Sawyer (Airell) v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
AIRELL JOSHUA THOMAS SAWYER, No. 67829
Appellant,
vs. FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. JUL 2 8 2016
TRACIE K LINDEMAN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE BY IC'V .E
DEPrirtif
This is an appeal from a district court order denying appellant
Airell Sawyer's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second
Judicial District Court,' Washoe County; Elliott A. Sattler, Judge.
Sawyer pleaded guilty to first-degree murder with the use of a
deadly weapon and was sentenced to two consecutive prison terms of 20 to
50 years. He later filed a timely postconviction petition for a writ of
habeas corpus challenging trial counsel's effectiveness and the validity of
his plea. The district court conducted multiple evidentiary hearings and
denied the petition. Sawyer contends that the district court erred.
Before addressing the district court's resolution of Sawyer's
petition, we first address his contention that the district court abused its
discretion by precluding certain witness from testifying below and by
otherwise limiting the presentation of his case. In postconviction
proceedings, the district court is the trier of fact and has discretion to
exclude testimony that it believes will not assist its fact-finding. Brown v.
State, 110 Nev. 846, 852, 877 P.2d 1071, 1075 (1994). Moreover, "[t]he
judge shall exercise 'reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence . . . [t]o make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth
. . . [and] [t]o avoid needless consumption of time." NRS 50.115 (a), (b).
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We discern no abuse of discretion. Sawyer's petition had been pending for
more than five years when the district court entered its order. The district
court had already conducted numerous evidentiary hearings and heard
testimony from many witnesses and Sawyer indicated that he planned to
call at least a dozen more. The district court was understandably
concerned. Our review of the record indicates that the restrictions placed
upon Sawyer were appropriate to ensure that the postconviction
proceedings were brought to a timely and just resolution. See generally
Trujillo v. State, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 75, 310 P.3d 594, 601 (2013)
(observing that "[w]e have long emphasized the importance of the finality
of judgments"). And given the nature of the claims raised, the district
court's factual findings, and the legal conclusions referenced herein,
Sawyer fails to establish that the witnesses who were excluded would have
changed the outcome of the proceedings. 1
Validity of the plea
Sawyer contends that the district court erred by denying his
claim that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was suffering from
Tostconviction counsel also contends that the district court
demonstrated bias against her and Sawyer. Although she lists several
instances where the district court purportedly demonstrated such bias, her
citation supporting this assertion merely refers to Sawyer's petition for a
writ of mandamus, which was denied, rather than the portions of the
record where these actions allegedly occurred. This is inappropriate. See
NRAP 28(e)(1) ("Every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record
hall be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any,
of the appendix where the matter relied on is to be found."). Moreover, the
claim is not supported by cogent argument or legal authority. We
therefore decline to consider it. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673,
748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987).
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conditions such as ``traumatic bonding," which caused him to be
susceptible to the coercive influence 2 of the man who, he asserts, is the
real killer, and because he entered the guilty plea while taking
psychotropic me dication. 3
A guilty plea is presumptively valid, and "[t]his court will not
invalidate a plea as long as the totality of the circumstances, as shown by
the record, demonstrates that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily
made and that the defendant understood the nature of the offense and the
consequences of the plea." State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1105, 13 P.3d
442, 448 (2000). "A thorough plea canvass coupled with a detailed,
consistent, written plea agreement supports a finding that the defendant
entered the plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Crawford v.
State, 117 Nev. 718, 722, 30 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2001), overruled on other
grounds by Stevensonl v. State, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 61, 354 P.3d 1277
(2015). We review a district court's determination regarding the validity
of a plea for a clear abuse of discretion. McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243,
250, 212 P.3d 307, 312 (2009).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Although Sawyer presented testimony from an expert who opined that
2 Sawyerdoes mit cite to any medical journals or legal authority
recognizing "traumatie bonding" or supporting the notion that traumatic
bonding could invalidate an otherwise valid plea.
3 Tothe extent Sawyer contends that he was found "incompetent" to
plead guilty, we reject his contention because Sawyer's expert stated at
the evidentiary hearing that Sawyer was competent, which was consistent
with the conclusions reached by those who evaluated Sawyer before he
entered his plea.
