Cassady v. Main

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
RICHARD A. CASSADY, No. 64015
Appellant,
vs.
C/O R. MAIN; MR. ROBERT LEGRAND,
WARDEN; MR. JAMES G. COX,
FILED
INDIVIDUALLY; NEVADA FEB 0 1 2016
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
AND THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion
to dismiss in an inmate litigation action. Sixth Judicial District Court,
Pershing County; Michael Montero, Judge.
Appellant Richard A. Cassady is an inmate at Lovelock
Correctional Center. Respondent R. Main, a correctional officer, searched
Cassady's cell and seized a blanket and magazines. Cassady filed a
petition requesting relief in the form of a declaratory judgment requiring
that respondents adhere and conform to their own administrative
regulations, that they be required to ensure that those working for them
are held accountable for their failure to comply and conform with
respondent Nevada Department of Corrections' (NDOC) administrative
regulations, and that Main be sanctioned for repeated failures to adhere to
those administrative regulations. The district court granted respondents'
motion to dismiss, finding that Cassady has no legally protected right or
cognizable interest at stake unless and until the facts alleged have been
established.
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On appeal, Cassady raises the following issues: (1) whether
the district court applied the proper law in dismissing his petition, and (2)
whether the district court erred by not granting him leave to file an
amended petition.
The district court did not err in dismissing Cassady's petition for
declaratory relief
The standard of review for a dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5) is
rigorous, as this court must presume all facts alleged in the complaint as
true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Buzz Stew,
LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672
(2008). On appeal from an order granting an NRCP 12(13)(5) motion to
dismiss, "[t]he sole issue presented . . . is whether a complaint states a
claim for relief." Merluzzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 409, 411, 610 P.2d 739, 741
(1980), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Clough, 106 Nev. 568, 569-
70 n.1 & n.2, 796 P.2d 592, 593-94 n.1 & n.2 (1990). This court's "task is
to determine whether ... the challenged pleading sets forth allegations
sufficient to make out the elements of a right to relief." Edgar v. Wagner,
101 Nev. 226, 227, 699 P.2d 110, 111 (1985). "The test for determining
whether the allegations of a [complaint] are sufficient to assert a claim for
relief is whether the allegations give fair notice of the nature and basis of
[a legally sufficient] claim and the relief requested." Ravera v. City of
Reno, 100 Nev. 68, 70, 675 P.2d 407, 408 (1984); see also W. States Constr.,
Inc. v. Michoff, 108 Nev. 931, 936, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1992).
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Cassady's petition is not ripe for judicial review
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, codified in NRS
Chapter 30, grants the district court the "power to declare rights, status
and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed." NRS 30.030. In Kress v. Corey, this court identified the four
elements that must be met before declaratory relief may be granted:
(1) there must exist a justiciable controversy; that
is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is
asserted against one who has an interest in
contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally
protectable interest; and (4) the issue involved in
the controversy must be ripe for judicial
determination.
65 Nev. 1, 26, 189 P.2d 352, 364 (1948); see also Doe v. Bryan, 102 Nev.
523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986) (holding that the four elements
described in Kress constituted the requirements for a justiciable
controversy in a declaratory relief action).
In Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, this court stated:
"[R]ipeness focuses on the timing of the action
rather than on the party bringing the action.. . .
The factors to be weighed in deciding whether a
case is ripe for judicial review include: (1) the
hardship to the parties of withholding judicial
review, and (2) the suitability of the issues for
review."
122 Nev. 877, 887, 141 P.3d 1224, 1230-31 (2006) (alteration in original)
(quoting In re T.R., 119 Nev. 646, 651, 80 P.3d 1276, 1279 (2003)).
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First, Cassady would face no hardship if judicial review is
withheld on his petition seeking declaratory relief. As the district court
noted, Cassady can still file a properly pleaded civil complaint to address
his situation. Secondly, the issues are not suitable for review as there are
no established facts. There has been no judicial determination that any of
the matters alleged by Cassady constitute violations of the regulations
that he cites. As such, the district court would have to engage in
speculation and forecast the outcome of any claims regarding respondents'
liability.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Cassady's
petition because it is not yet ripe for judicial review.
The district court did not err by dismissing Cassady's petition without
leave to amend
"A motion for leave to amend is left to the sound discretion of
the trial judge, and the trial judge's decision will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion." State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Sutton, 120
Nev. 972, 988, 103 P.3d 8, 19 (2004); see also Stephens v. S. Nev. Music
Co., 89 Nev. 104, 105, 507 P.2d 138, 139 (1973). A district court does not
abuse its discretion unless it acts oppressively or arbitrarily. Goodman v.
Goodman, 68 Nev. 484, 487, 236 P.2d 305, 306 (1951).
Here, Cassady did not file a motion for leave to amend in the
district court. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the district court acted
oppressively or arbitrarily, thereby abusing its discretion. Because
Nevada law does not impose a duty on the district court to grant leave to
amend sua sponte, we cannot say that the district court abused its
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discretion when it dismissed Cassady's petition without allowing him to
amend his complaint.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing the
petition without leave to amend.
Therefore, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge
Armstrong Teasdale, LLP/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Carson City
Pershing County Clerk
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