Dixon (Jerry) v. State

 The victim testified that Dixon, whom the victim had been dating and
residing with, strangled him and beat him, resulting in a deep laceration
to the victim's head which required numerous staples to close. See NRS
200.481(1)(a); NRS 200.485; NRS 33.018(1). The victim further testified
that Dixon forcefully took the victim's wallet, keys, and cell phone and
used violence and threats to prevent the victim from driving away from
the house. See NRS 200.380; NRS 207.190(1). While Dixon claims that
the victim's testimony conflicted with his own, it is up to the jury to assess
the witnesses' credibility and determine the weight to give their
testimony, and the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as
here, substantial evidence supports the verdict. See McNair, 108 Nev. at
56, 825 P.2d at 573.
Second, Dixon contends that the district court abused its
discretion in joining the domestic violence charges with the drug
possession charge. The joinder of charges is within the district court's
discretion and we will not reverse absent a showing that the "improperly
joined charges had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict."
Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 570-71, 119 P.3d 107, 119 (2005).
At trial, the victim testified that he had moved out of the
house he shared with Dixon because Dixon became secretive and began
bringing marijuana grow equipment into the house. Several weeks after
the victim moved out, the victim went to the house at Dixon's request, and
Dixon punched him and asked him "where his weed was." Dixon told the
victim that the victim was not safe because the marijuana belonged to
other people who believed that the victim had stolen it. The police, in
investigating the domestic violence incident, discovered marijuana in the
house.
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Dixon maintains that the domestic violence offenses and the
drug offense were not based on the same act or transaction and were not
part of a common scheme or plan, see NRS 173.115, and, further, that they
were not connected together because evidence from the domestic violence-
related offenses was not cross-admissible at a separate trial on the drug
possession offense, see Weber, 121 Nev. at 573, 119 P.3d at 120 (defining
" connected together" as requiring that evidence of each crime be cross-
admissible in a separate trial for the other). The question is close. But
even assuming joinder of the charges amounted to an abuse of discretion,
Dixon has failed to demonstrate that the joinder had a "substantial and
injurious effect" on the jury verdict, given the overwhelming evidence of
guilt presented by the State at trial on both the domestic violence-related
charges and the drug possession charge. See id. at 570, 119 P.M at 119.
Third, Dixon argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress marijuana that was discovered after a warrantless
entry into his home. When reviewing a district court's resolution of a
motion to suppress, we review its factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. State v. Lisenbee, 116 Nev. 1124, 1127, 13 P.3d
947, 949 (2000). Warrantless home entries are presumptively
unreasonable unless justified by a specific exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Hannon v. State, 125 Nev. 142,
145, 207 P.3d 344, 346 (2009). One such exception is an emergency home
entry where "law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis to
believe that there was an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of
themselves or others." Id. at 147, 207 P.3d at 347; see also Brigham City
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
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The district court determined that the entry of the home fell
into the emergency exception to the warrant requirement and denied
Dixon's motion to suppress. We agree. Although Dixon contends that the
altercation between him and the victim had ended before the police went
to the house and there was no concrete evidence that anyone was inside
his house or that a third person was involved, we conclude that the officers
had an "objectively reasonable basis" to believe that someone inside the
house needed help. See Hannon, 125 Nev. at 147, 207 P.3d at 347. In
particular, the officers saw movement and light in the house before
knocking on the front door, the front door had been forced open and the
lock was broken, blood was spattered on the floor, and Dixon's
whereabouts were unknown. Thus, the officers' emergency home entry did
not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the district court did not err by
denying Dixon's motion to suppress.
Fourth, Dixon argues that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by vouching for the victim's
credibility and asserting a personal opinion.' In analyzing allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, we take a two-step approach: we must first
"determine whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper," and if it was,
we must then "determine whether the improper conduct warrants
reversal." Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008).
It is unclear from the record whether the district court sustained Dixon's
"Dixon challenges two comments by the prosecutor: "So, you don't
have to take [the victim's] word for it although I can't imagine that
something happened that would make you not believe him but that's up to
you"; and "I think that it's certainly a stretch to say that [the victim's]
story is unbelievable."
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objection to the prosecutor's comments; we note that the objection should
have been sustained and the jury should have been instructed to disregard
the comments. Nevertheless, the improper comments do not warrant
reversal given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the prosecutor's
repeated emphasis to the jurors that it was their function to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. See id. at 1188-90, 196 P.3d at 476-77.
Having considered Dixon's contentions and concluded that no
relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
•
Saitta
Pick
PAr.0A 1,7 ' J.
cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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