State v. Robles (Omar)

 evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of
the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120
P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).
The State argues that the district court erred in concluding
that Robles' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a hearing
regarding Robles' competency and for failing to obtain a medical report
from Robles' childhood. We conclude that the district court properly
determined that counsel's performance was deficient and that Robles was
prejudiced.
During the pretrial proceedings, Robles was initially
determined to be incompetent, then later determined to be competent.
Robles then entered into a guilty plea agreement and pleaded guilty.
However, after obtaining different counsel, Robles sought to withdraw his
guilty plea by arguing he could not comprehend his plea due to mental and
cognitive problems. Robles was then evaluated by a neuropsychologist,
Dr. Perez, who concluded that Robles was not able to comprehend his
guilty plea due to complications stemming from a serious head injury
sustained when he was approximately two years old and other additional
learning disabilities. The trial court concluded that Robles was therefore
not competent to enter into a guilty plea, permitted Robles to withdraw his
guilty plea, and this matter proceeded to trial where a jury convicted
Robles.'
1-As the State is the appellant in this matter, it is the State's burden
to provide this court with an adequate record for review. See McConnell v.
State, 125 Nev. 243, 256 n.13, 212 P.3d 307, 316 n.13 (2009). The State
did not provide transcripts of the hearing where the trial court granted
Robles' motion to withdraw the guilty plea and only provided the trial
continued on next page. .
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It is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution to prosecute a person while he is incompetent. Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). "The test to be applied in determining
competency 'must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.' Melchor-Gloria v. State,
99 Nev. 174, 179-80, 660 P.2d 109, 113 (1983) (alteration in original)
(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). The test to
determine whether a defendant is competent to enter a plea is the same as
the general test to determine competency. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
389, 398-99 (1993). "A hearing to determine a defendant's competency is
constitutionally and statutorily required where a reasonable doubt exists
on the issue." Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev. at 180, 660 P.2d at 113; see also
NRS 178.400. Moreover, "a trial court must always be alert to
circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable
to meet the standards of competence to stand trial." Drope, 420 U.S. at
181.
Here, the trial court concluded that Robles was not competent
to enter a guilty plea, but then permitted him to proceed to trial. At the
. . . continued
court's minute order regarding that hearing. In its order granting Robles'
•
post-conviction petition, the district court stated that the trial court
concluded that• Robles was not competent to enter a guilty plea, and
therefore, we rely on the district court's order regarding the basis for the
withdrawal of Robles' guilty plea.
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post-conviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that the
purpose of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was to allow Robles to
proceed to trial and that counsel's focus was on the withdrawal of the
guilty plea. Counsel testified that once the trial court permitted Robles to
withdraw his guilty plea, counsel did not pursue further investigation into
Robles' medical records or seek further determination of Robles'
competency. As the standard for whether a defendant is competent to
enter a guilty plea is the same as the general standard for competency,
trial counsel should have ensured that Robles was competent to stand
trial. Failure to do so in the circumstances presented fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Moreover, it is readily apparent
from Dr. Perez's report that Robles' competency to proceed was in
question. Considering Dr. Perez's conclusions regarding Robles' mental
state, trial counsel provided deficient performance by focusing on the
withdrawal of Robles' guilty plea and failing to seek a competency hearing
after Robles withdrew his plea. See Dumas u. State, 111 Nev. 1270, 1271-
72, 903 P.2d 816, 817 (1995).
The evidence presented by Robles at the evidentiary hearing
also establishes a reasonable probability that he would have been found to
be incompetent had trial counsel sought a competency hearing following
issuance of Dr. Perez's report and had counsel also obtained the medical
record from Robles' childhood. At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,
Robles presented testimony from an expert neuropsychologist who
reviewed Robles' prior mental health evaluations in conjunction with the
childhood medical report. The expert testified to the importance of an
evaluation by a neuropsychologist due to Robles' brain injury and the
importance of use of a medical report from when Robles was eight years
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old. Again, as the trial court concluded that Robles was not competent to
enter a guilty plea, Robles would not have been competent to proceed to
trial. Taken together, the evidence before the district court in the post-
conviction proceedings established that there is a reasonable probability
that Robles would have been found to be incompetent but for the deficient
performance of trial counsel.
The district court concluded that Robles had met his burden to
demonstrate that trial counsel should have sought a competency hearing
and that Robles was prejudiced by counsel's failure to do so. 2 After review
of the record before this court, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the district court's ruling that trial counsel was ineffective.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
, J.
Hardesty
Dou
ztar"nr" Cherry
2 The State argues that the district court's oral ruling and its written
order did not have the same findings. The State further argues that the
district court also failed to properly articulate its findings regarding
prejudice. We conclude that the district court's written order substantially
complies with its oral pronouncement and the order is sufficient to permit
this court to fully review the State's claims.
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cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
William B. Terry, Chartered
Eighth District Court Clerk
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