S.L.W. v. New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits (081723) (Statewide)

SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
S.L.W. v. New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits (A-32-18) (081723)
Argued April 24, 2019 -- Decided June 24, 2019
TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court.
When members of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS) die after
retirement, their children and widowed spouses are eligible to receive survivor benefits
under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1. S.L.W., an adult woman with disabilities, sought survivor
benefits after her father, a longtime member of the New Jersey law enforcement
community, passed in 2012. In this appeal, the Court considers whether, as the Division
of Pensions and Benefits (Division) maintains, S.L.W. must prove under N.J.A.C. 17:4-
3.7 that she was dependent on her father before his death.
S.L.W.’s father retired after a long career in law enforcement and began receiving
pension retirement benefits from PFRS. S.L.W. followed her father into law
enforcement. Tragedy struck in late 2008 when a drunk driver plowed into S.L.W.’s
patrol car while she was on duty. Her injuries led to her physical disability and,
concurrently, her inability to work. At the time of the accident, S.L.W. was twenty-eight
years old, had never married, and lived independently. Going forward, S.L.W. relied on
her father for upwards of 90% of her living expenses but indicated on her income taxes
that no one could claim her as a dependent.
S.L.W.’s father died in June 2012. About a year and a half later, S.L.W. attempted
to submit an application for survivor benefits under his pension plan. In late June 2014,
the Division wrote to S.L.W., indicating that she did not meet the Division’s
interpretation of the word “child” for PFRS purposes because she had been emancipated
and employed prior to her disability. The letter concluded that, even if the Division’s
interpretation of “child” was incorrect, S.L.W. was still bound to prove dependency under
N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7.
In July 2014, S.L.W. filed a letter-appeal with the PFRS Board of Trustees
(Board) disputing the Division’s explanation that she must provide tax returns
showing her father had claimed her as a dependent. The Board held a hearing on the
matter in early August 2014 and decided S.L.W. did not qualify for survivor
benefits. Nevertheless, the Board referred the matter to the Office of Administrative
Law for an evidentiary hearing.
1
After the matter was assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), S.L.W.
and the Division cross-moved for summary judgment. The ALJ concluded S.L.W.
did not qualify as a “child” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d), granted the Division’s
motion for summary judgment, denied S.L.W.’s motion for summary judgment, and
dismissed S.L.W.’s appeal. In November 2016, the Board adopted the
recommendations of the ALJ.
S.L.W. appealed the Board’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed in
part. The Appellate Division agreed with the ALJ’s determination that S.L.W. did
not properly establish dependency but found that S.L.W.’s emancipation did not
disqualify her as a “child” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d).
The Court granted S.L.W.’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 217 (2018).
The Division did not cross-petition to challenge the determination that S.L.W. was
not disqualified as a “child.”
HELD: Upon review of the PFRS statute’s plain language and history, the Court finds
that the Legislature did not intend for children of PFRS members to meet a dependency
requirement to receive survivor benefits. The Court’s finding is consistent with the
PFRS’s underlying policy goal of financially protecting the family members of deceased
PFRS members.
1. PFRS not only provides for the financial well-being of retired police and firemen, but
also ensures financial stability for their surviving spouses and children by allowing for
survivor benefits for certain family members of a retiree in the system. As relevant here,
a “child” eligible for survivor benefits is defined in the PFRS pension scheme as a
deceased member’s or retirant’s unmarried child “of any age who, at the time of the
member’s or retirant’s death, is disabled because of an intellectual disability or physical
incapacity, is unable to do any substantial, gainful work because of the impairment and
[her or] his impairment has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months, as affirmed by the medical board.” N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d).
The PFRS statute includes an enabling clause allowing the State Treasurer to
“promulgate any rules and regulations necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act.”