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Sawyer's plea was involuntary, the expert admitted that his opinion was
not based on a legal standard or a standard recognized in his profession
and was instead based, in large part, on his opinion that Sawyer was
innocent. See generally Hargrove u. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503, 686 P.2d
222, 226 (1984) ("The, question of an accused's guilt or innocence is
generally not at issue. in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea."). The
district court rejected this testimony and its decision to do so is supported
by the record. The district court found that Sawyer's testimony at the
evidentiary hearings, his statements at the guilty plea canvass, the
language of the guilty plea memorandum, counsel's testimony, and other
evidence in the record demonstrated that his plea was validly entered.
Crawford, 117 Nev. at 722, 30 P.3d at 1126. We agree and conclude that
no relief is warranted on this claim.
Ineffective-assistance claims
To prove , ineffective• assistance of counsel sufficient to
invalidate a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea, a petitioner
must demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and resulting prejudice such that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, petitioner would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill u.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988,
923 P.2d 1102, 11071(1996). Both components of the inquiry must be
shown. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). We give
deference to the court's factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of
the law to those facts. de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120
P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).
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Sawyer raised numerous ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims. First, he contended that counsel was ineffective for failing to
retain a psychiatrist. He claimed that, had counsel hired a psychiatrist,
counsel would have learned that his personality, mental disorders,
upbringing, and drug use, made him susceptible to influence from the real
killer and caused him to confess to a crime he did not commit. Second, he
contended that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate. He
claimed that, had counsel investigated, counsel would have uncovered
witnesses who heard the real killer confess and brag about manipulating
Sawyer into taking the fall. Third, he contended that counsel was
ineffective for permitting him to plead guilty to first-degree murder with
the use of a deadly weapon because the evidence suggested that the victim
was dead at the time the knife was used. 4
Trial counsel testified that, before Sawyer pleaded guilty, he
had contacted an investigator, an expert in false confessions, and a
4 0n appeal, Sawyer contends that counsel was ineffective for
permitting him to plead guilty to using a deadly weapon on the ground
that the deadly weapon enhancement "was a jury question under
Dunkhurst v. State, 102 Nev. 732 (Nev., 1986)." Dunkhurst is an
unreported summary dismissal of an appeal and does not stand for this
proposition. Moreover, Sawyer argued below that counsel was ineffective
for telling him that he "wouldn't get the weapons enhancement dropped."
The claim raised on appeal is not the same as that raised below and
therefore we decline to consider it. See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600, 606,
817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State,
120 Nev. 1001, 103 Pi 3d 25 (2004). For the same reason, we decline to
consider Sawyer's claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1)
"contact the authorities," (2) move to withdraw his guilty plea, (3) and
ensure that he was separately canvassed that the State had to prove he
used a deadly weapon. Id.
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forensic pathologist, and he filed a motion challenging the validity of the
deadly weapon enhancement. According to counsel, he was prepared to
follow through with these actions but Sawyer insisted upon pleading
guilty before the States offer expired. See McConnell v. State, 125 Nev.
243, 253, 212 P.3d 307, 314 (2009) ("Although counsel certainly owes a
duty to advise his client whether to plead guilty, counsel does not have the
authority to override a defendant's decision to plead guilty. That decision
is reserved to the client."). The district court found counsel's testimony,
which was supported by evidence in the record, to be credible. In contrast,
the district court found that Sawyer was not a credible witness given his
multiple versions of the murder, contradictory statements throughout the
proceedings, and acknowledgement that he had lied to the court. Sawyer
asserts that this court should overturn the district court's credibility
determinations because he presented evidence, in the form of phone calls
and letters to his friends and family that he wanted to go to trial but
counsel was encouraging him to plead guilty. The district court considered
this evidence and found that it was not compelling. We agree. The
district court's credibility determinations are supported by the record and
are not clearly erroneous. See State v. Rincon, 122 Nev. 1170, 1177, 147
P.3d 233, 238 (2006) ("We emphasize that the district court is in the best
position to adjudge the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence, and
unless this court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed, this court will not second-guess the trier of
fact." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that
Sawyer failed to demonstrate that counsel was deficient. Moreover, we
conclude that Sawyer , failed to demonstrate that, had counsel performed
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differently, there is a1 reasonable probability that he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted upon a tria1. 5 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
, J.
J.
Gibbons
cc: Hon. Elliott A. Sattler, District Judge
Mary Lou Wilson
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
5 Sawyer also I contended that counsel's errors, considered
cumulatively, warrant I relief. Because we have discerned no error, there
are no errors to cumuthe.
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