Diane S. Lapsley v. Township of Sparta (085422)(Statewide)

SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
Diane S. Lapsley v. Township of Sparta (A-68/69-20) (085422)
Argued November 8, 2021 -- Decided January 18, 2022
FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, defendants Township of Sparta, Paul Austin, and Sparta
Department of Public Works (collectively, defendants) challenge a denial of workers’
compensation benefits to plaintiff Diane Lapsley under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Lapsley was employed by the Township as a librarian for the Sparta Public
Library. The library is in a municipal complex with athletic fields, offices, and three
common-use parking lots. The Township owns and maintains the parking lots, which are
open to Township employees and the general public alike. The Township did not direct
employees to park in the parking lots, assign parking spaces for employees, or require
permit or paid parking. Nor did the Township restrict employees’ manner of traveling
between the parking lots and the library.
On February 3, 2014, Lapsley’s husband arrived at the library to drive Lapsley
home. As they walked from the library to the car through the parking lot, they were
suddenly struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by Paul Austin, a
Township employee. As a result, Lapsley suffered injuries to her leg requiring multiple
surgeries and leaving her permanently disfigured. Lapsley filed a complaint against
defendants in the Law Division and, later, a claim for workers’ compensation benefits
against the Township in the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
The Division found that Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her
employment and were therefore compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Lapsley appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding Lapsley’s injuries were
not compensable under the Act. 466 N.J. Super. 160, 173 (App. Div. 2021). The Court
granted defendants’ petitions for certification. 246 N.J. 448 (2021); 246 N.J. 450 (2021).
HELD: Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the
parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent
to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. Lapsley was therefore
entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
1
1. The Workers’ Compensation Act is humane social legislation that has always been
construed and applied in light of its broad remedial objective. The Act authorizes
workers’ compensation benefits to an employee injured in an “accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment.” See N.J.S.A. 34:15-1. Aside from certain limited
exceptions, the Act is the exclusive remedy for an employee who suffers a work-related
injury. In determining whether an accident arises “out of and in the course of
employment,” New Jersey courts apply the premises rule established by the Legislature
in the 1979 amendments to the Act: “[e]mployment shall be deemed to commence when
an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work and shall
terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment, excluding
areas not under the control of the employer.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-36. The Legislature used
the phrase “excluding areas not under the control of the employer” in its definition of
employment because it intended to include areas controlled by the employer within the
definition. (pp. 9-10)
2. To determine whether an injury is compensable, “[t]he pivotal questions under the
premises rule are (1) where was the situs of the accident, and (2) did the employer have
control of the property on which the accident occurred.” Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J.
298, 316-17 (1998). The meaning of “control” under the Act is more expansive than
under formal property concepts. “[C]ontrol exists when the employer owns, maintains,
or has exclusive use of the property.” Id. at 317. And “when compensability of an
accident depends on control of the employer, that test is satisfied if the employer has the
right of control; it is not necessary to establish that the employer actually exercised that
right.” Brower v. ICT Grp., 164 N.J. 367, 372-73 (2000). The Court reviews examples
from case law. (pp. 10-12)
3. Applying the premises rule here, the Court finds that Lapsley is entitled to
compensation under the Act. The site of the accident was the parking lot adjacent to the
library where Lapsley’s husband had parked; Lapsley stepped off the library curb directly
into the parking lot before being injured there. The Township controlled that parking lot
through its ownership and maintenance. See Kristiansen, 153 N.J. at 317. The parties do
not dispute the Township’s ownership or maintenance. The Township’s plowing of the
parking lot of snow when the accident occurred visibly demonstrated the Township’s
exercise of control over the lot. See Brower, 164 N.J. at 372-73. Also, the Township
would have been aware that a library employee would park in the lot directly abutting the
library. This construction is consistent with the Act’s broad remedial objective.
(pp. 12-13)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-68/69 September Term 2020
085422
Diane S. Lapsley,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Township of Sparta and
Sparta Public Library,
Respondents-Appellants,
and
Paul Austin and Sparta
Department of Public Works,
Intervenors-Appellants.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
466 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 2021).
