Craciun (Robert) v. State

 frequently worked in the area, did not recognize Craciun and when they
ran his license plate they learned the vehicle was not registered to the
complex. Craciun exited the vehicle and did not appear to be elderly or
disabled. He approached the back doors of various residences and peered
through the windows rather than knocking. He then lingered between the
buildings while frequently looking over his shoulder and talking on his cell
phone. At this point, an officer approached Craciun and asked to speak
with him. Based upon the officer's observations, which he interpreted as
consistent with trespassing and drug-related activity, he performed a pat-
down for weapons. After feeling an item that was not a weapon, he asked
Craciun if he could perform a full search. Craciun consented, and drugs
were recovered.
First, Craciun contends that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress because (1) law enforcement lacked
reasonable suspicion to believe that he was engaged in drug-related or
other criminal activity, and (2) at most, law enforcement could only
reasonably have suspected that he was trespassing and it is
unconstitutional to seize a person for such a minor crime.
An officer may briefly seize a suspect if he has "reasonable
articulable suspicion that the suspect has committed, is committing or is
. . . continued
transcripts from the grand jury proceeding. The Honorable Stefanie Miley
considered and denied Craciun's second motion to suppress made during
trial. It is unclear which order Craciun challenges on appeal; however, we
have reviewed and considered the transcripts of each proceeding,
including those provided by the State, in making our determination and
have summarized the courts' findings.
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about to commit a crime." Somee v. State, 124 Nev. 434, 442, 187 P.3d
152, 158 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also NRS
171.123(1). Here, the officer supported his decision to engage Craciun and
briefly detain him with specific facts that, based upon his experience and
training, he inferred as consistent with criminal activity—facts that may
have been innocent in isolation "but which taken together warranted
further investigation." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Craciun's
detention was limited in scope and reasonable in the light of the public
interest and Craciun's right to be free of government interference. See
NRS 171.123(4); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
Having considered the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the
district court did not err by denying Craciun's motion to suppress on these
grounds.
Second, Craciun contends that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress because neither the pat-down nor the
subsequent full search were supported by reasonable suspicion. A pat-
down for weapons is constitutionally sound so long as "a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Here,
the officer reasonably suspected that Craciun was engaging in criminal
activity and nothing about Craciun's behavior after the initial encounter
"gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis." Id. at 28. The
officer also testified that the area was notorious for violent activity,
including drug sales, and that he was separated from his partner. These
facts support the officer's belief that a pat-down was warranted. See NRS
171.1232(1); Somee, 124 Nev. at 442, 187 P.3d at 158 (reasonable
articulable suspicion of drug-related activity is a relevant consideration in
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determining whether a pat-down is warranted). Because the pat-down
complied with constitutional parameters and Craciun consented to the
subsequent full search which uncovered the drugs, see State v. Ruscetta,
123 Nev. 299, 302, 163 P.3d 451, 454 (2007), we conclude that the district
court did not err by denying his motion to suppress on this ground.
Having considered Craciun's contentions and concluded that
they lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2
J.
Hardesty
cc: Hon. Stefany Miley, District Judge
Jonathan L. Powell
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
2 Craciun's fast track statement does not comply with the Nevada
Rules of Appellate Procedure because it fails to contain adequate citation
to the record, see NRAP 3C(e)(1)(C), and does not contain one-inch
margins on all sides, see NRAP 3C(h)(1); NRAP 32(a)(4). The appendix to
Craciun's fast track statement does not comply with the Nevada Rules of
Appellate Procedure because it does not contain all necessary transcripts.
See NRAP 3C(d)(3)(C). The State's fast track response fails to comply with
the Nevada Rules of Appellate procedure because it is not double-spaced.
See NRAP 3C(h)(1); NRAP 32(a)(4). We caution counsel for both parties
that future failure to comply with the applicable rules when filing briefs in
this court may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).
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