Lewis Vs. Sfr Invs. Pool 1, Llc

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
KAREN LEWIS, No. 82131
Appellant,
vs.
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, A FILED
NEVADA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY; AND SOUTHERN DEC I 7 2021
HIGHLANDS COMMUNITY ELIZAS _ A. BRowN
CLERK c• EME ØRT
ASSOCIATION, A NEVADA NON-
PROFIT CORPORATION, Kg' CLERK
Res • ondents.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from district court order granting a motion to
dismiss in a real property matter. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Eric Johnson, Judge.'
In 2009, appellant Karen Lewis paid respondent Southern
Highlands Community Association $1,115.79 in an attempt to cure the
default on her HOA assessments. However, Southern Highlands proceeded
to foreclose on the property in 2012, at which respondent SFR Investments
purchased the property. Thereafter, litigation ensued between SFR and the
beneficiary of the deed of trust that secured the property regarding the
validity of the HONs foreclosure sale. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Southern Highlands Cmty. Ass'n, Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, Case No. A-
13-683554-C. Although Lewis was initially named as a defendant in that
case and was served with a copy of both the deed of trust beneficiary's
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted in this appeal.
Complaint as well as SFR's Answer and Counterclaim, 2 she did not make
an appearance, and all claims purportedly asserted against her were
voluntarily dismissed by 2015.
In 2016, the district court in the Wells Fargo case entered a
judgment setting aside the foreclosure sale on the ground that Lewis's
payment to Southern Highlands cured the default, such that the foreclosure
sale was void.3 On appeal, however, this court reversed the judgment,
reasoning that Lewis had failed to pay amounts that had accrued in
addition to her $1,115.79 payment, such that she had not fully cured the
default and that the foreclosure sale was therefore valid. See SFR Invs.
Pool 1, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 70471, 2018 WL 6609670, at *1
(Nev. Dec. 13, 2018) (Order of Reversal and Remand).4
In 2020, Lewis filed the underlying action against SFR and
Southern Highlands. As relevant to this appeal, Lewis's complaint alleged
that Southern Highlands had wrongfully foreclosed on her property in 2012
because she was not in default and because Southern Highlands failed to
mail the Notice of Trustee's Sale to her Pennsylvania address. Her
complaint additionally alleged that SFR "wrongfully took possession" of the
property in 2013 but that she regained possession of and title to the
2Although Lewis denies being served with these documents, the
record in this case contains affidavits of service attesting that she was
personally served with these documents at her Pennsylvania address.
3A1though this judgment does not reference Lewis, she contends that
the judgment's practical effect was to reinstate her as the titleholder and
possessor of the subject property. Neither Southern Highlands nor SFR
meaningfully dispute that contention.
4The record reflects that, on remand, SFR and the deed of trust
beneficiary stipulated to dismiss the Wells Fargo case.
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property following the district court's 2016 judgment in the Wells Fargo
case. Finally, she alleged that SFR wrongfully evicted her and destroyed
her property in 2019 following this court's disposition in Docket No. 70471.
Her complaint asserted 13 claims generally pertaining to these allegations,
including claims for (1) quiet title, (2) "void documents," (3) declaratory
relief, and (4) unjust enrichment.
Southern Highlands filed an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss,
arguing that Lewis's claims either did not pertain to Southern Highlands or
that the claims were untimely under what Southern Highlands believed to
be the statute of limitations applicable to those claims, all of which,
according to Southern Highlands, accrued at the latest when Lewis was
served with the pleadings in the Wells Fargo case. In particular, Southern
Highlands argued (1) Lewis's claim for quiet title was governed by NRS
11.080s five-year limitations period; (2) Lewis's claim for "void documents"
was not a legally cognizable claim and, to the extent that it was, it was
subject to NRS 11.190(3)(0s three-year limitations period; (3) Lewis's claim
for "declaratory relief was governed by the same limitations period as the
underlying substantive claim for quiet title; and (4) Lewis's claim for unjust
enrichment either did not pertain to Southern Highlands or, to the extent
that it did pertain to Southern Highlands, it was subject to NRS
11.190(2)(c)'s four-year limitations period. Southern Highlands
additionally asked the district court to take judicial notice of various
documents, including the affidavits of service from the Wells Fargo case.5
In opposition, Lewis argued generally that the "discovery rule"
tolled any applicable limitations periods. As for her quiet title claim, she
5SFR filed a joinder to Southern Highlands' motion.
