In Re: K. H., a Minor

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF: K. H., A MINOR, No. 66352
K H.,
Appellant, FILE
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, JUN 1 6 2016
Respondent. 1" le K. 1_ t vIAN
BY
l." (
DS111
14141FA
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order affirming the
findings and recommendation of a hearing master in a juvenile
proceeding. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark
County; William 0. Voy, Judge.
Appellant K.H. argues that his probation violation was a new
delinquent act that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that
the evidence submitted by the State was insufficient. We disagree.
K.H. claims that his probation violation qualifies as a
delinquent act pursuant to NRS 62B.330(2)(b) because he violated a "rule
or regulation having the force of law" when he violated the conditions of
his probation. 1 Under the plain meaning of NRS 62B.330(2)(b), however,
"rule or regulation" refers to standards and orders that apply uniformly
and not to conditions specifically imposed on an individual, such as a
1 NRS 62B.330(2) provides for two other delinquent acts, the
violation of "a county or municipal ordinance" and the commission of "an
act designated a criminal offense," NRS 62B.330(2)(a), (c), neither of which
is at issue here. Additionally, NRS 62B.400(4) provides that the escape or
attempted escape from a facility for the detention or correctional care of
children is a delinquent act, also not at issue here.
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probationer. See Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev., Adv. Op.
48, 305 P.3d 898, 902 (2013) ("When interpreting a statutory provision,
this court looks first to the plain language of the statute."); see also
Regulation, Rule, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining a
regulation as "[t]he act or process of controlling by rule or restriction," or
"[a] rule or order, having legal force, usu[ally] issued by an administrative
agency," and defining a rule as Idenerally, an established and
authoritative standard or principal; a general norm mandating or guiding
conduct or action in a given type of situation"). Accordingly, K.H.'s
probation violation was not a delinquent act pursuant to NRS
62B.330(2)(b). 2 See Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274,
1277 (2012) (providing that this court reviews de novo questions of
statutory construction).
As K.H.'s probation violation was not a delinquent act, the
applicable burden of proof was that the court be reasonably satisfied that
K.H.'s conduct was not as good as required by the conditions of his
probation. See Naves v. State, 91 Nev. 106, 108, 531 P.2d 1360, 1362
(1975) (holding that a juvenile is not entitled to any greater rights than
those afforded to adults at a probation violation hearing); Lewis v. State,
90 Nev. 436, 438, 529 P.2d 796, 797 (1974) (discussing the standard at an
adult probation violation hearing as "[Ole evidence and facts must
reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not
2While K.H. argues that violations of probation are treated as
delinquent acts, NRS 62B.330(2) and NRS 62B.400(4) outline distinct acts
that are to be considered delinquent acts, and K.H.'s probation violation is
not one of those acts. Additionally, we have considered K.H.'s argument
regarding NRS 62E.710(1) and conclude that no relief is warranted,
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been as good as required by the conditions of probation"). Here, the
juvenile court found that K.H.'s active social networking account and his
admissions that he accessed social networking websites via his mother's
and his cousin's phones were sufficient to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that K.H. violated his probation. 3 We conclude the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion by sustaining the hearing master's findings and
recommendation. See In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764, 772, 291 P.3d 122, 127-28
(2012) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the juvenile court's decision on
objection from a dependency master's findings and recommendation). 4
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
J.
Dougla
J.
Gibbons
3As to K.H.'s argument regarding corpus delicti and the use of his
confession, the corpus delicti rule does not apply to revocation proceedings,
where the burden of proof is lower than in a criminal prosecution. See
United States v. Bulger, 728 F.3d 947, 949-51 (9th Cir. 2013) (outlining
that state courts have consistently held the corpus delicti rule does not
apply at revocation proceedings).
4 To the extent K.H. claims the State failed to produce probation
terms signed by him to the hearing master, he fails to present relevant
authority or cogent argument for this requirement at a probation violation
hearing. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1978) ("It
is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent
argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court.").
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cc: Hon. William 0. Voy, District Judge, Family Court Division
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Eighth District Court Clerk
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