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-16.16. One such enacted regulation provides: “Proof of dependency
shall be established by the filing of an affidavit of dependency, supported by the deceased
and the claimant’s income tax returns, for the period immediately preceding the death or
accident.” N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7. (pp. 12-13)
2. The Court previously considered PFRS survivor benefits in Saccone v. PFRS, 219
N.J. 369 (2014). In Saccone, the Court emphasized the recognized strong public policy
favoring the financial protection of a public employee’s family, including protecting a
public employee’s ability to provide adequately for the well-being of his disabled child
2
after his death. Id. at 382. The Court concluded that the survivor benefits statute, like the
entire PFRS pension scheme, should be interpreted in light of its remedial character and
construed in a manner that furthers its fundamental purpose. Id. at 387. (p. 14)
3. The literal reading of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d) supports S.L.W.’s argument: the
definition of “child” makes no mention of any dependency requirement for survivor
benefits. The plain language of the statute, viewed through the lens of the statute’s
commitment to provide for the financial security of a retirant’s surviving children with
disabilities, is sufficient to end this inquiry. (pp. 15-16)
4. Review of the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12 and its related definitions
underscores the fact that the absence of a dependency requirement was an intentional
choice of the Legislature. The PFRS statute’s definition of “child” has never
included a dependency requirement, unlike its definitions of certain other family
members. The Court declines to conclude N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)’s definition of
child holds any implied, presumed, or suggested dependency requirement for
children who may qualify for survivor benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1. The
Division’s implementation of its contrary interpretation of the statute through its
denial of S.L.W.’s appeal on the basis of her presumed ineligibility was arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable. (pp. 17-20)
5. The Court cannot find S.L.W. eligible for survivor benefits as she has not yet had
the opportunity to prove she meets all the requirements for those benefits. As such,
this matter must be remanded to determine whether S.L.W. is otherwise eligible for
survivor benefits. (p. 21)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is
REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’S opinion.
3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-32 September Term 2018
081723
S.L.W.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits,
Respondent-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Argued Decided
April 24, 2019 June 24, 2019
John F. Pilles, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (John F.
Pilles, Jr., on the brief).
Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause
for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
attorney; Juliana C. DeAngelis, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
When members of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (PFRS)
die after retirement, their children and widowed spouses are eligible to receive
1
survivor benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1. S.L.W., an adult woman with
disabilities, sought survivor benefits after her father, a longtime member of the
New Jersey law enforcement community, passed in 2012. The Division of
Pensions and Benefits (Division) maintains S.L.W. is ineligible. It argues that
to receive survivor benefits she must prove that she was dependent on her
father before his death, citing N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7.
The statutory definition of “child” within the PFRS framework, N.J.S.A.
43:16A-1(21), provides:
“Child” shall mean a deceased member’s or retirant’s
unmarried child (a) under the age of 18, or (b) 18 years
of age or older and enrolled in a secondary school, or
(c) under the age of 24 and enrolled in a degree program
in an institution of higher education for at least 12
credit hours in each semester, provided that the member
died in active service as a result of an accident met in
the actual performance of duty at some definite time
and place, and the death was not the result of the
member’s willful misconduct, or (d) of any age who, at
the time of the member’s or retirant’s death, is disabled
because of an intellectual disability or physical
incapacity, is unable to do any substantial, gainful work
because of the impairment and his impairment has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months, as affirmed by the medical
board.
Upon review of the PFRS statute’s plain language and history, we find that the
Legislature did not intend for children of PFRS members to meet a dependency
requirement to receive survivor benefits. This finding is consistent with the
2
PFRS’s underlying policy goal of financially protecting the family members of
deceased PFRS members.
I.
A.
We elicit the facts from the record.
J.R.W. and C.L.M. married and had two children, including S.L.W. The
parents divorced; J.R.W. later remarried. J.R.W. retired on January 1, 2005,
after a long career in law enforcement. Shortly thereafter, he began receiving
pension retirement benefits from PFRS.
S.L.W. was twenty-five years old at the time of J.R.W.’s retirement.
S.L.W. had followed her father into law enforcement, serving as an officer for
the Delaware River Port Authority. What follows are S.L.W.’s representations
of the pertinent facts of her case.
Tragedy struck in late 2008 when a drunk driver plowed into S.L.W.’s
patrol car while she was on duty. Her injuries led to her physical disability
and, concurrently, her inability to work. At the time of the accident, S.L.W.
was twenty-eight years old, had never married, and lived independently.
