Cheyenne French v. Tucker Kram

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2016-0681, Cheyenne French v. Tucker Kram,
the court on May 26, 2017, issued the following order:
Having considered the brief and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We
reverse.
The defendant, Tucker Kram, appeals an order of the Circuit Court
(Tenney, J.) granting a civil stalking final order of protection to the plaintiff,
Cheyenne French. See RSA 633:3-a, III-a (2016). He contends, in part, that the
evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he stalked the plaintiff. We
review the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and uphold the findings and rulings of
the trial court unless they lack evidentiary support or are erroneous as a matter
of law. Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 190 (2007).
RSA 633:3-a, I(a) (2016) provides that a person “commits the offense of
stalking” if he “[p]urposely, knowingly or recklessly engages in a course of
conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to
fear for his or her personal safety . . . and the person is actually placed in such
fear.” A “course of conduct” consists of “2 or more acts over a period of time,
however short, which evidence[ ] a continuity of purpose,” but does not “include
conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of
making contact with the targeted person.” RSA 633:3-a, II(a).
Before issuing a stalking order of protection, the trial court must make
specific findings on the record that the defendant engaged in two or more such
specific acts. South v. McCabe, 156 N.H. 797, 798 (2008). The trial court must
limit its findings to the factual allegations specifically recited in the stalking
petition. Id. at 799.
In this case, although the trial court found that the defendant “continued
his attempts to contact [the plaintiff] repeatedly, despite numerous requests not
to do so,” it did not find that any of those attempted contacts would have caused
a reasonable person to fear for her safety, nor did the plaintiff testify that any of
those contacts actually caused her to so fear. See Comer v. Tracey, 156 N.H.
241, 249 (2007) (reversing stalking order when plaintiff did not testify to content
of defendant’s telephone calls or that his actions placed her in fear).
Accordingly, we conclude that, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the trial court’s finding that the defendant stalked her
lacks evidentiary support. See Fisher, 155 N.H. at 190. Given this conclusion,
we need not address the defendant’s second argument.
Reversed.
Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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