Matkulak v. Davis

138 Nev., Advance Opinion 4 1 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
TONY MATKULAK, No. 83173
Appellant,
vs.
KOURTNEY L. DAVIS, FILE
Respondent.
SEP 0 1 2022
EL
CLERK
BY
C IEF DEPUTY CLERK
Appeal from a district court order establishing child custody,
visitation, and child support. Second Judicial District Court, Family
Division, Washoe County; Sandra A. Unsworth, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Willick Law Group and Marshal S. Willick, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Bader & Ryan and Kevin P. Ryan and Todd A. Bader, Reno,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, SILVER, CADISH, and PICKERING,
JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, SILVER, J.:
Where separated parents cannot agree on child support, NAC
425.140 provides the framework for calculating the parents' base child
support obligations. But a district court may, pursuant to NAC 425.150(1),
deviate from that calculation and adjust a party's child support obligation
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as required to meet the child's specific needs and based on the parties'
economic circumstances. Although a court may base a deviation on the
relative income of the parties' households, under NAC 425.150(1)(0, the
adjustment cannot exceed the other party's total obligation.
In this case, appellant is substantially wealthier than
respondent and, based on this income disparity, the district court increased
appellant's child support obligation by nearly $2,000 per month over NAC
425.140's base child support obligation. The district court also awarded
respondent her attorney fees. Although an upward adjustment was allowed
by NAC 425.150 and was supported by the district court's detailed findings
on the relevant factors, we conclude the district court erred by exceeding
the NAC 425.150(1)(f) cap. We therefore reverse and remand for the district
court to reduce appellant's monthly child support obligation consistent with
NAC 425.150(1)(f), but we affirm the award of attorney fees.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant Tony Matkulak and respondent Kourtney Davis have
one child, B.M., born in May 2018. The parties were never married. In
April 2020, Davis petitioned to establish custody, visitation, and child
support. The parties stipulated to share joint legal and physical custody,
and Matkulak voluntarily agreed to pay Davis approximately $1,850 per
rnonth in child support. Davis supports herself and the record does not
indicate she is struggling financially, but Matkulak's monthly income of
approximately $38,000 far outstrips Davis's monthly income of
approximately $5,000.1 Thus, Davis sought an upward adjustment to
1 Below, Davis indicated that B.M.'s basic needs were being met
without an upward adjustment and that she had sufficient money to cover
B.M.'s expenses and to save for her retirement.
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Matkulak's child support obligation. Specifically, Davis argued that
additional child support would allow her to move into a house with a larger
yard and a security system, eat out more often, work less, increase her
retirement savings and financial security, and reduce her stress levels—all
things that would ultimately benefit B.M.
Pursuant to NAC 425.140, the district court calculated Davis's
monthly obligation as $823.04 and Matkulak's monthly obligation as
$2,415.70. The court offset Matkulak's monthly obligation by Davis's
monthly obligation as required by NAC 425.115(3) because the parties
share joint physical custody, finding that Matkulak accordingly owed Davis
$1,592.562 per month. But applying NAC 425.150(1), the court concluded
the monthly obligation was insufficient to meet B.M.'s specific needs arising
from the parties' disparate economic circumstances. The court addressed
each of the NAC 425.150(1) factors, finding that factors f, g, and h weighed
in favor of an upward deviation. Specifically, the court concluded that under
factor f Matkulak makes 7.46 times the amount per month that Davis
makes from working two jobs; that under factor g B.M. has additional
expenses for childcare, extracurricular activities, and health insurance; and
that under factor h Matkulak has the ability to pay additional child support.
Accordingly, the district court ordered Matkulak to pay 100
percent of B.M.'s childcare and medical expenses, 75 percent of B.M.'s
extracurricular expenses, and $3,500 per month in child support. The court
additionally awarded Davis her attorney fees. Matkulak appeals.
2We note this number should be $1,592.66 per month.
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DISCUSSION
Matkulak argues the district court improperly increased his
monthly child support obligation based solely on his greater income and
further erred by awarding attorney fees to Davis.
