Tulelake Horseradish, Inc. v. Santa Margarita Ranch LLC

 1283-84 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying Arizona law to conclude that a party to a
settlement agreement could still be deemed the prevailing party for the
purposes of recovering attorney fees pursuant to a statute); Khavarian
Enters., Inc. v. Commline, Inc., 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657, 665 (Ct. App. 2013)
("It is not unlawful for a plaintiff who filed a voluntary dismissal but
received a net monetary recovery through settlement to be found to be a
prevailing party."). Additionally, under federal law a party to a settlement
can be a prevailing party. See generally Buck hannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)
(explaining that "settlement agreements enforced through a consent
decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees" pursuant to
a statute that authorizes awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party).
Thus, we conclude that a party to a compromise settlement can be a
prevailing party under NRS 18.010(2)(a). See Albios v. Horizon Cmtys.,
Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 417, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006) (stating that we review
issues of statutory interpretation de novo).
Under 18,010(2)(a), the district court may make an allowance
of attorney's fees to a prevailing party . . [w]hen the prevailing party has
not recovered more than $20,000." Furthermore, "a money judgment is a
prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under [NRS 18.010(2)(a)]." 1
1-Santa Margarita argues that based upon Smith v. Crown Financial
Services, Tulelake cannot recover attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a)
because it did not receive a money judgment at trial. See Smith v. Crown
Fin. Servs. of Am., 111 Nev. 277, 280, 890 P.2d 769, 771 (1995) (stating
that "a party may recover attorney fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(a) only
if that party received a money judgment at trial" (emphasis added)). We,
however, view our addition of "at trial" in Crown Financial Services to our
rule from Woods, 107 Nev. at 427, 812 P.2d 1299, as dicta. See St. James
continued on next page . . .
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
Woods v. Label Inv. Corp., 107 Nev. 419, 427, 812 P.2d 1293, 1299 (1991),
overruled on other grounds by Hanneman v. Downer, 110 Nev. 167, 180
n.8, 871 P.2d 279, 287 n.8 (1994). Here, the offer of judgment awarded
Tulelake $20,000 and resulted in a money judgment in Tulelake's favor. 2
Thus, we conclude that Tulelake is potentially capable of receiving
attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a). 3 Accordingly, we remand for the
district court to determine: (1) whether Tulelake was the prevailing party,
(2) if so, whether to award Tulelake attorney fees, see 18.010(2)(a) ("[T]he
. continued
Village, Inc. v. Cunningham, 125 Nev. 211, 216, 210 P.3d 190, 193 (2009)
("Dictum is not controlling.").
2 Santa Margarita also contends that Tulelake cannot obtain
attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a) because a "judgment" was not
entered. Both NRCP 68(d) and NRS 17.115(2)(a) allow for dismissal of the
settled claim, instead of a judgment being entered, if the party that owes
money under the settlement requests dismissal and pays the offer amount
within a reasonable amount of time. Santa Margarita points out that it
requested dismissal and paid the offer amount within a reasonable
amount of time. We conclude, however, that the offer of judgment, as
evidenced by thefl parties' email exchange in the record, expressly
prohibited Santa Margarita from moving for dismissal. See Ringle v.
Bruton, 120 Nev. 82, 93, 86 P.3d 1032, 1039 (2004) ("When contract
language is ambiguous and incomplete. . . extrinsic evidence may be
admitted to determine the parties' intent, explain ambiguities, and supply
omissions."). Thus, pursuant to the offer of judgment, Tulelake was
entitled to have a money judgment entered against Santa Margarita,
which satisfies the prerequisite to an attorney fees award. Consequently,
we conclude that this argument by Santa Margarita fails.
3 We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude
that they are without merit.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party . .
(emphasis added)), and (3) if so, how much. 4 Consequently, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order.
, J.
Saitta
J.
Gibbons
J.
cc: Hon. Leon Aberasturi, District Judge
Laurie A. Yott, Settlement Judge
Law Office of James Shields Beasley
Law Offices of Roderic A. Carucci
Wayne A. Pederson, P.C.
Lyon County Clerk
4 We recognize that the district court found that Tulelake incurred
$33,865.00 in attorney fees in order to avoid remand if this court
determined that a party to a compromise settlement could be a prevailing
party. With this in mind, we still conclude that remand is appropriate
because fees from this appeal may be warranted, or the district court could
exercise its discretion in another way.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A