Arreguini v. Arreguini (Child Custody)

 requesting immediate primary physical custody of the two oldest children.
After conducting a hearing, the district court entered an order on
November 8, 2012, awarding appellant sole legal and physical custody of
the two oldest children and concluding that reunification efforts were no
longer in the children's best interests. The district court transmitted that
order to this court, and it was filed in this appeal.
Jurisdiction to modify custody while appeal pending
Because it appeared that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to modify custody while this appeal was pending, we directed appellant to
show cause why this portion of the appeal should not be remanded under
Huneycutt v. Huneycutt, 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978), and ultimately
dismissed as moot. Having considered appellant's response, as well as the
procedural posture of this case, we conclude that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to grant appellant sole legal and physical custody of the two
oldest children in the November 8, 2012, order.
During the pendency of an appeal, the district court is without
jurisdiction to revisit issues that are before this court. Mack-Manley v.
Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 855, 138 P.3d 525, 529-30 (2006). This court has
set forth a procedure for a limited remand when a party seeks to modify
custody issues that are pending on appeal. See Huneycutt, 94 Nev. 79, 575
P.2d 585, and Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. , 228 P.3d 453 (2010).
Appellant, who was represented by counsel at the time, elected not to
follow that procedure and sought a custody modification from the district
court without a limited remand. We certainly recognize that reunification
can be challenging and that the district court may make temporary
adjustments to custody on an emergency basis to protect the children's
welfare. Id. at 856, 138 P.3d at 530. But here, the district court's award
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of sole custody to appellant was more permanent in nature, and thus, we
conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter that order
while this appeal was pending. Accordingly, the November 8, 2012, order
is void and ineffective to the extent that it actually changes the custody
arrangement, and we vacate that order. We express no opinion as to the
merits of that order, and the district court may reenter it once jurisdiction
is transferred back to that court.'
Custody arrangement as to youngest child
The district court's November 8, 2012, order did not indicate
any intent to alter the parties' joint custody of the youngest child.
Therefore, we will review this appeal as to that child. On appeal,
appellant contends that the district court improperly applied a higher,
beyond a reasonable doubt, standard, rather than the preponderance of
the evidence standard applicable to custody modifications, when
determining whether respondent had physically abused the youngest
child. Appellant argues that there was substantial evidence to support the
allegations of respondent's abuse. Appellant also contends that the
district court expressed bias against her at trial by making objections on
'In response to our order to show cause, appellant contends that this
appeal is not moot because the custody change was based on reunification
difficulties, and the district court did not reverse its finding that
respondent's alleged abuse was unsubstantiated. We disagree. The issue
before the district court was one of child custody. Once the district court
reenters an order granting appellant sole legal and physical custody of the
two oldest children, appellant is no longer aggrieved as to them, and there
is no reason for this court to reach the factual issue concerning abuse. If,
however, the district court changes its ruling on remand, appellant may
appeal from that determination if aggrieved. See Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 874 P.2d 729 (1994).
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behalf of respondent, who was representing himself, and reprimanding
appellant's counsel for asking leading questions.
A court may modify primary physical custody when there has
been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare,
and the child's best interest is served by the modification. Ellis v. Carucci,
123 Nev. 145, 150-51, 161 P.3d 239, 242-43 (2007). Generally, in
establishing the child's best interest, the court applies a preponderance of
the evidence standard. See Mack v. Ashlock, 112 Nev. 1062, 1066, 921
P.2d 1258, 1261 (1996); but see NRS 125C.230(1) (providing that clear and
convincing evidence of domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption
that custody with the perpetrator is not in the child's best interest). Child
custody matters rest in the district court's sound discretion. Wallace v.
Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996); Sims v. Sims, 109
Nev. 1146, 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). The district court's factual
determinations must be supported by substantial evidence. Rico v.
Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 701, 120 P.3d 812, 816 (2005).
Here, the district court determined that the child abuse
allegations against respondent were unsubstantiated by social services
and that the district attorney's office declined to bring criminal charges
against respondent. The court considered conflicting testimony from
professional therapists and determined that appellant did not show by a
preponderance of the evidence that respondent had abused the children or
that it was in the youngest child's best interest to grant appellant primary
physical custody. It is the duty of the trier of fact, not an appellate court,
to weigh the credibility of witnesses. Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 103,
86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that
the district court was fair and unbiased at trial and applied the correct
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evidentiary standard. We further conclude that the district court's
findings are supported by substantial evidence and that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in its custody determination. See Rico, 121
Nev. at 701, 120 P.3d at 816; Wallace, 112 Nev. at 1019, 922 P.2d at 543.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's custody determination as to the
youngest child. This is our final decision in this appeal. Any further
appeal in this matter shall be assigned a new docket number.
It is so ORDERED.
Saitta
cc: Hon. Chuck Weller, District Judge, Family Court Division
Samantha Arreguini
Jerod Arreguini
Washoe District Court Clerk
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