The upward adjustment to Matkulak's child support obligation
We review the district court's decision regarding a child support
obligation for an abuse of discretion. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92
P.3d 1224, 1227 (2004). But we review questions of statutory interpretation
de novo. Valdez v. Aguilar, 132 Nev. 388, 390, 373 P.3d 84, 85 (2016). In
interpreting a statute or regulation, we give effect to its plain meaning and,
to the extent it is ambiguous, we interpret it consistent with reason and
public policy. Id.; see also Silver State Elec. Supply Co. v. State, Dep't of
Taxation, 123 Nev. 80, 85, 157 P.3d 7120, 713 (2007) ("Statutory
construction rules also apply to administrative regulations."). We consider
provisions as a whole and will avoid interpretations that render phrases
superfluous or nugatory. Manuela v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 132 Nev.
1, 6-7, 365 P.3d 497, 501 (2016).
Pursuant to NRS 425.620, the Administrator of the Division of
Welfare and Supportive Services of the Nevada Department of Health and
Human Services has adopted various regulations in NAC Chapter 425
pertaining to the support of dependent children. NAC 425.140 sets forth a
framework for calculating a base child support obligation. By regulation, it
is presumed that this amount provides for the child's basic needs. NAC
425.100(2). A court may deviate from the NAC 425.140 framework if it
calculates the base child support obligation and sets forth findings of fact
supporting the deviation. NAC 425.100(3). NAC 425.150(1) additionally
authorizes a court to adjust the base child support obligation "in accordance
with the specific needs of the child and the economic circumstances of the
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parties" based on eight factors and specific findings of fact. Those factors
are:
(a) Any special educational needs of the child;
(b) The legal responsibility of the parties for
the support of others;
(c) The value of services contributed by either
party;
(d) Any public assistance paid to support the
child;
(e) The cost of transportation of the child to
and from visitation;
(f) The relative income of both households, so
long as the adjustment does not exceed the total
obligation of the other party;
(g) Any other necessary expenses for the
benefit of the child; and
(h) The obligor's ability to pay.
NAC 425.150(1)(a)-(h).
Matkulak contends that a precondition to applying any of the
NAC 425.150(1) factors is that the adjustment must address a specific need
of the child. Although we agree the court must appropriately weigh the
child's specific needs in evaluating an adjustment, we disagree that NAC
425.150(1) requires any adjustment to be based on a specific need of the
child. NAC 425.150(1) permits district courts to adjust the child support
obligation "in accordance with the specific needs of the child and the
economic circumstances of the parties based upon the following factors and
specific findings of factE.1" (Emphases added.) The phrase "in accordance
with" means to be "in a manner conforming with." Accordance, New Oxford
American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); see also Accordance, Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) (defining the term as to be in
conformity with). Thus, the child's specific needs, if any, along with the
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parties' economic circumstances, provide a prism through which the court
must view the requested child support deviation to determine whether it is
appropriate. But pursuant to the plain language of NAC 425.150(1), it is
the eight factors therein that set forth possible bases upon which to order
an adjustment. Some of those factors regard specific needs a child may
have, but others do not, making clear that although an adjustment under
NAC 425.150(1) must conform with any specific needs the child may have,
an adjustment is not contingent on the child having a specific need for that
adjustment.