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argued that NRS 11.080s five-year limitations period did not accrue until
2019 when SFR wrongfully evicted her because the 2016 judgment in the
Wells Fargo case invalidating Southern Highlands foreclosure sale had the
effect of reinstating Lewis as the owner and possessor of the property. With
no explanation, Lewis made the same argument regarding her "void
documente claim. Lewis did not address her declaratory relief claim. As
for her unjust enrichment claim, Lewis argued that claim was viable
against SFR but made no argument as to its viability against Southern
Highlands.
At a hearing, the district court sought clarification regarding
the bases for Lewis's claims. Lewis reiterated her argument regarding the
quiet title claim, suggested that the "void documente claim applied only to
SFR, again did not address the declaratory relief claim, and again made no
argument as to her unjust enrichment claim's viability against Southern
Highlands. Thereafter, the district court entered an order granting
Southern Highlands' motion in its entirety, including Southern Highlands'
request for judicial notice. It determined that Lewis's quiet title claim was
time-barred by NRS 11.080, which accrued in 2012 at the time of Southern
Highlands' foreclosure sale. In so doing, the district court reasoned that the
2016 judgment in the Wells Fargo case did not toll the limitations period
because that judgment did not end the Wells Fargo litigation and the
judgment was ultimately reversed by this court. The district court ruled
that Lewis's "void documente' claim was time-barred and, alternatively,
that the claim was not asserted against Southern Highlands (consistent
with Lewies suggestion at the hearing). The district court also ruled that
the declaratory relief claim was governed by the same limitations period as
the underlying substantive claim for quiet title and was likewise time-
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barred. The district court further ruled that the unjust enrichment claim
was time-barred and, alternatively, that the claim was not asserted against
Southern Highlands.
Lewis then filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the
district court's order granting Southern Highlands NRCP 12(b)(5) motion.
Therein, she reiterated her argument that her possession of and title to the
property from 2016 to 2019 reset NRS 11.080s five-year limitations period
and that her quiet title claim was timely. She also argued that her "void
documents" claim was not subject to any statute of limitations. Relatedly,
she argued that her declaratory relief claim was not subject to any statute
of limitations. Additionally, she argued that she had asserted an unjust
enrichment claim against Southern Highlands.
At a hearing on her motion, the district court commented that
Lewis was "trying to bring up new legal arguments which isn't necessarily
a proper basis for reconsideration." Thereafter, the district court entered
an order denying Lewis's motion for reconsideration against Southern
Highlands, as well as an order granting SFR's motion to dismiss Lewis's
quiet title claim as time-barred. This appeal followed.
On appeal Lewis argues (1) her "void documente claim was not
subject to any statute of limitations, (2) her declaratory relief claim was not
subject to any statute of limitations, and (3) she had asserted an unjust
enrichment claim against Southern Highlands. She additionally argues (4)
her quiet title claim was timely6 because (a) NRS 11.080s five-year
61n her reply brief, Lewis contends that she is arguing that all her
claims were timely. However, Lewis's opening brief coherently argues only
that her quiet title claim was timely. Cf. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden
Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (observing
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limitation period was reset in 2016 once she regained possession of and title
to the property, but even if the limitation period was not reset (b) the district
court erroneously relied on documents outside of the allegations in her
coraplaint to determine when she was on notice of her quiet title claim.7
As for arguments 1, 2, and 3, we conclude that the district court
was within its discretion in declining to consider those arguments, as they
were raised for the first time in Lewis's motion for reconsideration. See
Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 417, 168 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007) (observing that
a district court has discretion in deciding to consider the merits of
arguments made for the first time in a motion for reconsideration); Achrem
v. Expressway Plaza Ltd., 112 Nev. 737, 742, 917 P.2d 447, 450 (1996)
("Points or contentions not raised in the original hearing cannot be
maintained or considered on rehearing."); see also AA Primo Builders, LLC
v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010) (reviewing a
district court's decision on a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
discretion).
The first part of appellant's fourth argument implicates this
court's decision in Berberich v. Bank of America, N.A., 136 Nev. 93, 97, 460
P.3d 440, 443 (2020), which addressed when a quiet title claim accrues for
purposes of triggering NRS 11.080s five-year limitations period.
that it is a party's responsibility to present cogent arguments supported by
salient authority).
