Bradford v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.

129 Nev., Advance Opinion 60
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
GEANIE BRADFORD, No. 61129
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
FILED
SANDRA L. POMRENZE, DISTRICT AUG 29 1013
JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
KEVIN BRADFORD,
Real Party in Interest.
Original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
challenging a district court order dismissing a divorce complaint.
Petition denied.
Abrams Law Firm, LLC, and Jennifer V. Abrams and Vincent Mayo, Las
Vegas,
for Petitioner.
James M. Davis Law Office and James M. Davis, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest.
BEFORE PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and SAITTA, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:
In this original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition,
petitioner Geanie Bradford challenges a district court order finding that
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she and real party in interest Kevin Bradford were never legally married.
Although it appears that the district court may have been in error, Geanie
never appealed the court's order. We must determine whether Geanie's
failure to timely appeal the order precludes writ relief. In doing so, we
must consider whether the validity of the parties' marriage is an issue
that we would have an opportunity to meaningfully review on appeal. We
conclude that it is, and that an appeal would have been an adequate legal
remedy. Accordingly, writ relief is precluded.
FACTS
Geanie and Kevin were married on December 27, 2008, by
newly elected district court judge Bryce Duckworth. Although Judge
Duckworth had sworn his oath of office four days earlier, on December 23,
2008, he was not authorized to take the bench until January 5, 2009. Nev.
Const. art. 6, § 5.
Geanie filed for divorce from Kevin in 2011. In her divorce
complaint, she sought custody of the couple's minor child born on
September 18, 2007. At the divorce hearing, the district court sua sponte
questioned whether Judge Duckworth had authority to solemnize the
marriage and thus whether the parties were legally married. Although
the parties neither briefed this issue nor were given an opportunity to
formally argue it before the district court, the district court concluded that
a judge does not have authority to solemnize a marriage until his or her
term actually starts because simply being sworn in does not confer any
actual authority. Because the court found as a result that there was no
valid marriage, the court dismissed Geanie's divorce complaint as moot.
Although the record is unclear as to when a separate custody case was
initiated, the district court's dismissal order stated that the custody issues
would be resolved in a separate companion custody case. Geanie did not
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appeal the district court's dismissal order, and she failed to seek any other
relief until one year later, when she filed her writ petition with this court.
DISCUSSION
This court has discretion to entertain a petition for
extraordinary writ relief. Int? Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 124 Nev. 193, 198, 179 P.3d 556, 559 (2008). But we have
consistently recognized that writ relief is available only "when there is no
plain, adequate and speedy legal remedy." Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004); see Cnty. of Washoe v.
City of Reno, 77 Nev. 152, 155, 360 P.2d 602, 603 (1961); State ex rel.
Brown v. Nev. Indus. Comm'n, 40 Nev. 220, 225, 161 P. 516, 517 (1916);
see also NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330. Generally, the right to appeal is an
adequate legal remedy that precludes consideration of a writ petition.
Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 840-41. Moreover, a writ petition is not a
substitute for an untimely appeal. Id. at 224-25, 88 P.3d at 841 (citing
Rim View Trout Co. v. Dep't of Water Res., 809 P.2d 1155, 1156-57 (Idaho
1991); State ex rel. Hulse v. Montgomery Circuit Court, 561 N.E.2d 497,
498 (Ind. 1990); State ex rel. Boardwalk Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga Cnty., 564 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio 1990)).
Geanie argues that writ relief is appropriate because the
district court's order dismissing her complaint as moot was not appealable
as a valid, final judgment. See NRAP 3A(b)(1) (stating that final
judgments are appealable). She contends that the order was not valid
because the district court reached the wrong legal conclusion, and that it
was not final because a companion custody case is ongoing and addresses
issues that were involved in the divorce case. We disagree.
It appears that the district court's conclusion that Geanie and
Kevin were never legally married may have been in error. Both NRS
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122.090 and the de facto officer doctrine provide that a marriage
performed by a person without actual authority to solemnize the marriage
is nevertheless valid if both parties shared a good-faith belief that the
person had the required authority. NRS 122.090; State ex rel. Busteed v.
Harmon, 38 Nev. 5, 6-7, 143 P. 1183, 1184 (1914). Regardless, an
incorrect legal conclusion does not render a judgment invalid or void. See
generally State ex rel. Smith v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 63 Nev. 249,
256-57, 167 P.2d 648, 651 (1946) (noting that a judgment rendered when
jurisdiction exists may be valid even though erroneous), overruled on other
grounds by Poirier v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 81 Nev. 384, 387, 404 P.2d 1,
2-3 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe
Homeowners Ass'n, 116 Nev. 646, 648-49, 5 P.3d 569, 570-71 (2000); 46
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 29 (2006) ("A judgment is not void simply
because it is erroneous."). A judgment's validity depends on whether the
district court had jurisdiction, not whether it reached the correct legal
result. State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Cord, 81 Nev. 403, 407, 404 P.2d 422,
424 (1965). Here, the district court had jurisdiction to consider the divorce
complaint before it.' NRS 125.020.
In addition, the pending separate custody suit does not render
ongoing the issues involved in the divorce proceeding. The custody case is
a separate action, not a continuation of the divorce case. Thus, the district
court order dismissing the divorce complaint was a final, appealable
1-We reject Geanie's argument that mandamus relief is required
because the district court refused to take jurisdiction over Geanie's divorce
complaint. The district court did not dismiss Geanie's divorce complaint
on jurisdictional grounds; it dismissed the complaint as moot because it
found that the parties were never validly married and thus could not
obtain a divorce.
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judgment. See Simmons Self-Storage Partners, LLC v. Rib Roof, Inc., 127
Nev. 247 P.3d 1107, 1108 (2011) (stating that "[a] final judgment
is generally defined as one that resolves all of the parties' claims and
rights in the action, leaving nothing for the court's future consideration
except for post-judgment issues").
Because the district court's order was a valid, final, and
appealable judgment, we must determine whether an appeal would have
constituted an adequate legal remedy. To determine whether an appeal is
an adequate legal remedy, this court considers "'whether [an] appeal will
permit this court to meaningfully review the issues presented." Halcrow,
Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. „ 302 P.3d 1148, 1151
(2013) (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev.
468, 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736 (2007)). Although this court will not
consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal, In re
AMERCO Derivative Litigation, 127 Nev. , n.6, 252 P.3d 681, 697
n.6 (2011), the validity of the parties' marriage was raised sua sponte by
the district court below and was the ground for dismissal of the divorce
complaint. We see no reason why Geanie would not have been able to
argue, and we would not have been able to consider, the validity of her
marriage on appeal. Therefore, we conclude that writ relief is
inappropriate because an appeal would have been an adequate legal
remedy.
We recognize that Geanie's failure to timely appeal or move to
set aside the district court's order leaves her without legal recourse to
challenge the district court's conclusion. However, as noted, "writ relief is
not available to correct an untimely notice of appeal," Pan, 120 Nev. at
224-25, 88 P.3d at 841, and her failure to timely challenge the district
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court's order by appeal, NRCP 60(b) motion, or otherwise has resulted in
both parties relying on the validity of the order in their subsequent
pursuits. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to entertain
this writ petition, and it is thus denied.
fireAA J.
Hardesty
We concur:
Pick
Pieke/t. We
' , C.J.
Saitta
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