In Re: Discipline Of Todd M. Leventhal

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF No. 83245
TODD M. LEVENTHAL, BAR NO. 8543.
FILED
JUN 1 7 2022
ELIZA9Tt*4 A. BROWId
CLERK OFNPf4:EME COURT
BY 5•
DEPLIc Y CLERK
ORDER OF SUSPENSION
This is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada Disciplinary
Board hearing panel's recommendation that attorney Todd M. Leventhal be
suspended for one year, stayed for five years subject to certain conditions,
based on two violations of RPC 1.8(a) (conflict of interest: current clients:
specific rules),I
As an initial matter, Leventhal argues the hearing panel erred
by denying his motion for summary judgment after one of the two subject
clients withdrew his grievance. Attorney "disciplinary proceedings are
generally treated as civil actions." In re Discipline of Arabia, 137 Nev., Adv.
Op. 59, 495 P.3d 1103, 1109 (2021). In a civil action, summary judgment is
appropriate "when the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate
that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc.,
121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because the State Bar has a duty to proceed with a disciplinary
action after the withdrawal of a client grievance if warranted, SCR 107, and
the record supports that a genuine issue of material fact remained disputed
SUPREME COURT 'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
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as to whether Leventhal violated RPC 1.8(a),2 we conclude the hearing
panel properly denied Leventhal's motion. Cf. GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 117 Nev.
265, 268, 21 P.3d 11, 13 (2001) (explaining that while a denial of a summary
judgment is not independently appealable, this court can review it de novo
in an appeal brought from the final judgment).
As to the challenged disciplinary recommendation, the State
Bar has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that
Leventhal committed the violations charged. In re Discipline of Drakulich,
111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995). We conclude that the panel's
findings of fact regarding only one violation of RPC 1.8(a) is supported by
substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. See SCR 105(3)(b); Sowers
v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 129 Nev. 99, 105, 294 P.3d 427, 432 (2013).
Substantial evidence supports the panel's conclusion that Leventhal
borrowed a client's personal vehicle for more than one year without
obtaining a conflict of interest waiver and failed to return the vehicle after
numerous requests by the client, which forced the client to rent a vehicle for
his own use. However, substantial evidence does not support the panel's
finding that Leventhal violated RPC 1.8(a) in relation to his acceptance of
stolen property as collateral from a second client.
Turning to the appropriate discipline, we review the hearing
panel's recommendation de novo. SCR 105(3)(b). Although we "must . . .
exercise independent judgment," the panel's recommendation is persuasive.
In re Discipline of Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496, 515, 25 P.3d 191, 204 (2001). In
2The evidence included copies of text messages the client sent to
Leventhal. After the disciplinary hearing, Leventhal raised questions as to
whether some text messages were missing, thus providing an incomplete
history of the transaction underlying the disciplinary complaint. When he
moved for surnmary judgment, however, Leventhal did not assert any
SUPREME COURT inaccuracy with the text message evidence.
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determining the appropriate discipline, we weigh four factors: "the duty
violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by
the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors." In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067,
1077 (2008).
Leventhal knowingly violated a duty owed to his client (failure
to avoid conflicts of interest). The client suffered actual harm because he
was without his personal vehicle for over a year. The baseline sanction for
Leventhal's misconduct, before consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, is suspension. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and
Standards, Standard 4.32 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2017) (Suspension is generally
appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully
disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or
potential injury to a client."). The panel found and the record supports five
aggravating circumstances (prior discipline,3 dishonest or selfish motive,
pattern of misconduct, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law) and one
mitigating circumstance (full and free disclosure to the disciplinary
authority or cooperative attitude toward proceeding). Because we conclude
that only one of the violations found by the panel is supported by substantial
evidence, we conclude the panel's recommended discipline is too harsh.
Accordingly, we hereby suspend attorney Todd M. Leventhal
from the practice of law for six months, stayed for five years subject to the
3This factor is particularly aggravating, as Leventhal's prior
discipline also involved a violation of RPC 1.8(a), in which Leventhal
accepted personal and real property as payment from a client and then tried
SUPREME COUff to evict the client from the real property while he was still representing her.
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following conditions: (1) Leventhal must complete one additional hour of
Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credit in ethics and one additional hour
of CLE credit in law practice management every year during the stayed five-
year term; and (2) Leventhal must not receive a public reprimand or worse
during the five-year term. Additionally, Leventhal shall pay the costs of the
disciplinary proceeding, including $2,500 mandated by SCR 120(3), within
30 days from the date of this order. The State Bar shall comply with SCR
121.1.
It is so ORDERED.
, J.
Hardesty
Stiglich
J.
Herndon
cc: Chair, Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board
Lipson Neilson P.C.
Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada
Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada
Admissions Office, U.S. Supreme Court
SUPREME COURT
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