Argued Decided
November 8, 2021 January 18, 2022
William G. Johnson argued the cause for appellants Paul
Austin and Sparta Department of Public Works (Johnson
& Johnson, attorneys; William G. Johnson, of counsel
and on the briefs).
John R. Tort, Jr. argued the cause for appellants
Township of Sparta and Sparta Public Library (Leitner,
1
Tort, DeFazio & Brause, attorneys; John R. Tort, Jr., of
counsel and on the briefs).
Christine M. McCarthy argued the cause for respondent
(Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick, attorneys;
Christine M. McCarthy, Christopher L. Musmanno, and
Matheu D. Nunn, on the brief).
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, defendants Township of Sparta, Paul Austin, and Sparta
Department of Public Works (collectively, defendants) challenge a denial of
workers’ compensation benefits to plaintiff Diane Lapsley under the Workers’
Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -147. The Act authorizes workers’
compensation benefits to an employee injured in an “accident arising out of
and in the course of employment.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.
Lapsley was injured in a parking lot owned and maintained by her
employer, the Township, and adjacent to her place of work. However, the
Township did not control where Lapsley parked, did not restrict how
employees entered and exited the building where she worked, and allowed
both employees and the general public to use the parking lot. The Divis ion of
Workers’ Compensation awarded benefits to Lapsley. The Appellate Division
reversed, finding that Lapsley’s injuries did not arise “out of and in the course
2
of” her employment because the Township exercised no control over her use of
the parking lot.
We find that Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her
employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and
maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by
Township employees to park. We therefore conclude that Lapsley was entitled
to benefits under the Act, and we reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Division.
I.
Lapsley was employed by the Township as a librarian for the Sparta
Public Library. The library is in a municipal complex with athletic fields,
offices, and three common-use parking lots. The Township owns and
maintains the parking lots, which are open to Township employees and the
general public alike. The Township did not direct employees to park in the
parking lots, assign parking spaces for employees, or require permit or paid
parking. Nor did the Township restrict employees’ manner of traveling
between the parking lots and the library.
On February 3, 2014, Lapsley closed the library early due to a
snowstorm. Lapsley’s husband, Donald, arrived to drive her home and parked
his car in one of the parking lots. The parking lot he used is adjacent to the
3
library and is commonly used by employees for library purposes. As the
Lapsleys walked from the library to the car, they stepped off the curb, walked
approximately eighteen and a half feet into the parking lot, and were suddenly
struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by Paul Austin, a
Township employee. As a result, Lapsley suffered injuries to her leg requiring
multiple surgeries and leaving her permanently disfigured.
Lapsley filed a complaint against the Township, the library, Austin, and
the Sparta Department of Public Works in the Law Division. Defendants filed
a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, arguing that Lapsley’s claim was
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. The Law Division denied
the motion.
The next day, Lapsley filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that her injuries were not compensable under the Act. Defendants filed a cross
motion for a stay and transfer of the matter to the Division of Workers’
Compensation for a determination of compensability under the Act or,
alternatively, for summary judgment.
Lapsley then filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against
the Township in the Division of Workers’ Compensation. The Township filed
an answer to the claim conceding that Lapsley was employed by the Township
and that her injuries were compensable under the Act. Austin and the Sparta
4
Department of Public Works moved to intervene in the matter, which the
Division of Workers’ Compensation granted. Meanwhile, the Law Division
denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment but granted a stay to allow
the Division of Workers’ Compensation to decide the issue of compensability.
The Division of Workers’ Compensation ultimately found that Lapsley’s
injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and were therefore
compensable under the Act. Relying on Hersh v. County of Morris, 217 N.J.
236, 245 (2014), the compensation judge determined that the dispositive
factors were the site of the accident and the employer’s control of that
location. Accordingly, the judge noted that the parking lot was adjacent to the
library and that the Township owned, maintained, and had the right to control
the lot. Therefore, the judge found Lapsley’s injures to be compensable.
Lapsley appealed and, in a published opinion, the Appellate Division
reversed, finding Lapsley’s injuries were not compensable under the Act.
