misunderstood the plea negotiations as they were represented by retained counsel, (2) he entered the guilty plea agreement based on retained counsel's representation that his codefendant had made a written statement against him when in fact the codefendant had only made an oral statement against him, and (3) he was impaired by mental health issues when he entered his plea. Appointed counsel informed the district court that nothing in the record substantiated these claims. The district court observed that no written motion to withdraw guilty plea had been filed. It asked appointed counsel if he wished to file a written motion and if there was a basis to do so. Appointed counsel responded no, whereupon the district court proceeded with sentencing. The record does not demonstrate that Bickford sought to withdraw his guilty plea based on an alleged breach of the guilty plea agreement (one of the grounds asserted on appeal), that appointed counsel requested an evidentiary hearing, or that a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea was properly before the district court. See EDCR 3.70 (defendant who has counsel cannot file motions); EDCR 7.40(a) (defendant who has counsel cannot appear on his own behalf without court's consent). Accordingly, we conclude that Bickford has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in this regard, and we ORDER the amended judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. J. SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge Clark County Public Defender Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (01 I947A ogpF,