiet title in the Eighth
Judicial District Court of Nevada to recover an undivided one-half interest
in the real property decedent transferred to the Trust.
After the close of discovery, respondent filed a motion for
summary judgment. In her opposition to the motion, appellant contended
for the first time that the putative spouse doctrine applied. According to
appellant, the putative spouse counterclaim precluded summary
judgment.
In his report and recommendation, the probate commissioner
applied principles of comity and deferred to the Taiwanese judgments
regarding the validity of decedent and respondent's marriage. Based on
this valid marriage, which predated appellant's marriage to decedent, the
probate commissioner recommended awarding respondent an undivided
one-half interest in the house and motel. The probate commissioner also
suggested that the putative spouse doctrine did not apply. 2 Thereafter,
the district court fully adopted the probate commissioner's report and
recommendation.
On appeal, appellant argues that the district court erred by (1)
recognizing and adopting the Taiwanese judgments regarding the validity
of decedent and respondent's marriage, (2) failing to apply the putative
spouse doctrine, (3) awarding respondent a one-half interest in the house
held in joint tenancy by decedent and appellant, and (4) refusing to apply
2 We note that the probate commissioner should have but did not
identify the legal authority upon which he relied in making his
recommendations.
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laches to respondent's claims. We now affirm the district court's order
granting respondent's motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo,
viewing all evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). We
have stated that Is] ummary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56
when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
and affidavits, if any, that are properly before the court demonstrate that
no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1031. "Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
at 730, 121 P.3d at 1030 (internal quotation omitted). "A factual dispute is
genuine when the evidence is such that a rational trier of fact could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1031. "Mere
allegations and conclusory statements . . . are insufficient to survive
summary judgment." King v. Cartlidge, 121 Nev. 926, 928, 124 P.3d 1161,
1162-63 (2005).
The Principle of Comity
"[C]omity is a principle whereby the courts of one jurisdiction
may give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction
out of deference and respect." Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 99
Nev. 93, 98, 658 P.2d 422, 424-25 (1983). A court applying the principle of
comity should consider the "duties, obligations, rights and convenience of
its own citizens and of persons who are within the protection of its
jurisdiction." Id. at 98, 658 P.2d at 425 (internal quotation omitted).
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on.
When applying comity to international judgments, Nevada
courts may recognize another jurisdiction's judgment only if it was issued
by a judicial system comprised of impartial tribunals and procedures
compatible with due process of law. Gonzales-Alpizar u. Griffith, 130 Nev.
Adv. Op. No. 2, 317 P.3d 820, 826 (2014). Assuming these requirements
are satisfied, Nevada courts may still choose not to recognize a foreign
judgment if (1) the court issuing that judgment lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, (2) the defendant received insufficient notice, (3) the
judgment was obtained by fraud, (4) the cause of action or judgment is
repugnant to public policy, (5) the judgment contradicts another existing
and valid final judgment, or (6) the parties previously agreed to submit the
controversy to a different forum. Id.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by applying
principles of comity and recognizing the Taiwanese judgments because
doing so impaired her rights to marital property as a Nevada resident.
Respondent contends that the district court acted properly because the
Taiwanese courts provided substantive and procedural due process.
The record for this appeal shows that the Taiwanese courts
were impartial and provided procedures compatible with due process. For
example, these courts addressed the arguments and evidence submitted by
both sides, made findings, and applied Taiwanese law. Despite an adverse
judgment, decedent was also able to file two appeals that resulted in
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written decisions. Accordingly, the Taiwanese proceedings afforded
decedent due process. 3
Additionally, none of the factors that could have justified
refusing to afford comity to the Taiwanese judgments were present.
Specifically, the record does not support the proposition that the
Taiwanese proceedings were corrupt, fraudulent, biased, or unfair. 4
Moreover, appellant does not allege that the Taiwanese courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, the parties previously agreed to hold the
proceeding in a different forum, or the judgment contradicts an existing
and valid final judgment. Finally, the Taiwanese judgments recognizing
that respondent and decedent were lawfully married are not repugnant to
public policy. In light of these facts, we conclude that the district court
properly applied the principle of comity as a matter of law by recognizing
the Taiwanese judgments deeming decedent and respondent's marriage to
be valid.
3 Wenote that the notice factor is inapplicable here because decedent
was the plaintiff-appellant in the Taiwanese proceedings, not the
defendant-respondent.
4 We reject appellant's argument that the record contained evidence
of fraud in the Taiwanese proceedings. First, appellant's contention that
respondent's daughter had a willingness to bribe witnesses for false
testimony is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that
fraud actually occurred in the Taiwanese proceedings. Second, although
decedent filed a perjury action against a witness from the Taiwanese
proceedings, that action was subsequently dismissed. Therefore, we
conclude that this contention lacks merit.
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Putative Spouse Doctrine
It is clearly established that a nonmoving plaintiff may not
raise new legal claims for the first time in response to a• summary
judgment motion by a defendant. See Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall
Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating "summary judgment
is not a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings"
(internal quotation omitted)); Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., &
Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (clarifying that once a
case has progressed to the summary judgment stage, liberal pleadings
standards that permit leave to amend freely no longer apply). Permitting
a plaintiff to do otherwise raises concerns of efficiency and judicial
economy, see Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315
(11th Cir. 2004), as well as concerns of unfair surprise to the defendant.
Tucker, 407 F.3d at 788.
We conclude that similar concerns of judicial economy and
unfair surprise arise when a nonmoving defendant raises a new
counterclaim in response to a summary judgment motion by a plaintiff.
Here, defendant-appellant raised her putative spouse counterclaim for the
first time in response to plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary
judgment. This was improper. Accordingly, we decline to consider this
issue on appea1. 5
The joint tenancy appellant identifies was invalid because
5
respondent did not expressly or impliedly consent to the gift of her share
of community property. NRS 123.230(2).
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Based on the foregoing, we ORDER the judgment of the
district court AFFIRMED. 6
124.AC6°aS17
Parraguirre 5.4%
J.
-,411 /4d. , J.
Douglas
Chsza
Cherry
cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge
Ara H. Shirinian, Settlement Judge
Reisman Sorokac
Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.
Eighth District Court Clerk
6We reject appellant's attempt to inject a laches argument related to
the dismissed divorce action into respondent's quiet title action. Even if
the argument was appropriate, it would lack merit here. See Gold v. Gold,
62 A.2d 540, 542-43 (Md. 1948). Moreover, we conclude that laches was
inapplicable to respondent's quiet title action, as there was no delay on
respondent's part that prejudiced appellant. See Carson City v. Price, 113
Nev. 409, 412, 934 P.2d 1042, 1043 (1997).
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