Lapsley v. Township of Sparta, 466 N.J. Super. 160, 173 (App. Div. 2021).
Relying in part on this Court’s decision in Novis v. Rosenbluth Travel,
138 N.J. 92 (1994), the Appellate Division determined that the critical factor in
workers’ compensation matters for an off-premises parking lot is the degree of
control the employer exercised over the employee’s use of the lot. Id. at 170-
71. Considering that factor, the Appellate Division found that the Township
5
did not exercise control over Lapsley’s use of the common-use parking lot
because employees were not instructed on where to park or how to enter and
exit the complex and because they shared the parking lot with the public. Ibid.Moreover, because the Township owns and maintains multiple properties and
roadways including the municipal complex, the Appellate Division concluded
that to find that Lapsley’s injuries were compensable “would be an
unwarranted and overbroad expansion” of liability for public employers. Id. at
173.
Defendants then petitioned for certification, which we granted. 246 N.J.
448 (2021); 246 N.J. 450 (2021).
II.
The parties advance the following arguments with respect to whether
Lapsley is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under the Act.
Defendants first argue that the Appellate Division erred in concluding
that the premises rule requires a finding that the Township exercised control
over Lapsley’s use of the parking lot to find compensability under the Act.
Instead, defendants maintain that the premises rule looks to the site of the
accident and the employer’s right to control the parking lot, not the degree of
control exercised, in determining compensability. Accordingly, defendants
claim that because the accident occurred in a parking lot owned and
6
maintained by the Township, Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course
of her employment and are therefore compensable. Defendants further argue
that the Appellate Division’s decision would improperly expand public
employers’ exposure to potential tort liability and restrict employees’
eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits.
Lapsley, on the other hand, argues that the degree of control exercised
over an employee’s use of a parking lot is routinely analyzed and required in
applying the premises rule to determining compensability. Lapsley maintains
that the parking lot is not part of the Township’s premises because the
Township exercised no control over her route to or from the library and
because the parking lot where she was injured was shared with the public.
Lapsley further argues that if ownership and maintenance of the parking lot is
sufficient to find compensability, the premises rule would be abrogated
because the Township owns and maintains many properties and roadways
within its boundaries, thus inviting expansive, unwarranted interpretations of
the Act.
III.
A.
“Courts generally give ‘substantial deference’ to administrative
determinations.” Earl v. Johnson & Johnson, 158 N.J. 155, 161 (1999)
7
(quoting R&R Mktg., L.L.C. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 158 N.J. 170, 175
(1999)). Indeed,
[i]n the workers’ compensation context, the scope of
appellate review is limited to a determination of
“‘whether the findings made could reasonably have
been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in
the record,’ considering ‘the proofs as a whole,’ with
due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the
witnesses to judge their credibility.”
[Ibid. (quoting Dietrich v. Toms River Bd. of Educ.,
294 N.J. Super. 252, 260-61 (App. Div. 1996)).]
“Deference must be accorded [to] the factual findings and legal
determinations made by the Judge of Compensation unless they are ‘manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with competent relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.’” Lindquist v. City of
Jersey City Fire Dep’t, 175 N.J. 244, 262 (2003) (quoting Perez v. Monmouth
Cable Vision, 278 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 1994)). However, we are
not “bound by [an] agency’s interpretation of a statute or its determination of a
strictly legal issue.” Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93
(1973). Instead, we review an agency’s interpretation of a statute de novo.
Russo v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011).
8
B.
The Workers’ Compensation Act “is humane social legislation designed
to place the cost of work-connected injury on the employer who may readily
provide for it as an operating expense.” Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus,
Inc., 111 N.J. 89, 94-95 (1988) (quoting Hornyak v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
63 N.J. 99, 101 (1973)). Therefore, “provisions of the Act have always been
construed and applied in light of [its] broad remedial objective.” Id. at 95.
Relevant to this appeal, the Act provides that
[w]hen personal injury is caused to an employee by
accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, of which the actual or lawfully imputed
negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate
cause, he shall receive compensation therefor from his
employer, provided the employee was himself not
willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury
....
[N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 (emphasis added).]