S.L.W. further states that, in striving for a modicum of independence
and to respect her father’s privacy, she did not move in with him after her
accident. Still, she asserts that she depended almost entirely on him
3
financially going forward. J.R.W. directly paid S.L.W.’s creditors and gave
her money, in cash, to cover her living expenses. Despite relying on her father
for upwards of 90% of her living expenses, S.L.W. indicated on her income
taxes that no one could claim her as a dependent.
Although her father’s tax returns are not part of the record, the parties
apparently agree that J.R.W. likely never claimed S.L.W. as a dependent on his
income taxes after the accident.
J.R.W. died in June 2012. His second wife predeceased him in 2008.
About a year and a half after J.R.W.’s death, S.L.W. notes that she attempted
to submit an application for survivor benefits under J.R.W.’s pension plan to
the Division of Pension and Benefits. S.L.W. reviewed Fact Sheet No. 19
from the Division. It stated a retired member’s “child(ren)” may be entitled to
survivor benefits. The fact sheet’s definition of “child” included a retirant’s
child who is unmarried, of “any age,” and “who, at the time of [the member’s
or retirant’s] death is disabled because of mental or physical incapacity and is
incapable of substantial employment because of the impairment,” if the
incapacity is expected to last at least twelve continuous months. That
definition of “child” was repeated in the PFRS Handbook.
S.L.W. asserts that a Division representative did not allow her to submit
an application, informing her she did not qualify for survivor benefits because
4
J.R.W. had not claimed her as a dependent on his income taxes and she had not
lived with her father before or at the time of his death.
S.L.W. hired a lawyer. S.L.W. chronicled her lawyer’s efforts on her
behalf. Her lawyer wrote to the Division outlining S.L.W.’s claim for benefits.
Nearly a month later, the Division responded with a call to S.L.W.’s lawyer in
which the representative parroted the explanation S.L.W. had already received
of why she was ineligible for survivor benefits.
Litigation ensued. On April 14, 2014, S.L.W. filed a claim against the
Division in Camden County’s Law Division, seeking an order awarding
S.L.W. survivor benefits under her father’s retirement plan and directing the
Division to provide those survivor benefits, fees and costs. Around the same
time, S.L.W. states she received a letter dated April 11, 2014 from a Pensions
Benefit Specialist at the Division stating S.L.W.’s application was effectively
time-barred because her father’s retirement predated S.L.W.’s disability.
In late June 2014, Michael Weik, Division Manager of Operations, wrote
to S.L.W. outlining the Division’s interpretation of the term “child” as
“someone who at the time of emancipation could not be gainfully employed as
a result of a physical or mental disability they incurred prior to their
emancipation.” The letter reasoned because S.L.W. had been emancipated and
employed, she did not meet that definition of “child.” Notably, the letter
5
concluded that even if the Division’s interpretation of “child” was incorrect,
S.L.W. was still bound to prove dependency under N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7 and
advised S.L.W. she could appeal the finding to the PFRS Board of Trustees
(Board).
In July 2014, S.L.W. filed a letter-appeal disputing the Division’s
explanation that she must provide tax returns showing J.R.W. had claimed her
as a dependent and stressing the Division’s failure to provide her and her
father notice of the requirement. S.L.W. requested the matter be referred to
the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) to establish a record.
The Board held a hearing on the matter in early August 2014 and
decided S.L.W. did not qualify for survivor benefits. The Board found S.L.W.
did not meet the definition of “child,” that is, “someone [who] at the time of
emancipation . . . could not be gainfully employed as a result of a physical or
mental disability they incurred prior to their emancipation.” The Board also
noted the lack of income tax forms showing any legal dependency on J.R.W.
Nevertheless, the Board referred the matter to the OAL for an evidentiary
hearing.
B.
After the matter was assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
S.L.W. and the Division cross-moved for summary judgment. The ALJ heard
6
oral argument and then issued a written decision on October 7, 2016. The ALJ
acknowledged that the “literal reading” of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d)’s
definition of “child” supports S.L.W.’s argument, but found, without more, the
literal interpretation “appears to run afoul of legislative objectives and public
policy.”
