In The Matter of Sandra Matarozzo and James Matarozzo

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2017-0130, In the Matter of Sandra Matarozzo
and James Matarozzo, the court on March 6, 2018, issued the
following order:
Having considered the briefs and the record submitted on appeal, the
court concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. See
Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The respondent, James Matarozzo (father), appeals an order
of the Circuit Court (Garner, J.) granting a motion for contempt filed by the
petitioner, Sandra Carleton f/k/a Sandra Matarozzo (mother). We issued an
order on November 8, 2017, affirming the circuit court’s order. On November
16, 2017, we withdrew our order and held resolution of this case in abeyance
pending a decision in case no. 2017-0133, In the Matter of Wendy S. White and
Michael L. White. We issued the mandate in White on February 23, 2018. We
now affirm.
The father contends that the trial court erred by not finding that: (1) his
alleged agreement with the mother to reduce his child support payments was
effective; and (2) the mother was estopped from denying the existence of that
agreement.
We will not disturb the trial court’s rulings regarding child support
absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion or an error of law. In the Matter
of Nicholson & Nicholson, 164 N.H. 105, 107 (2012).
We first address the father’s contention that the court erred by failing to
find that there was an implied agreement between the parties to reduce the
father’s child support payments upon the emancipation of their eldest child.
He maintains that a contract may be modified by agreement and, here, the
parties impliedly modified his child support obligation.
Any agreement between parties to reduce court-ordered child support
payments, absent a court order approving the agreement, is not enforceable.
See id.; see also In the Matter of LaRocque & LaRocque, 164 N.H. 148, 151
(2012). A “child support award is a standing order from the trial court.” In the
Matter of Nicholson & Nicholson, 164 N.H. at 107 (quotation omitted). “Parties
may not modify orders of the court through private agreement.” In the Matter
of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 336 (2010).
Moreover, in this case, the standing order to the parties’ 2010 Uniform
Support Order stated that “[t]he amount of child support may be recalculated
according to the guidelines whenever there is a change in the number of
children for whom support is ordered, upon petition of any party.” Thus, the
father was on notice that he was required to petition the trial court to have his
child support obligation reduced upon the emancipation of his eldest child.
The father contends that the reduced support that he paid exceeded the
guidelines for support due for the remaining child. However, this does not
defeat the requirement that any change in a court order must be made by the
court. See id. We further disagree with the father’s characterization of the
requirement of judicial approval of any change in a court order as “a mere
formality.” See In the Matter of Mortner & Mortner, 168 N.H. 424, 429 (2015)
(stating judicial review of divorce stipulation is not “mere formality” (quotation
omitted)). Rather, judicial review is intended to ensure that the agreement is
fair and reasonable to all, including the children. See In the Matter of Laura &
Scott, 161 N.H. at 337 (stating that “judicial approval of all child support
agreements is necessary to prevent collusion between the parties and
situations in which one party puts undue pressure on the other”); cf. In the
Matter of Mortner & Mortner, 168 N.H. at 429 (stating that, in divorce
proceeding, trial court has duty to both parties and all citizens to ensure that a
stipulation is fair and reasonable). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court sustainably exercised its discretion by ruling that any private agreement
between the parties had no effect upon the arrearages due under the support
order.
For similar reasons, we disagree with the father’s contention that the
trial court erred by failing to find that, based upon the parties’ agreement, the
mother was equitably estopped from petitioning for arrearages based upon the
full amount of child support ordered. As we explained, even if the mother had
agreed to modify the father’s support obligation, such an agreement would be
unenforceable absent court approval. See In the Matter of LaRocque &
LaRocque, 164 N.H. at 151. Furthermore, the purpose of child support is to
provide economic support for the children. In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds,
156 N.H. 498, 503 (2007). Regardless of the parents’ actions, the children
should not be deprived of the amount of support to which they are entitled. Id.Thus, we have said that equitable estoppel cannot apply to prevent a court
from awarding the proper amount of child support, particularly where the
legislature has explicitly permitted parents de novo review of existing support
obligations. Id.; see RSA 458-C:7, I (Supp. 2017). Accordingly, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel does not apply. See In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156
N.H. at 503.
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Finally, the remaining issues the father raised in his notice of appeal, but
did not brief, are deemed waived. See In the Matter of Kempton & Kempton,
167 N.H. 785, 804 (2015).
Affirmed.
DALIANIS, C.J., and LYNN, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ.,
concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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