Eugene Gaudreau & a. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2017-0067, Eugene Gaudreau & a. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. & a., the court on October 26, 2017, issued the
following order:
Having considered the briefs, memorandum of law, and record submitted
on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See
Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.
The plaintiffs, Eugene Gaudreau and Francine Hart, appeal the order of
the Superior Court (Anderson, J.) denying their motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, to set aside the
verdict, following a jury trial and verdict in favor of the defendants, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., and Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, on the plaintiffs’
negligence claim. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in denying their
motion because the evidence conclusively established that the defendants’
negligent clean-up of a water spill in their store caused plaintiff Eugene
Gaudreau (Gaudreau) to slip and fall or, in the alternative, that the jury’s
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. They also argue that the trial
court erred in ruling that the evidence was conflicting as to whether, at the
time of Gaudreau’s fall, there was a store policy or protocol in place that
required employees to check the adjacent aisle after cleaning up a spill.
“A party is entitled to JNOV only when the sole reasonable inference that
may be drawn from the evidence, which must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, is so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving
party that no contrary verdict could stand.” Akwa Vista v. NRT, 160 N.H. 594,
598 (2010). “In deciding whether to grant the motion, the trial court cannot
weigh the evidence or inquire into the credibility of witnesses.” Id. “If the
evidence adduced at trial is conflicting, or if several reasonable inferences may
be drawn, the court must deny the motion.” Id. “Our standard of review of a
trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV is extremely narrow.” Id.The trial court may grant a motion to set aside the jury’s verdict when it
is “conclusively against the weight of the evidence,” which means that the
verdict “must be one no reasonable jury could return.” George v. Al Hoyt &
Sons, Inc., 162 N.H. 123, 133 (2011). “We will not overturn the trial court’s
decision on a motion to set aside the verdict unless it is without evidence or an
unsustainable exercise of discretion.” Id.The record shows that Gaudreau was walking in the bread and fruit aisle
in the defendants’ store when he slipped in a puddle of water and fell to the
floor. Approximately fifteen minutes earlier, store employees had become
aware of a spill in the adjacent aisle and had completed their clean-up of the
spill several minutes prior to Gaudreau’s fall. The plaintiffs argue that they
conclusively proved that the defendant’s negligent clean-up of the spill in the
adjacent aisle caused Gaudreau’s fall. At trial, the defendants argued that the
puddle did not form in the bread and fruit aisle until shortly before, or
immediately before, Gaudreau fell. Video evidence showed customers and
employees walking through the area where Gaudreau fell minutes before he
fell. Their movements were inconsistent with the existence of a large puddle of
water in the aisle. The jury could have inferred that the puddle that caused
Gaudreau to fall did not form until minutes before or immediately before his
fall. Thus, the plaintiffs’ theory that the water puddle in the bread and fruit
aisle was caused by the negligent clean-up of the spill that occurred
approximately fifteen minutes earlier in the adjacent aisle was not the sole
reasonable inference that the jury could have drawn from the evidence. See
Akwa Vista, 160 N.H. at 598. Nor can we conclude, upon this record, that the
inferences drawn in the defendants’ favor were conclusively against the weight
of the evidence. Al Hoyt & Sons, Inc., 162 N.H. at 133.
The plaintiffs next argue that they conclusively proved that the
defendants violated their safety policies and protocols by cleaning up the spill
in the adjacent aisle without checking to determine whether it had migrated
into the bread and fruit aisle. The defendants’ assistant manager testified that
no such policy or protocol existed at the time of Gaudreau’s fall. The testimony
of the defendants’ safety manager was unclear as to whether such a policy
existed. There was no evidence that any such policy or protocol existed in
written form. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably inferred that no
such policy or protocol existed. Thus, the plaintiffs’ theory that the defendants
violated their safety policies and protocols was not the sole reasonable
inference that the jury could have drawn from the evidence. Nor can we
conclude, upon this record, that the jury verdict was conclusively against the
weight of the evidence. Moreover, even if the plaintiffs had conclusively proven
that the defendants violated their safety policies and protocols, such a violation
would constitute evidence of negligence, not conclusive proof of negligence.
Lemery v. O’Shea Dennis, Inc., 112 N.H. 199, 200 (1972). Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for JNOV or, in
the alternative, to set aside the verdict. See Akwa Vista, 160 N.H. at 598; Al
Hoyt & Sons, Inc., 162 N.H. at 133.
Affirmed.
Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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