DocketNumber: No. 2172
Judges: McCarran, Norcross
Filed Date: 7/15/1915
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/12/2024
By the Court,
This appeal presents the question of the liability of White Pine County to the appellant for water furnished respondent county during the year 1913 for sprinkling the lawn surrounding the courthouse building in the town of Ely. The question involves the construction of certain provisions of the franchise granted to the appellant corporation by the legislature of 1907, under an act approved February 26, 1907 (Stats. 1907, c. 25), entitled "An act entitled 'An act granting to the Ely Water Company the right, privilege and franchise to supply the towns of Ely and Ely City in White Pine County, State of Nevada, and the additions of said towns, with water for domestic, municipal, fire protection, irrigation, and other purposes and to charge rental therefor; and ratifying and confirming a certain grant of a water franchise made to the said Ely Water Company on the sixteenth day of February, 1907, by the board of county commissioners of said county and by the said town of Ely, and other matters relating thereto. ’ ”
By the eighth provision it is provided that the appellant corporation " shall furnish and supply water to the courthouse,‘hospitals, city hall, and schoolhouses in said town and its additions free of any cost to said town or its additions, or to said county of White Pine, State of Nevada, during the life of this instrument; provided, that the cost of all taps, pipes and plumbing necessary to connect said public buildings with mains'or pipes * * * shall be borne by said town, or its additions, or by said county, as the case may be. ”
The sixth provision of the charter provides • that the appellant corporation "shall charge not more than $6 per season for sprinkling one lot of the dimensions of 100 by 25 feet or less, and for the sprinkling of each adjacent lot or portion thereof owned by the same person, not more than $5 per season.”
The amount of the claim for sprinkling the courthouse grounds, which covered an entire block of about four acres, was determined by estimating the number of lots said grounds, exclusive of the area covered by the building itself, would make of the dimensions referred to in the sixth provision of the franchise, supra, and supplying thereto the rate in force in the town of Ely for sprinkling in accordance with the said sixth provision.
" The clause providing for free water for the courthouse does not carry with it free water for the grbunds. * * * On the other hand, the act provides that the' water
Counsel upon either side of this case have been able to find but few authorities that might be considered in point upon the question whether a provision in a franchise requiring the furnishing of free water to a courthouse, schoolhouse, or other municipal public building, would also include the'furnishing of free water for the grounds thereof. The only two cases cited that are analogous to the one here presented are the following: City of Birmingham v. Water Co., 42 South. 10; Henderson Water Co. v. Henderson Schools, 151 N. C. 171, 65 S. E. 927. These cases support the construction placed upon the provision of the charter by the court below. Whatever doubt might have existed in case the proviso of the eighth provision of the charter had not been included is, we think, removed by the language of such proviso, which refers to the courthouse, hospital, etc., as "said public buildings. ”
While the court held that the appellant was not required to furnish free water for sprinkling the courthouse grounds, it was held that it was not entitled to recover, for the reason that no basis of charge for water so furnished was prescribed in the charter. The court construed the sixth provision of the charter, supra, as applying to town lots as platted on the official town plat, the blocks of the town being platted generally in lots of 25 by 100 feet, and not applicable to a block not so divided into lots — the block upon which the courthouse was located being not so platted. We need not, we think, determine whether this construction of the charter was correct.
The Virginia City case, supra, was not called to the attention of the court below, which would have undoubtedly followed the rule therein laid down, had its attention been directed to that case. The court found as a fact that the water furnished was of the value charged therefor, and it was stipulated in the court below that, if the appellant was entitled to recover at all, it was entitled to recover for the full amount alleged in the complaint.
The judgment is modified, by allowing plaintiff and appellant also the amount sued for in its first cause of action, and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.