Ard v. Garcia

 Smith, 111 Nev. 528, 893 P.2d 372 (1995), and Wright v. Schum, 105 Nev.
611, 781 P.2d 1142 (1989), a landlord must assume some affirmative duty
to protect third-parties against their tenant's pets to have liability, and
here, the landlords took no action which imposed on them an affirmative
duty to protect the Ards from Wood's dogs. Additionally, the district court
found that the landlords' mere knowledge that Wood owned dogs did not
impose any type of duty upon them to investigate the nature of Wood's
dogs.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
(2005). The district court properly relied upon Harry and Wright. Under
Harry and Wright, a landlord only has a duty to protect third-parties from
his tenant's dogs if the landlord assumes a duty through his actions, i.e.
offers to fix a fence." Harry, 111 Nev. at 533-34, 893 P.2d at 375; Wright,
'On appeal, the Ards urge this court to abandon the standard
articulated in Harry and Wright, and apply the general premise liability
standard articulated in Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 110 Nev. 320, 333,
871 P.2d 935, 943 (1994), in order to determine whether the landlords
owed the Ards a duty of care. We decline to extend the general premise
liability standard to the dog attack scenario presented here at this time.
Yet, even under this standard, we would still affirm the district court,
because the harm (the dog attack) created by the defendants' conduct (the
landlords renting the property to Wood) was not foreseeable. See Sparks
v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 23, 255 P.3d 238, 244
(2011) ("[A] duty of care arises when (1) a special relationship exists
between the parties ... , and (2) the harm created by the defendant's
conduct is foreseeable." (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The harm was not foreseeable because dogs are presumed non-
violent and there was no evidence that Wood's dogs had a violent nature.
See, e.g., Goennenwein v. Rasof, 695 N.E.2d 541, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
("It is presumed that a dog is tame, docile, and harmless absent evidence
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121 Nev. at 618, 781 P.2d at 1146. Here, contrary to the Ards' argument,
the landlords did not owe the Ards any duty of care, because they took no
action which imposed a duty upon them. See Sparks v. Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity, Inc., 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 23, 255 P.3d 238, 244 (2011) (stating
that to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the
existence of a duty of care, which is a question of law). 2 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
, J.
Saitta
J.
J.
. . . continued
that the dog has demonstrated vicious propensities."). Further, courts do
not require landlords to investigate into the nature of their tenant's dogs.
See Georgianna v. Gizzy, 483 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)
(stating that requiring a landlord to investigate into a tenant's dog's
history would be "oppressive and unreasonable"); Robison v. Stokes, 882
P.2d 1105, 1106 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994) (explaining that a tenant's
contractual right to keep a dog is not tantamount to a landlord's approval
and knowledge of a dangerous dog, and a landlord does not have a duty to
inspect the property for a dangerous dog).
2 We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude
that they are without merit.
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cc: Hon. Susan Johnson, District Judge
Paternoster Law Group
Upson Smith/Las Vegas
Eighth District Court Clerk
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