In considering whether the PFRS statute has a dependency requirement,
the ALJ drew support from divergent statutes, both of which require a showing
of dependency for adult children with disabilities -- the Federal Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d), and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, which governs child-support
orders. Although the ALJ reviewed statutes concerning adult children, he
ultimately determined N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d)’s definition of child should be
limited to children whose disabilities predate their emancipation.
Rejecting S.L.W.’s argument that the Division should be estopped from
enforcing N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7’s tax return proof requirement, the ALJ found the
regulation was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in nature. The ALJ
concluded S.L.W. did not qualify as a “child” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d)
because she was emancipated before she became disabled and could not show
financial dependency on J.R.W.
The ALJ granted the Division’s motion for summary judgment, denied
S.L.W.’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed S.L.W.’s appeal.
7
In November 2016, the Board adopted the recommendations of the ALJ,
affirming S.L.W.’s ineligibility for survivor benefits.
C.
S.L.W. appealed the Board’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed
in part in an unpublished per curiam opinion.
The Appellate Division agreed with the ALJ’s determination that S.L.W.
did not properly establish dependency. The Appellate Division rejected
S.L.W.’s argument about N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7(a), finding the Division’s
enactment of the regulation requiring the submission of income tax returns was
valid under the enabling statute. It was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable because it augments the legislative policy of the PFRS statute.
Consequently, the Appellate Division concluded S.L.W.’s claim should fail
due to her inability to comply with N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7(a).
Also, for the sake of completeness, the Appellate Division addressed the
issue of whether S.L.W. qualified as a “child” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d)
based on the emancipation requirement the ALJ and the Division found
implicit in the statute. Conducting an analysis under Metromedia, Inc. v.
Director, Division of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313 (1984), the Appellate Division
found the imposed requirement that child-beneficiaries not be emancipated
“was not predictable or fair, thereby requiring formal rulemaking procedures
8
and public notice.” As such, the court found the ALJ erred in finding S.L.W.’s
emancipation disqualified her as a “child” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d).
We granted S.L.W.’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 217 (2018).
II.
S.L.W. argues she is entitled to survivor benefits as she has met the
definition of “child” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21). Further, S.L.W. asserts the
Division’s regulatory requirement of tax returns to establish dependency is
incompatible with the statute. Finally, S.L.W. alternatively suggests the
Division failed to provide proper public notice of the dependency requirement,
citing materials prepared by the Division which neglect to mention the income
tax return requirement. S.L.W. contends had J.R.W. been aware of the tax
return dependency requirement during his lifetime, he would have taken the
necessary steps to ensure S.L.W. could comply and receive survivor benefits.
The Division asserts S.L.W. is ineligible for survivor benefits because
she is not a “child” under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21) and is unable to demonstrate
dependency on J.R.W. through the provision of his income tax returns as is
required by N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7. The Division notes the Board is charged with
administering the PFRS fund and contends it acted within its authority in
promulgating the associated regulations, including N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7. The
Division emphasizes policy concerns with S.L.W.’s interpretation of the
9
statute, namely that it could produce absurd results and a depletion of the
PFRS fund.
The Division did not cross-petition this Court for certification, so the
issue of whether S.L.W. is disqualified from collecting survivor benefits
because her emancipation predated her disability is not before the Court.
III.
Board decisions are afforded a deferential standard of review and will be
reversed only if “there is a clear showing that [the decision] is arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.” Mount
v. PFRS, 233 N.J. 402, 418 (2018) (quoting Russo v. PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27
(2010)). Still, we are not “bound by an agency’s interpretation of a statute or
its determination of a strictly legal issue, particularly when that interpretation
is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives.” Id. at 418-19 (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Russo, 206 N.J. at 27).
