Shaw (Jeremiah) v. State

 conscience, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991)
(plurality opinion); Blume, 112 Nev. at 475, 915 P.2d at 284.
Accordingly, we conclude that Shaw's sentence does not violate the
constitutional proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment.
Second, Shaw claims that the district court abused its
discretion at sentencing by relying upon suspect evidence and improper
argument. He specifically argues that "[Airtually each witness called
by the State referenced the first sentencing result and asked the court
to impose the same sentence. The State argued the same approach."
Although a sentencing "court is privileged to consider facts and
circumstances which clearly would not be admissible at trial," Silks v.
State, 92 Nev. 91, 93-94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976), we "will reverse a
sentence if it is supported solely by impalpable and highly suspect
evidence," Denson v. State, 112 Nev. 489, 492, 915 P.2d 284, 286 (1996).
We conclude that the victims' and State's calls for a maximum sentence
were not evidence and Shaw has not demonstrated that the district
court abused its sentencing discretion. See Chavez v. State, 125 Nev.
328, 348, 213 P.3d 476, 490 (2009).
Third, Shaw claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by arguing that the district court should impose the same sentence that
was previously imposed. Shaw did not object to the prosecutor's
sentencing argument and he has not demonstrated plain error because
there was no error: the prosecutor was merely arguing for the punishment
he thought was appropriate. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196
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P.3d 465, 477 (2008) (reviewing unpreserved claims of prosecutorial
misconduct for plain error).
Having concluded that Shaw is not entitled to relief, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.'
Pickering
J.
Saitta
cc: Hon. Jerome Polaha, District Judge
Karla K. Butko
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
"The fast track statement does not comply with formatting
requirements of NRAP 3C(h)(1) and NRAP 32(a)(4) because it does not
have one-inch margins on all four sides. We caution appellant's counsel
that future failure to comply with the applicable rules when filing briefs in
this court may result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n)
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(0) 1947A