City of Las Vegas v. Dist. Ct. Crowder (Ryan)

 134, 994 P.2d 692, 696 (2000); see also State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
(Armstrong), 127 Nev., Adv. Op. 84, 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (defining
"{a]n arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion [as] one founded on
prejudice or preference rather than on reason, or contrary to the evidence
or established rules of law." (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
Under the circumstances discussed below, we elect to exercise
our discretion and consider the petition. See NRS 34.160; NRS 34.170;
Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851
(1991) ("[T]he issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition is purely
discretionary with this court.").
Crowder was convicted in municipal court of driving under the
influence. See NRS 484C.110(1)(a). Crowder appealed from his conviction
to the district court, claiming that the City failed to present sufficient
evidence of his guilt. The district court agreed, finding that the City
elected not to present evidentiary breath or blood tests, attempted to make
arguments based on the administration of field sobriety tests, and lacked
sufficient evidence for a DUI prosecution.
"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the
critical question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the lightS most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Diomampo v.
State, 124 Nev. 414, 433, 185 P.3d 1031, 1043 (2008) (emphasis in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979). "In addition, where there is substantial evidence to
support a verdict in a criminal case . . . the reviewing court will not
disturb the verdict nor set aside the judgment." Diomampo, 124 Nev. at
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433, 185 P.3d at 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Substantial
evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Thompson v. State, 125 Nev. 807, 816, 221 P.3d
708, 715 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Insufficiency of the
evidence occurs where the prosecution has not produced a minimum
threshold of evidence upon which a conviction may be based." Id. at 816,
221 P.3d at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is the function of
the fact finder, not the appellate court, to assess the weight of the
evidence. See McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992).
Given these standards, we conclude that the district court
arbitrarily or capriciously exercised its discretion by reversing Crowder's
conviction for driving under the influence. The district court correctly
stated the standard for appellate review; however, our review of the record
reveals that the district court substituted its own judgment for that of the
trial court as to the weight of the evidence. The district court should have
focused on the evidence presented at trial rather than evidence that could
have made the case stronger. Additionally, the district court did not view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution when it
overlooked testimony as to the trooper's observations of Crowder and
speculated as to the effects Crowder's back pain may have had on the field
sobriety tests.
Having determined that the district court arbitrarily or
capriciously exercised its discretion, we
ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS instructing the
district court to vacate its order reversing real party in interest Ryan
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Crowder's conviction for driving under the influence and to remand the
matter to the municipal court for completion of the imposed sentence.'
CR_ J.
Parraguirre
c—DeD LA-et 4-2
Douglas
J.
cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge
Attorney General/Carson City
Las Vegas City Attorney
Las Vegas City Attorney/Criminal Division
Mueller Hinds & Associates
Eighth District Court Clerk
'We decline Crowder's request to impose the doctrine of laches to
preclude consideration of the petition. See Bu,ckholt v. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 94 Nev. 631, 633, 584 P.2d 672, 673 (1978), overruled on other
grounds by Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 88 P.3d 840
(2004).
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