We presume agency regulations “are both ‘valid and reasonable,’” unless
and until “the party challenging a regulation . . . prov[es] that the agency’s
action was ‘arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.’” N.J. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs
v. Schundler, 211 N.J. 535, 548 (2012) (first quoting N.J. Soc’y for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Dep’t of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 385 (2008);
10
then quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). We
consider:
(1) whether the agency’s action violates the enabling
act’s express or implied legislative policies; (2)
whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the findings on which the agency based its
action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative
policies to the facts the agency clearly erred by
reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have
been made upon a showing of the relevant factors.
[Ibid. (quoting In re Petitions for Rulemaking, N.J.A.C.
10:82-1.2 & 10:85-4.1, 117 N.J. 311, 325 (1989)).]
Adopted regulations are ordinarily not declared invalid absent one of those
circumstances. Id. at 549.
In considering an agency’s adoption of regulations, we will “look
beyond the specific terms of the enabling act to the statutory policy sought to
be achieved by examining the entire statute in light of its surroundings and
objectives.” Ibid. (quoting N.J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75
N.J. 544, 562 (1978)). Our examination of both the enabling statute and the
law in its entirety is guided by our duty “to determine and effectuate the
Legislature’s intent.” Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 127 (2011)
(quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009)).
“[G]enerally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language.”
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). If the statutory language is
11
clear, our inquiry ends; if ambiguity persists, we turn to extrinsic evidence.
Richardson v. PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007) (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at
492).
IV.
A.
PFRS is a retirement system created to “provid[e] retirement allowances
and other benefits for policemen and firemen.” N.J.S.A. 43:16A-2. “PFRS not
only provides for the financial well-being of retired police and firemen, but
also ensures financial stability for their surviving spouses and children.”
Saccone v. PFRS, 219 N.J. 369, 379 (2014). PFRS does so by allowing for
survivor benefits for certain family members of a retiree in the system:
Upon the death after retirement of any member of the
retirement system there shall be paid to the member’s
widow or widower a pension of 50% of final
compensation for the use of herself or himself, to
continue during her or his widowhood, plus 15% of
such compensation payable to one surviving child or an
additional 25% of such compensation to two or more
children; if there is no surviving widow or widower or
in case the widow or widower dies or remarries, 20%
of final compensation will be payable to one surviving
child, 35% of such compensation to two surviving
children in equal shares and if there be three or more
children, 50% of such compensation would be payable
to such children in equal shares.
[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1(a).]
12
Once again, “child” is defined in the PFRS pension scheme as
a deceased member’s or retirant’s unmarried child (a)
under the age of 18, or (b) 18 years of age or older and
enrolled in a secondary school, or (c) under the age of
24 and enrolled in a degree program in an institution of
higher education for at least 12 credit hours in each
semester, provided that the member died in active
service as a result of an accident met in the actual
performance of duty at some definite time and place,
and the death was not the result of the member’s willful
misconduct, or (d) of any age who, at the time of the
member’s or retirant’s death, is disabled because of an
intellectual disability or physical incapacity, is unable
to do any substantial, gainful work because of the
impairment and [her or] his impairment has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months, as affirmed by the medical board.
[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21) (emphasis added).]
The statute includes an enabling clause allowing the State Treasurer,
with advice from the Division and related parties, to “promulgate any rules and
regulations necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act.” N.J.S.A.
43:16A-16.16. One such enacted regulation provides:
(a) Proof of dependency shall be established by the
filing of an affidavit of dependency, supported by the
deceased and the claimant’s income tax returns, for the
period immediately preceding the death or accident.
(b) A parent will be deemed to be dependent on the
member if they were accepted as dependents of the
member for Federal income tax purposes.
[N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7.]
13
B.
We have previously considered PFRS survivor benefits in Saccone, 219
N.J. 369. A retired member of PFRS sought to ensure his son would be able to
receive his future survivor benefits through a special needs trust (SNT). Id. at
372-73. The son had a severe mental disability and receiving the survivor
benefits directly would jeopardize his eligibility for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) benefits. Ibid.