7Lewis's argument regarding the district court's reliance on
documents outside of her complaint primarily pertains to the district court's
finding that she was in default on her HOA dues. Lewis does not explain
how this purportedly erroneous finding has any bearing on the validity or
timeliness of her claims, nor is any explanation self-evident, and we
therefore decline to address this specific component of her argument.
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Specifically, Berberich clarified that "the limitations period in NRS 11.080
does not run against a plaintiff seeking to quiet title while still seized or
possessed of the property," but that "the limitations period is triggered
when the plaintiff is ejected from the property or, has had the validity or
legality of his or her ownership or possession of the property called into
question." Id. at 96-97, 460 P.3d at 442-43. According to Lewis, because
she was "seized" and "possessed" of the property from 2016 to 2019, NRS
11.080 was not triggered until 2019, even though her complaint explicitly
alleged that "in 2013, SFR wrongfully took possession of the Property"
following the 2012 foreclosure sale.
Lewis's argument takes Berberich out of context because
Berberich did not address a situation in which a property owner was ejected
from property but then subsequently regained possession of the property.
Thus, Berberich's comment that "the limitations period . . . does not run
against a plaintiff.. . . while still seized or possessed of the property" does
not stand for the proposition that NRS 11.080s limitations period is reset if
a property owner who has previously been ejected from the property
subsequently regains possession of the property. 136 Nev. at 96-97, 460
P.3d at 442-43. Rather, in its appropriate context, Berberich stands for the
proposition that "the limitations period is triggered when the plaintiff is
{initially] ejected from the property or has had the validity or legality of his
or her ownership or possession of the property called into question." Id. at
97, 460 P.3d at 443. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined
that the district court's judgment in the Wells Fargo case did not have the
effect of tolling or resetting NRS 11.080s five-year period.
The second part of appellant's fourth argument implicates this
court's "discovery rule," which recognizes that "the statutory period of
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limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or reasonably should
have discovered facts supporting a cause of action." Petersen v. Bruen, 106
Nev. 271, 274, 792 P.2d 18, 20 (1990). According to Lewis, the district court
improperly considered documents outside of the allegations in her
complaint to determine that she "discovered" her quiet title claim at the
time of Southern Highlands 2012 foreclosure sale and that NRS 11.080s
five-year period was triggered at that point. Cf. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of
N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008) (recognizing that
when considering an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion, the court must "recognize all
factual allegations in [the plaintiffs] complaint as true and draw all
inferences in its favoe). We agree with Lewis to the extent that the district
court disregarded the allegations in her complaint that she was never
served with the Notice of Trustee's Sale before the 2012 foreclosure and, by
implication, that she was unaware that the sale took place when it did.8
Nonetheless, Lewis's own complaint demonstrated that she "discovered" her
quiet title claim at the latest when "in 2013, SFR wrongfully took possession
of the Property." Given that Lewis was on notice of Southern Highlands'
foreclosure by 2013 once SFR evicted her and/or her tenant from the
property, she had five years from that time to assert a quiet title claim,
thereby rendering her 2020 quiet title claim time-barred.9 Accordingly, we
8The district court's order does not specify what documents it relied
upon in determining that Lewis "discovered" her quiet title claim in 2012.
9SFR specifically raised this argument in its answering brief. Lewis
has not argued in her reply brief that her tenant failed to notify her that
SFR had taken possession of the property in 2013, such that Lewis's quiet
title claim may have accrued at a later date. Cf. Ozawa v. Vision Airlines,
Inc., 125 Nev. 556, 563, 216 P.3d 788, 793 (2009) (recognizing that failure
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affirm the district court's dismissal of her quiet title claim. See Saavedra-
Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202
(2010) (recognizing that this court may affirm the district court on any
ground supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district court).
Consistent with the foregoing, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.10
C.J.
Hardesty
Herndon
cc: Hon. Eric Johnson, District Judge
Carolyn Worrell, Settlement Judge
Cory Reade Dows & Shafer
Alverson Taylor & Sanders
Kim Gilbert Ebron
Eighth District Court Clerk
to respond to an argument can be treated as a confession that the argument
is meritorious).
Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
1°The
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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