And aside from “certain limited exceptions, the Workers’ Compensation Act is
the exclusive remedy for an employee who suffers a work-related injury.”
Univ. of Mass. Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Christodoulou, 180 N.J. 334, 346
(2004) (citing N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, -8).
In determining whether an accident arises “out of and in the course of
employment,” our courts apply the premises rule established by the Legislature
in the 1979 amendments to the Act. Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298, 316
9
(1998) (citing N.J.S.A. 34:15-36). “The premises rule is based on the notion
that an injury to an employee that happens going to or coming from work
arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury takes place on the
employer’s premises.” Ibid. Therefore, “[t]he fact that [an employee] had
punched out on the time clock does not preclude compensability.” Brower v.
ICT Grp., 164 N.J. 367, 372 (2000).
Specifically, the amendments provide that “[e]mployment shall be
deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer’s place of
employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves
the employer’s place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of
the employer.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-36. We have explained that
[t]he Legislature used the phrase “excluding areas not
under the control of the employer” in its definition of
employment because it intended to include areas
controlled by the employer within the definition. That
phrase was intended to make clear that the premises
rule can entail more than the four walls of an office or
plant.
[Kristiansen, 153 N.J. at 316.]
To determine whether an injury is compensable, “[t]he pivotal questions
under the premises rule are (1) where was the situs of the accident, and (2) did
the employer have control of the property on which the accident occurred.” Id.at 316-17 (citing Livingstone, 111 N.J. at 96). “[P]laces that are not under the
10
control of the employer are not considered part of the employer’s premises for
purposes of workers’ compensation benefits . . . .” Hersh, 217 N.J. at 249. That
said, “[t]he meaning of ‘control’ under the Act is more expansive than under
formal property concepts.” Brower, 164 N.J. at 372 (citing Ramos v. M & F
Fashions, Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 592 (1998)). “[T]his Court has stated that control
exists when the employer owns, maintains, or has exclusive use of the
property.” Kristiansen, 153 N.J. at 317. It is also well-established that “when
compensability of an accident depends on control of the employer, that test is
satisfied if the employer has the right of control; it is not necessary to establish
that the employer actually exercised that right.” Brower, 164 N.J. at 372-73.
Applying the premises rule in Kristiansen, for example, this “Court
found that control was obvious where the accident occurred because the
[employer] owned, operated and maintained the” property where the employee
was injured. Hersh, 217 N.J. at 245 (citing Kristiansen, 153 N.J. at 317)). In
Hersh, however, this Court did not find control where the employee was
injured when walking on a non-employer-owned street to a non-employer-
owned parking garage; the employer only rented a portion of the garage over
which it had no control, and it exercised no control over where the employee
parked. Id. at 249. Accordingly, this Court held that the employee, “injured
11
on a . . . street, not controlled by the employer, [was] not entitled to
compensation under [the Act].” Id. at 250.
IV.
Applying the premises rule here, we find that Lapsley is entitled to
compensation under the Act.
The site of the accident was the parking lot adjacent to the library where
Lapsley’s husband had parked; Lapsley stepped off the library curb directly
into the parking lot before being injured there. The Township controlled that
parking lot through its ownership and maintenance. “[C]ontrol exists when the
employer owns, maintains, or has exclusive use of the property.” Kristiansen,
153 N.J. at 317 (citing Livingstone, 111 N.J. at 104). The parties do not
dispute the Township’s ownership or maintenance. The Township’s plowing
of the parking lot of snow when the accident occurred visibly demonstrated the
Township’s exercise of control over the lot. See Brower, 164 N.J. at 372-73.
Also, the Township would have been aware that a library employee would park
in the lot directly abutting the library.
Unlike in Hersh, where the employee was injured on non-employer-
owned property, the Township controlled this parking lot adjacent to Lapsley’s
place of work. And the lot was available for use by employees of the adjacent
library. Therefore, we find Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of
12
her employment and are compensable under the Act. That construction of the
Act is consistent with its “broad remedial objective.” Livingstone, 11 N.J. at
95.
V.
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Division and affirm the judgment of the Division of Workers’
Compensation.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON,
SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s
opinion.
13