We emphasized the “recognized strong public policy favoring the
financial protection of a public employee’s family,” including protecting “a
public employee’s ability to provide adequately for the well-being of his
disabled child after his death.” Id. at 382. Accordingly, we concluded, “the
survivor benefits statute, like the entire PFRS pension scheme, should be
interpreted in light of its remedial character. The statute should be construed
in a manner that furthers its fundamental purpose.” Id. at 387.
Noting a “rigid” reading of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1 would serve only to
harm “the very people [the statute] was intended to help,” we held the survivor
benefits could be paid into a SNT and “the Board’s contrary determination . . .
was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” Id. at 387-88. We further our
analysis here with the Saccone decision in mind.
14
C.
We owe a certain measure of deference to a government agency’s
interpretation of a legislative scheme it is entrusted to execute, but government
agencies are “expected to administer the scheme with the underlying
legislative policies foremost in mind. That principle applies in force when [as
here] the legislative scheme is remedial in nature.” Id. at 385.
Keeping New Jersey’s “strong public policy favoring the financial
protection of a public employee’s family,” including “a public employee’s
ability to provide adequately for the well-being of his disabled child after his
death,” id. at 382, at the forefront of our minds, we examine the plain language
of the statute. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1 makes survivor benefits available to a
member’s widow or widower and/or surviving children. Four sub-categories
of “a deceased member’s . . . unmarried children” qualify as a “[c]hild”; the
category relevant here is defined based on the child’s inability to do “any
substantial, gainful work” due to the child’s disability status “at the time of the
member’s or retirant’s death.” N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d).
As the ALJ noted -- and subsequently discarded -- the “literal reading”
of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21)(d) supports S.L.W.’s argument: the plain language
definition of “child” makes no mention of any dependency requirement for
survivor benefits. Instead, the statute requires someone in S.L.W.’s position to
15
demonstrate they: (1) are the child of a deceased member or retirant; (2) are
unmarried; (3) are “disabled because of an intellectual disability or physical
incapacity” “at the time of the member’s or retirant’s death”; (4) have an
impairment that “has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months, as affirmed by the medical board”; and (5) are
“unable to do any substantial, gainful work because of the impairment. ” Ibid.
We are obliged to interpret the statutory language here “in light of [the
PFRS pension scheme’s] remedial character.” Saccone, 219 N.J. at 387. The
PFRS’s survivor benefits statute manifests a strong commitment to the
financial well-being of a deceased PFRS member’s or retirant’s surviving
spouse and children. Correspondingly, the inclusion of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-
1(21)(d), specifically providing for children with disabilities and impairments
that inhibit a child’s ability to work, demonstrates the PFRS scheme’s desire to
use the delayed compensation benefits earned by members of PFRS to support
their family members with disabilities. We see nothing in the statute’s plain
language that requires the Division to limit those protections.
The plain language of the statute, viewed through the lens of the
statute’s commitment to provide for the financial security of a retirant’s
surviving children with disabilities, is sufficient to end this inquiry.
16
Nevertheless, a brief review of the legislative history of N.J.S.A.
43:16A-12 and its related definitions underscores the fact that the absence of a
dependency requirement was an intentional choice of the Legislature. The
PFRS statute’s definition of “child” has never included a dependency
requirement. That starkly contrasts with its definitions of certain other family
members, which have included such a requirement. The evolution of the PFRS
statute further reflects the Legislature’s intention to loosen the eligibility
requirements for survivor benefits for the welfare of spouses and children.
The original PFRS statute “permitted PFRS members to elect one of
three optional retirement plans . . . and to designate any beneficiary as the
recipient of the benefit.” Saccone, 219 N.J. at 379 (citing; L. 1944, c. 255
(codified at N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12; repealed 1967). The Legislature replaced
that original statute in 1967 with “N.J.S.A. 43:16A-12.1, which eliminated the
three optional retirement plans in lieu of a life annuity automatically payable
to the PFRS member’s surviving spouse and children.” Id. at 379 (citing L.
1967, c. 250, § 26); see also L. 1967, c. 250, § 31.
