Gorsuch (Gregory) v. State

 charged with felony possession, and moved to suppress the
methamphetamine, which the district court denied. Gorsuch then pleaded
guilty while maintaining the right to appellate review of the denial of his
suppression motion, the subject of the instant appeal.
In reviewing a district court decision on a motion to suppress,
we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and the legal
consequences of those facts, including the constitutionality of a search or
seizure, de novo. State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. , 312 P.3d 467, 469
(2013); State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. „ 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013).
Gorsuch asserts two reasons why the motion to suppress should have been
granted.
Gorsuch first argues that the justice court did not have the
authority to order searches without any cause as a condition of his
misdemeanor suspended sentence. The court need not reach this issue,
however, because the justice court had authority to order, as a condition of
Gorsuch's probation based on a suspended sentence, that he Islubmit to
periodic tests to determine whether the offender is using a controlled
substance or consuming alcohol." NRS 4.373(1)(h). Therefore, the justice
court had authority to order Gorsuch to submit to periodic drug testing
with DAS.
Second, Gorsuch argues that, regardless of his probation
conditions, the drug test was unreasonable. This court considers the
overall reasonableness of a probationer search to determine whether it
complies with the probationer's rights. Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 94-95,
590 P.2d 1152, 1155-56 (1979); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118 (2001) (looking to the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a search is reasonable). And, a warrantless search of a
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probationer may be reasonable if based on reasonable grounds and
conducted pursuant to a reasonable probation condition. Seim, 95 Nev. at
94-95, 590 P.2d at 1155-56.
Here, Gorsuch's underlying conviction was for drug
possession, and he had previously violated his probation conditions twice
by using methamphetamine before he was subjected to the at-issue drug
test. Gorsuch's previous and known drug use resulting in probation
violations gave DAS reasonable grounds to test Gorsuch. Furthermore,
the condition here was reasonable and tailored to Gorsuch's underlying
offense and subsequent behavior. The lower court ordered the periodic
drug testing condition only after Gorsuch's second drug-related probation
violation. And this condition furthered a legitimate underlying purpose of
probation. See People v. Balestra, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83-84 (Ct. App.
1999) (concluding that drug testing at the probation officer's discretion
was a valid condition of probation because it was intended "to aid the
probation officer in ensuring the probationer is complying with the
fundamental probation condition, to obey all laws"); Smith v. State, 298
S.E.2d 482, 483 (Ga. 1983) ("The requirement that a probationer, upon
request, produce body fluid for analysis is reasonable as an aid in
determining compliance with the prohibition upon the use of controlled
substances.").
In other words, as the district court held, "the condition was
imposed because of the underlying crime and subsequent violations," and
"the crime coupled with those violations are what gave rise to the officers'
reasonable suspicions in the instant case." Thus, the warrantless drug
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test here was reasonable, and the district court did not err in denying the
motion to suppress. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
01)6_ )1
74
Pickering
Parra;*tra m
, J.
ta
cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge
State Public Defender/Carson City
Attorney General/Carson City
Carson City District Attorney
Carson City Clerk
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