DocketNumber: 67060
Filed Date: 9/14/2015
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 9/15/2015
A claim for additional presentence credit should be raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in compliance with the procedural requirements set forth in NRS chapter 34, see Griffin v. State,122 Nev. 737
, 744,137 P.3d 1165
, 1169 (2006), and thus appellant's motion should have been construed as a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, appellant improperly sought relief in a motion and the district court improperly considered the motion without construing it as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and requiring appellant to comply with applicable procedural requirements, see, e.g., NRS 34.730 (requiring that the petition be verified); NRS 34.735 (outlining the form and specificity of facts for the petition). Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand with instructions to construe the motion as a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 Accordingly, we 2 The district court should also consider when appellant expired his parole in determining whether he was entitled to any credits in the case. See NRS 176.055(2) ("A defendant who is convicted of a subsequent offense which was committed while [he] was . . . on probation or parole from a Nevada conviction is not eligible for any credit on the sentence for the subsequent offense for the time he has spent in confinement which is within the period of the prior sentence." (emphasis added)). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order. 3 r j. es; >e,••—94nA Parraguirre , J. akSZAL Douglas 19.7 Cherry cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge Ryan Isidro Flores Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk 3 We have considered all documents that appellant has submitted in pro se to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude that appellant is only entitled to the relief set forth in this order. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A