DocketNumber: No. 3860.
Citation Numbers: 71 A.2d 747, 96 N.H. 154
Judges: LAMPRON, J.
Filed Date: 12/6/1949
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
The quoted statute as construed in this state is not a legislative expression of hostility to the creation of joint tenancies for "the purpose of the statute is not to forbid or prevent the creation of estates in joint tenancy but to make certain that effect is given to the intention of the grantor." Roar v. Champlin, *Page 157
Upon analysis it appears that the statute provides three ways to create a joint tenancy. The first method is an express statement in the deed that the grantees shall take as joint tenants. The second method calls for express statement of the grantees "and the survivor of them." The third method is the use of any other words "clearly expressing an intention to create a joint tenancy." The deed in question is not within the first and third methods enumerated above. The question remains whether it is a substantial compliance with the second.
There is considerable authority for the proposition that the use of the word "survivor" or "survivors" in deeds and wills is sufficient to negative the statutory presumption of a tenancy in common. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.) s. 424; Blaine v. Dow,
It may be conceded that the deed in dispute is not a model form to create a joint tenancy and that the notary public who prepared it was not a model draftsman. That is not fatal, however, if it can be fairly said that the intent was expressed in reasonably clear terms. "If the intent to create a right of survivorship is expressed, it is to be given effect." Burns v. Nolette,
Objection is made that the words of survivorship do not appear in other parts of the deed and are therefore ineffective. The relative weight to be given words appearing in different sections of the deed as developed at common law has never been followed in this jurisdiction. The intent of the grantor is to be gathered from all parts of the deed without resorting to presumptions of law in determining their effect. It is finally suggested that the construction placed upon this deed discourages clearness of expression and the better forms of conveyancing. This argument has been considered many times in the last half a century but it has not been considered as important as the principle of carrying out the expressed intent of written documents regardless of the method of their expression. Lawyers and judges sometimes have difficulty when they attempt to make a fortress out of the dictionary and we should impose no higher standards upon the layman. See Marvin v. Peirce,
JOHNSTON, C. J., concurs in this opinion.
ON REHEARING. After the foregoing opinion was filed, the plaintiff moved for rehearing on the ground that "the majority opinion of the Court . . . has failed to consider sufficiently the intention of the parties to the deed under consideration, by sustaining the defendants' exceptions to the decree of the Trial Court without qualification, and ruling that, as a matter of law, the deed in question created only a tenancy in common, without giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to present evidence as to the facts and circumstances existing at the time of and surrounding the drawing up of the deed. . . ."
Argument was invited on the issue of plaintiff's right to have considered evidence of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Michael v. Lucas , 152 Md. 512 ( 1927 )
Mulvanity v. Nute , 95 N.H. 526 ( 1949 )
Geers v. Geers , 95 N.H. 316 ( 1949 )
Therrien v. Therrien , 94 N.H. 66 ( 1946 )
Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. Nottingham , 86 N.H. 321 ( 1933 )
Marvin v. Peirce , 84 N.H. 455 ( 1930 )
Burns v. Nolette , 83 N.H. 489 ( 1929 )