Here, the district court made findings on each of the NAC
425.150(1) factors, along with detailed findings on the parties' economic
circumstances and B.M.'s specific needs in light of those circumstances. In
ordering an upward adjustment, the court applied factors f, g, and h. Factor
f is "Mhe relative income of both households, so long as the adjustment does
not exceed the total obligation of the other party." NAC 425.150(1)(f). This
language allows one party's relative wealth to provide a basis for an upward
adjustment. The district court found that Matkulak earns 7.46 times more
than Davis in a month. This factor therefore supports an upward
adjustment. Factor g, however, does not. That factor references "[a]ny
other necessary expenses for the benefit of the child," and although the court
found that B.M. had expenses related to childcare, extracurricular
activities, and health insurance, the court separately ordered Matkulak to
pay for those expenses, removing them from consideration for purposes of
NAC 425.150(1). Nor does factor h support an upward adjustment based on
one party's relative wealth. Factor h references "Mlle obligor's ability to
pay." But factor f already provides for such an adjustment and caps it at
"the total obligation of the other party." To read factor h as providing the
same grounds for an additional upward adjustment would create a conflict
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with the cap in factor f andlor make factor f redundant. See Comm. to
Review Child Support Guidelines, Comm. Meeting Notes (Nev. Sept. 17,
2021) (discussing factor h as allowing a downward adjustment when the
party's life circumstances made it difficult for the party to pay the
regulatory amount of child support).
Thus, only factor f provides a basis for an upward adjustment
here. The district court's order focused on that factor, concluding that
B.M.'s specific needs are not met by the base child support obligation
because of the gross income disparity between the parties when considered
in conjunction with their respective expenses for food and shelter. Because
the district court ordered the adjustment in accordance with the child's
specific needs and the parties' economic circumstances, based on one of the
authorized factors, we conclude the district court did not err in ordering an
upward adjustment. That does not fully resolve the question before us,
however, as NAC 425.150(1)(f) allows an upward adjustment on that basis
only "so long as the adjustment does not exceed the total obligation of the
other party." This language plainly caps the limit of any upward
adjustment here to Davis's monthly obligation amount, which the district
court calculated as $823.04. The district court therefore erred by increasing
Matkulak's monthly obligation by nearly $2,000 per month, as this far
exceeds the amount allowed by factor f. We therefore reverse the district
court's decision to increase Matkulak's child support obligation to $3,500
per month and remand with instructions to reduce Matkulak's monthly
child support obligation to no more than an additional $823.04 per month
above the base child support obligation.
Attorney fees
NRS 125C.250 gives the district court broad discretion in a
child custody action to order reasonable attorney fees and costs as
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determined by the court. The district court's decision to award attorney fees
will stand absent an abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev.
619, 622, 119 P.3d 727, 729 (2005).
Here, the district court found that an award to Davis was
proper because Matkulak used his superior wealth to unnecessarily
increase litigation costs. Matkulak argues the district court improperly
penalized him for correctly pointing out, as a negotiation tactic, that he was
voluntarily paying more child support than required by the regulations and
that a downward adjustment was possible. However, the district court
found that Matkulak requested a downward adjustment to pressure Davis
into accepting a settlement offer and that he engaged in other tactics to
increase litigation expenses, such as unnecessarily involving his attorney in
minutia. Matkulak does not contest these findings, and to the extent
Matkulak argues it was Davis's conduct more than his own that increased
the litigation costs, we decline to reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Ellis
v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 152, 161 P.3d 239, 244 (2007) (refusing to reweigh
credibility determinations on appeal); Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev.
1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000) (noting that this court is not at liberty
to reweigh evidence on appeal). Accordingly, even though we conclude the
upward adjustment here improperly exceeded the NAC 425.150(1) cap, we
conclude that Matkulak fails to show that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees to Davis, and we affirm this portion of
the court's decision.
CONCLUSION
NAC 425.150(1) provides district courts with the discretion to
adjust a child support obligation based on eight separate factors and in
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accordance with the child's specific needs and the parties' economic
circumstances. But when a court orders an upward adjustment based on
NAC 425.150(1)(f), the relative income of the households, the amount of the
other party's total obligation caps the upward adjustment. Here, the
district court did not err by basing an upward adjustment on NAC
425.150(1)(f), but the court did err by ordering an upward adjustment in
excess of the other party's total obligation. We further conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees. We
therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case to the district
court with instructions to reduce the amount of Matkulak's monthly child
support obligation in accordance with NAC 425.150(1)(f).
J.
Silver
We concur:
6 0 44
J.
Cadish
J.
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