In the Matter of Timothy W. Johnson and Carol A. Johnson

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2014-0529, In the Matter of Timothy W.
Johnson and Carol A. Johnson, the court on May 11, 2015,
issued the following order:
Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. We affirm.
The petitioner, Timothy Johnson, appeals an order of the Circuit Court
(Lemire, J.) denying his motion to modify his child support. The petitioner
contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the 2013 amendment to
RSA 461-A:14, IV, see Laws 2013, 201:1, which provided that “[n]o child support
order for a child with disabilities may continue after the child reaches age 21,”
does not apply retroactively to support orders, like his, that were issued prior to
the effective date of the amendment. Because resolution of this issue requires
statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. In the Matter of Serodio &
Perkins, 166 N.H. 606, 609 (2014).
A child’s right to receive financial support is substantive in nature. In the
Matter of Donovan & Donovan, 152 N.H. 55, 63 (2005). Therefore, the
presumption in favor of prospective application must be applied. Id.Furthermore, the 2014 amendment to RSA 461-A:14, IV, see Laws 2014, 225:1,
which became effective before the trial court’s notice of decision of its order ruling
that the 2013 amendment is not retroactive, clarified the legislature’s intent that
the 2013 amendment not apply to support orders issued before its effective date.
The 2014 amendment specifically provides that “[n]o child support order for a
child with disabilities which becomes effective after [the effective date of the 2013
amendment] may continue after the child reaches age 21.” RSA 461-A:14, IV
(Supp. 2014); Laws 2014, 225:1.
The petitioner argues that the 2013 amendment is remedial, and,
therefore, should be applied retroactively, because it “was enacted to provide a
remedy for those situations wherein one parent was obligated to pay child
support for an adult child with disabilities who was entitled to benefits through
Social Security or Medicaid as of the age of 21” and does not impose “a new
obligation on any party, but removed an obligation which the legislature
determined to eliminate.” However, the statute affects the child’s substantive
right to support. See Donovan, 152 N.H. at 63.
The petitioner argues that the 2014 amendment shows that the “legislature
realized that the plain meaning and effect of the 2013[ ] amendment . . . was to
deprive the Family Division of the power to order child support for disabled
children who are 21 years of age and to automatically terminate all support
orders when the adult child reached the age of 21.” To the contrary, we conclude
that the 2014 amendment clarifies the legislature’s original intent as to whether
the 2013 amendment is to apply retroactively.
The petitioner argues that, on the date of its initial order denying his
motion, the trial court “did not have the legal authority to order [him] to continue
paying child support for the parties’ disabled child who was then over 21 years of
age.” Assuming without deciding that this argument is preserved, because the
2013 amendment to RSA 461-A:14, IV does not apply retroactively, the trial court
had the requisite authority to require the petitioner to continue paying support
pursuant to the earlier support order.
Affirmed.
Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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