The 1967 statute defined what criteria a member’s surviving family had
to meet to qualify for benefits. The definition for child stated:
“Child” shall mean a deceased member’s unmarried
child either (a) under the age of 18 or (b) of any age
who, at the time of the member’s death, is disabled
because of mental retardation or physical incapacity, is
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unable to do any substantial, gainful work because of
the impairment and his impairment has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months, as affirmed by the medical board.
[L. 1967, c. 250, § 1.]
There was no dependency requirement in the definition’s plain language. In
contrast, the 1967 statute’s definitions for “dependent parent” and “dependent
widower” expressly required parents and widowers to prove dependency based
on the amount of financial support received from the member before death.
Ibid.
In 1971, the Legislature removed the word “dependent” throughout the
statute wherever it appeared before “parent” or “widower,” but the Legislature
did not delete the dependency requirements contained in the definitions of
parent or widower or add explicit dependency requirements for widows or
children. See, e.g., L. 1971, c. 175, §§ 1, 16.
The 1985 Legislature expanded the PFRS statute’s definition of “child”
to encompass more individuals. L. 1985, c. 525, § 1. It did not, however, alter
the section discussing children with disabilities. Ibid. As the legislative
history explains, the 1985 amendment served “to expand the class of persons
eligible, as children of a deceased PFRS member or retirant, for survivor
benefits under the retirement system,” beyond its coverage at the time of “any
such surviving child who is under the age of 18 or disabled.” A. State Gov’t,
18
Civil Serv., Elections, Pensions & Veterans Affairs Comm. Statement to S.
729 (L. 1985, c. 525) (emphasis added).
In 1996, the Legislature eliminated the dependency requirement for
widowers, bringing the “widower” definition in line with the definition of
“widow.” L. 1996, c. 89, § 1. The definition of “parent” is the only one that
continues to have a dependency requirement. The Legislature has never
imposed such a requirement on the children of PFRS members.
The history of the regulation at issue here, N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7, mirrors the
statute’s history. It was originally adopted in 1975 and codified at N.J.A.C.
17:4-1.10. 7 N.J.R. 393(a) (Aug. 7, 1975); 7 N.J.R. 238(a) (May 8, 1975).
Section (a) is identical to its current version, while section (b) originally applied
to widowers as well as parents. N.J.A.C. 17:4-1.10 (1975). In 2000, the
regulation was recodified at N.J.A.C. 17:4-3.7, and the Board deleted the
references to “widowers” “because a widower no longer must prove
dependency to receive a surviving spouse benefit.” 32 N.J.R. 4060(a) (Nov.
20, 2000).
As the PFRS statute stands today, the absence of any dependency
language in the statute’s longstanding definition of “child” is striking when
considered alongside the definition of “parent”:
the parent of a member who was receiving at least one-
half of his support from the member in the 12-month
19
period immediately preceding the member’s death or
the accident which was the direct cause of the member’s
death. The dependency of such a parent will be
considered terminated by marriage of the parent
subsequent to the death of the member.
[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(22) (emphases added).]
The history of the family member definitions and the present-day plain
language of those definitions demonstrate that the Legislature knows how to
impose a clearly defined dependency requirement when it so desires. So, it is
implausible to impute a dependency requirement to qualify as a child when the
law expressly outlines that requirement only for parents. We decline to
conclude the statute’s definition of child holds any implied, presumed, or
suggested dependency requirement.
We hold that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(21) creates no dependency requirement
for children who may qualify for survivor benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-
12.1. Flowing from that finding, the Division’s implementation of its contrary
interpretation of the statute through its denial of S.L.W.’s appeal on the basis
of her presumed ineligibility was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.
Here, there has been no demonstration that this plain language approach
to the statute developed by the Legislature can lead to an absurd result. If such
potential is demonstrated in the future, it may be resolved through use of, and
20
analysis within, the canons of interpretation. See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-
93.
We cannot, on the record developed before this Court, find S.L.W.
eligible for survivor benefits as she has not yet had the opportunity to prove
she meets all the requirements for those benefits. As such, this matter must be
remanded to determine whether S.L.W. is otherwise eligible for survivor
benefits.
V.
We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the
Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE
TIMPONE’S opinion.
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