Candelas (Jose) v. State

 First, Candelas argues that his plea was involuntarily given
because he was coerced by counsel, who led Candelas to believe that there
was no other alternative and spoke to him in a loud, emphatic manner. At
a hearing on the motion, the district court stated that it had reviewed the
plea agreement and the transcript of the plea canvass and recalled
Candelas's ability to engage with counsel and the district court. The
district court found that there was nothing to indicate that Candelas felt
threatened or coerced during the proceedings. The totality of the
circumstances supports the district court's determination, and we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Second, Candelas contends that his plea was unknowingly
given because he was not advised by counsel or the district court regarding
possible lesser-included offenses. This claim was not raised below, and we
need not consider it in the first instance on appeal. See Davis v. State, 107
Nev. 600, 606, 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by
Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012-13, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We note,
however, that with regard to the district court, Candelas's claim is belied
by the record. Despite the fact that there is no requirement for the district
court to canvass a defendant about possible lesser-included offenses, see
Neffley v. Warden, 89 Nev. 573, 574, 516 P.2d 1403, 1404 (1973), the
district court did converse with Candelas about lesser-included offenses
and informed him that he would not be convicted of both attempted
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and battery with the use of a
deadly weapon because the district court viewed the latter as a lesser-
included offense. As to Candelas's claim concerning counsel, we note that
he has failed to demonstrate prejudice, pursuant to Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984), because he was informed about
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possible lesser-included offenses by the district court and fails to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged failure
to advise him about lesser-included offenses, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on continuing with the trial.
Third, Candelas argues that his plea was unknowingly given
because he was denied exculpatory information regarding a key witness
for the State. After he pleaded, Candelas discovered that the key witness
may have been involved in a crime with the victim in his case and made a
discovery request to ascertain whether the State had made any immunity
deals with the key witness. At a hearing on the motion, the State
represented that, while it knew nothing about any uncharged crimes
involving the key witness, the victim had not been charged at the time of
trial and therefore there would have been no impeachment value.
Candelas fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion.
Fourth, Candelas contends that his plea was involuntary
because the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations.
Relying on Cripps v. State, 122 Nev. 764, 770-71, 137 P.3d 1187, 1191
(2006) (stating that the district court should not be involved in the plea
negotiation process), Candelas claims that the district court not only
emphasized that the negotiated charge was probationable but also spoke
on behalf of the defense. He further claims that the district court's
unusual accommodations, providing statutory material and extra time for
negotiations, constituted an endorsement of the negotiations and that
court staff and a corrections officer pressured him to accept the plea offer.
Candelas fails to demonstrate that the district court participated in the
formulation of the plea agreement. The district court answered Candelas's
questions about the sentencing parameters and refused to commit to any
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particular sentencing structure. As for any additional time and statutory
materials provided, the district court provided these at the parties'
request. We discern no error by the district court in this regard.
Having considered Candelas's contentions and concluded that
no relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
/ St; ,J.
Hardesty
J.
itino,: 277
cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge
Hua Ferguson Law Offices
Law Offices of John P. Parris
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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