DocketNumber: No. 46090
Citation Numbers: 124 Nev. 43, 175 P.3d 910
Judges: Cherry, Gibbons, Saitta
Filed Date: 2/7/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/23/2022
OPINION
In this appeal, we consider whether an action against a residential designer based on alleged mistakes in his plans drawn to construct a personal residence is subject to the procedural requirements set forth in the provisions of NRS Chapter 40 that pertain to constructional defect actions. We hold that the provisions of NRS Chapter 40 do not apply in this case.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellants Tory and Patricia Pankopf entered into a contract
Consequently, the Pankopfs brought suit against Peterson, alleging that Peterson’s plans contained numerous design defects, mis
In its order, the district court ultimately granted Peterson’s motion, concluding that because NRS 40.615 defines a constructional defect as a “defect in the design ... of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an appurtenance” and NRS 40.605 defines an appurtenance as including “the parcel of real property,” the Pankoffs’ claims fell within NRS Chapter 40’s purview. However, because NRS Chapter 40 requires a claimant to provide the defendant contractor with notice, inspection, and an opportunity to cure and to submit the matter to mediation, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, in order to allow the Pankopfs to proceed in accordance with NRS Chapter 40. The Pankopfs appealed.
DISCUSSION
Standards of review and statutory interpretation
In an appeal from an order granting an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, “[t]he sole issue presented ... is whether a complaint states a claim for relief.”
Applicability of NRS Chapter 40 to the Pankopf s’ claims
“NRS Chapter 40 provides a comprehensive procedural process for resolving constructional defect disputes between contractors and homeowners, under which a homeowner must provide notice of defects and give the contractor an opportunity to inspect and repair.”
Meanings of constructional defect and appurtenance
The district court determined that, based on its interpretation of the terms “constructional defect” and “appurtenance” set forth in NRS Chapter 40, the Pankopfs’ claims fell within the purview of the statute. We disagree. According to NRS 40.615, a constructional defect is defined as
a defect in the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an appurtenance and includes, without limitation, the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an appurtenance.
In addition, NRS 40.605(1) defines an appurtenance as “a structure, installation, facility, amenity or other improvement that is appurtenant to or benefits one or more residences, but is not a part
The definition of an appurtenance set forth in NRS 40.605(1) describes an “improvement” that is attached to or “benefits” a residence. While the definition of “appurtenance” includes “the parcel of real property” as the district court noted, the real property must be “associated with or benefiting one or more residences.”
Meaning of new residence
The second issue presented by the parties is whether NRS Chapter 40 applies to the design of a new residence when the residence has not been built. The Pankopfs assert that because no dwelling exists, NRS Chapter 40 does not apply. Peterson counters that the definition of constructional defect includes “the design ... of a new residence”
We recently addressed the meaning of the term “new residence” as defined by NRS Chapter 40 in Westpark Owners’ Ass’n v. District Court.
We conclude that the Pankopfs did not make ‘ ‘constructional defect” claims for the purposes of NRS 40.615 and NRS 40.605(1). We also conclude that the Pankopfs did not bring suit regarding “new construction” as defined by NRS Chapter 40. Accordingly, NRS Chapter 40 does not apply to the Pankopfs’ claims, and we reverse the order of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In their opening brief, the Pankopfs claim that the contract was written. However, their verified amended complaint states that it was oral.
Specifically, the Pankopfs claim Peterson failed to provide them with a complete and competent set of architectural plans, failed to perform site layout services, failed to provide cross-sections of various rooms to provide details as to how the residence was to be built, incorrectly designed the foun
Merluzzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 409, 411, 610 P.2d 739, 741 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Clough, 106 Nev. 568, 796 P.2d 592 (1990).
Vacation Village v. Hitachi America, 110 Nev. 481, 484, 874 P.2d 744, 746 (1994).
Id. (quoting Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 228, 699 P.2d 110, 112 (1985)).
Gallagher v. City of Las Vegas, 114 Nev. 595, 599, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998).
Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538-39, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995).
Baron v. District Court, 95 Nev. 646, 648, 600 P.2d 1192, 1193-94 (1979).
General Motors v. Jackson, 111 Nev. 1026, 1029, 900 P.2d 345, 348 (1995).
Westpark Owners’ Ass’n v. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 349, 167 P.3d 421 (2007).
NRS 40.605(1).
NRS 40.615.
123 Nev. at 360, 167 P.3d at 428-29.
Id. at 360, 167 P.3d at 429.
The parties also dispute whether the subsections of NRS 40.615 apply here. However, because the residence in this case does not constitute a “new residence,” neither the portion of NRS 40.615, which defines a constructional defect as a “defect ... of a new residence,” nor its subsections, apply to the instant controversy.