Vanwinkle (Gene) v. State

 The holding in Lewis that NRS 177.015(1)(b) does not apply to
intermediate orders that can be reviewed on appeal from the final
judgment, 124 Nev. at 136, 178 P.3d 148, is not inconsistent with the plain
language of NRS 177.015(1)(b). 1 Although the plain language of NRS
177.015(1)(b) does not limit the right to appeal based on when the motion
for new trial was filed or when the order resolving it was entered, NRS
177.045 permits a party to challenge an intermediate order on appeal from
the judgment of conviction. Lewis harmonizes both of these appeal
provisions and avoids double appeals from pre-judgment orders that may
be challenged on appeal from the judgment of conviction. See Washington
v. State, 117 Nev. 735, 739, 30 P.3d 1134, 1136 (2001) ("Statutes within a
scheme and provisions within a statute must be interpreted harmoniously
with one another in accordance with the general purpose of those statutes
and should not be read to produce unreasonable or absurd results."). And
Lewis does not conflict with either Allgood or Fairman. In Allgood, this
court identified appeals from orders granting or refusing a new trial, as
allowed under an earlier statute using the same language as NRS
177.015(1)(b), as some of the few "appeals authorized before
pronouncement of a final judgment." 78 Nev. at 328, 372 P.2d at 467. But
Allgood did not involve such an appeal and the observation was not a
holding. In Fairman, this court resolved on the merits an appeal from a
prejudgment order denying a motion for new trial, 83 Nev. 138, 425 P.2d
at 343, but in so doing this court did not address its jurisdiction or
interpret the appeal statute.
'This court may need to revisit Lewis as it pertains to the
appealability of orders granting prejudgment motions for a new trial, but
that issue is not currently before this court.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
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(0) 1947A 9 s
Because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an
order denying a motion in arrest of judgment or to set aside the verdict,
see Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990), and
because an order denying a pre-judgment motion for a new trial is an
intermediate order that can and should be reviewed on appeal from the
judgment of conviction, see NRS 177.045, we lack jurisdiction to consider
this appeal, and we
ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.
p
Parraguirre
cc: Hon. Michael P. Gibbons, District Judge
Kristine L. Brown
Attorney General/Carson City
Douglas County District Attorney/Minden
Douglas County Clerk
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