McIntyre (Garrett) v. State

 on suspect evidence, specifically, "inaccurate information about the
procedural status of the case." In a related argument, McIntyre contends
that the district court also abused its discretion at sentencing and violated
his right to due process and equal protection by refusing to consider his
application for a Mental Health Court diversion program. We disagree
with McIntyre's contentions.
This court will not disturb a district court's sentencing
determination absent an abuse of discretion. See Parrish v. State, 116
Nev. 982, 989, 12 P.3d 953, 957 (2000). McIntyre's prison term of 12-30
months falls within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes, see
NRS 453.337(2)(a); NRS 193.130(2)(d), and the sentence imposed is not so
unreasonably disproportionate to the gravity of the offense as to shock the
conscience, see CuIverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22
(1979); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991)
(plurality opinion). McIntyre fails to demonstrate that the district court
relied solely on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. See Chavez v.
State, 125 Nev. 328, 348, 213 P.3d 476, 490 (2009). Further, nothing in
record below supports McIntyre's claim that the district court refused to
consider his request for mental health court, and he fails to offer cogent
argument or demonstrate on appeal that the district court violated his
right to due process and equal protection by imposing a term of
incarceration. See NRS 176A.250; NRS 176A.260(1); see also NRS
176A.100(1)(c) (the granting of probation is discretionary). We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.
Finally, McIntyre contends that the district court violated his
right to due process by refusing his request for credit for time served in
the regimental discipline program. See NRS 176A.780(6) ("Time spent in
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
(0) 1947A
2
ENinfZA
'
the program must be deducted from any sentence which may thereafter be
imposed."). When the matter of credit was discussed at the sentencing
hearing, a representative from the Division of Parole and Probation
informed the district court that pursuant to earlier negotiations, McIntyre
"actually gave up his credit for time served for Boot Camp" and that "this
was agreed to by his attorney at the time, Gemma [Waldron]." As a result,
the district court found that McIntyre was not entitled to credit for his
time in the regimental discipline program. Defense counsel did not object
to either the Division's representation or the district court's
determination, and on appeal, McIntyre fails to address his purported
waiver or demonstrate that the district court erred. McIntyre also fails to
establish, to the extent the claim is raised on appeal, that he is entitled to
additional credit beyond that accrued during his time in the regimental
discipline program. Therefore, we conclude that McIntyre fails to
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief, and we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
.er,4.t
n ,J.
Hardesty
J.
Parraguirre
cc: Second Judicial District Court Dept. 8
Karla K. Butko
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
EIMVU WEI2 AgNM t7. It* isfA: