Rohan, LLC v. Kim Carmichael

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2017-0417, Rohan, LLC v. Kim Carmichael,
the court on November 1, 2018, issued the following order:
Having considered the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that a
formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The defendant, Kim
Carmichael, appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Lyons, J.) granting a writ of
possession to the plaintiff, Rohan, LLC. See RSA 540:13 (2007). On appeal,
the defendant argues that the trial court erred by granting the writ of
possession following the plaintiff-landlord’s noncompliance with a payment
arrangement issued in December of 2016. Specifically, the defendant argues
that the trial court erred when it failed to grant the defendant’s motion to be
heard on issues relating to payment, and that New Hampshire’s minimum
housing standards statute, RSA 48-A:14 (Supp. 2017), does not afford equal
protection to tenants. We affirm.
The following facts are derived from the record submitted on appeal. On
December 12, 2016, the trial court approved an agreement of the parties to
stay issuance of a writ of possession (Agreement to Stay). The agreement
acknowledged that the court had awarded judgment to the plaintiff in an action
brought pursuant to RSA chapter 540. In accordance with the Agreement to
Stay, the parties agreed that the writ would not be issued if the defendant
made payments pursuant to an agreement for payment of past due rent
(Payment Agreement). In the supplemental Payment Agreement, the parties
agreed that the plaintiff would make a series of repairs to the defendant’s
residence, and the defendant would make payments as required by the
Agreement to Stay. The supplemental Payment Agreement also stated, “If [the]
repairs are not completed, [defendant] may request a further hearing.”
On April 25, 2017, the court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion “to
be heard re: repairs.” At the hearing, which the plaintiff did not attend, the
defendant testified that the plaintiff had not completed all repairs as required
by the Payment Agreement, and requested that the court order financial
sanctions against the plaintiff. The defendant also stated that she had stopped
making payments pursuant to the payment agreement because of the
uncompleted repairs. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge explained to
the defendant that he would need to look at the applicable statute before
determining the appropriate next steps.
Subsequently, on May 3, 2017, the plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Non-
Compliance, which stated that the plaintiff had completed all required work in
the defendant’s apartment, and that the defendant failed to make her
payments as required by the Agreement to Stay. On May 10, the defendant
filed an “objection to writ” requesting a hearing and stating that the repairs
were not complete.
It appears that the court held an evidentiary hearing on June 2, after
which it issued an order stating, “The evidence presented indicate[s] that the
landlord has completed the requested work[,]” and that the tenant had stopped
paying rent because she believed more work was needed. The order also stated
that the case would be continued, and “[u]pon presentation of the inspection
results that the property meets the code[,] a writ of possession shall issue
unless the parties agree otherwise.” Furthermore, the order provided that
“[s]hould the property be found not to pass the inspection[,] either party may
request an additional hearing and no writ of possession will issue.”
Afterwards, a Certificate of Compliance was issued on June 14, 2017,
attesting that the defendant’s property was found to be in compliance with the
applicable provisions of the Manchester Housing Code. Upon receiving the
Certificate of Compliance, the court issued a final order on June 16 granting
the plaintiff possession of the property. In the order, the court also stated that
all pending motions were denied, and that no further hearing would be
necessary. Thereafter, on June 23, the trial court denied the defendant’s
request to be heard and objection to writ. Several days later, on June 26, the
trial court also denied the defendant’s ex parte motion for discretionary stay.
This appeal followed.
We first address the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motions. The
trial court has broad discretion in managing the proceedings before it. In the
Matter of Conner & Conner, 156 N.H. 250, 252 (2007). We review a trial
court’s rulings in this area under an unsustainable exercise of discretion
standard. Id. To establish that the court erred under this standard, the
defendant must demonstrate that the court’s rulings were clearly untenable or
unreasonable to the prejudice of her case. Id.In this case, the trial court denied the defendant’s motions on her
request to be heard and request for discretionary stay. The trial court had
previously approved an Agreement to Stay the writ of possession while the
plaintiff made repairs to the defendant’s apartment, so long as the defendant
made the required payments, pursuant to the separate Payment Agreement.
The defendant subsequently stopped making payments due to the plaintiff’s
alleged noncompliance with the Payment Agreement. Thereafter, an
evidentiary hearing was held after which the court found that the plaintiff had
completed the requested work and that the defendant had stopped paying rent.
Because the defendant has not provided us with a transcript of that hearing,
we must assume that the evidence supported the trial court’s finding. See
Bourdelais v. Boisselle, 2017 WL 3141034, *2 (N.H. 2017).
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Ultimately, upon receipt of certification that the apartment met the
housing code standards, the trial court issued a final order granting possession
of the property to the plaintiff pursuant to the Agreement to Stay writ of
possession. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision not
to consider the defendant’s post-order motions was untenable or unreasonable.
To the extent the defendant asserts violations of her equal protection
rights under the State Constitution, the arguments are not sufficiently
developed to warrant further review. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49
(2003).
Affirmed.
LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN,
JJ., concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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