State v. Reinaldo Fuentes (070729)

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
State of New Jersey v. Reinaldo Fuentes (A-18-12) (070729)
Argued September 9, 2013 -- Decided January 7, 2014
PATTERSON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court reviews a sentencing court’s application of the aggravating and mitigating factors
in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b).
On July 1, 2009, police were summoned to a New Brunswick apartment which defendant Reinaldo Fuentes
shared with Adrian Bentazos. Officers found Bentazos lying on a bed in a rear bedroom, with his pants open and his
genitals exposed. Bentazos had suffered two stab wounds in his abdomen and multiple head contusions. In the
apartment, officers found a bloodstained knife, a damaged and bloodstained car stereo amplifier, and a small amount
of cocaine. Police traced Bentazos’s cellphone to Fuentes, who subsequently confessed to killing Bentazos.
Fuentes was indicted for first-degree murder, third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,
fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance.
He pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter. During his plea hearing, Fuentes explained that he was
awakened by Bentazos, who grabbed his neck and threatened to rape him. When Fuentes stood to defend himself,
Bentazos grabbed a knife. Fuentes repeatedly struck Bentazos with the amplifier, wrested the knife away from him,
and stabbed him twice. Fuentes knew Bentazos needed medical attention, but did not seek assistance. He agreed
that he acted recklessly and with extreme indifference to human life, admitted that he had acted out of “extreme
annoyance,” and acknowledged that his actions threatened and caused Bentazos’s death.
The trial court sentenced Fuentes to a twenty-year prison term subject to an eighty-five percent parole
ineligibility period and a five-year period of parole supervision. Applying the aggravating factors found in N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a) and mitigating factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b), the court found aggravating factor nine, “[t]he need for
deterring the defendant and others from violating the law,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and assigned it “substantial
weight.” It found three mitigating factors, including factor eight, “[t]he defendant's conduct was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), to which it assigned “moderate weight.” The court
concluded that, although Fuentes’s imprisonment would impose a hardship on his family, the multiple mitigating
factors were substantially outweighed by the strength of the sole aggravating factor. Nine days later, the court held a
second sentencing hearing in order to state its finding with respect to an additional factor, aggravating factor one,
“[t]he nature and circumstance of the offense, and the role of the actor therein, including whether or not it was
committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), which it had inadvertently
omitted from the first hearing. The court accorded moderate to significant weight to the factor, finding that Fuentes
used excessive force by stabbing and beating Bentazos beyond the level necessary for self-defense. The court
reiterated its earlier findings and did not amend the sentence.
Fuentes appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial court impermissibly double-counted an
element of the offense of aggravated manslaughter in finding aggravating factor one, relied on facts inconsistent
with the basis of Fuentes’s guilty plea, gave improper weight to aggravating factor nine, and improperly balanced
the aggravating and mitigating factors. The Appellate Division rejected Fuentes’s arguments and affirmed his
sentence. The Court granted Fuentes’s petition for certification. 212 N.J. 431 (2012).
HELD: Because the trial court did not adequately explain its findings with respect to the aggravating factors, or its
balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b), the matter is remanded
for resentencing.
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1. Sentencing determinations are accorded deference, and a reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court. When determining the appropriate sentence within the applicable statutory range, the trial court
must identify whether any of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)’s aggravating factors or N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)’s mitigating factors
apply. Each factor found by the court must be supported by competent, reasonably credible evidence, and the court
must balance the aggravating and mitigating factors. The balancing process is case-specific, requiring the court to
qualitatively assess and assign the appropriate weight to each factor. The court must provide a clear and detailed
statement of reasons for imposing a particular sentence, including the factual basis supporting its findings with
respect to the aggravating and mitigating factors. This is necessary for effective appellate review. (pp. 13-18)
2. Aggravating factor one requires that the court consider “[t]he nature and circumstance of the offense, and the role
of the actor therein, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). The trial court must review the severity of the crime and assess the degree to which the
safety of others was threatened. In doing so, the court must take care to avoid double-counting facts that establish
elements of the relevant offense. In order to convict a defendant of aggravated manslaughter, the State must prove
that the victim died due to the defendant’s reckless conduct under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life. Thus, a trial court applying aggravating factor one must provide an analysis sufficient to
ensure reviewing courts that its application of the factor was not based on evidence necessary to prove the elements
of aggravated manslaughter, such as the victim’s death. Additionally, the court’s assessment of the nature and
circumstances of the offense must fairly reflect the record before it. (pp. 19-23)
3. Here, the trial court did not provide an adequate explanation of its reasons for applying aggravating factor one. It
failed to discuss the circumstances of the offense or to identify the supporting facts in the record distinct from those
necessary to prove elements of the offense. Since application of the factor was not supported by competent and
credible evidence, Fuentes must be resentenced. On remand, the court may apply aggravating factor one only if it is
supported by credible evidence. The court must provide a detailed explanation of its findings with respect to this
and any other factor applied. (p. 24)
4. Aggravating factor nine invokes “[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law.”
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). This requires the trial court to assess the risk of recidivism, as well as evaluate the
defendant in light of his or her criminal history. The factor’s deterrence component incorporates two related but
distinct concepts: the sentence’s general deterrent effect on the public and its specific deterrent effect on the
defendant. The latter is the primary focus of aggravating factor nine. (pp. 25-26)
5. Here, the question of specific deterrence is complicated by the trial court’s finding of mitigating factor eight,
which requires the court to conclude that the offense at issue was “the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.”
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Although case law reveals that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight rarely
apply in the same sentencing, they are not inherently incompatible. In exceptional cases, even where the record
shows that the offense arose under circumstances unlikely to recur, a defendant could nonetheless pose of a risk of
recidivism warranting specific deterrence. Similarly, a finding of mitigating factor seven, lack of a criminal record,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), also does not negate a finding of aggravating factor nine. Here, as with aggravating factor
one, the trial court’s reasons for applying aggravating factor nine are insufficiently explained. If, on resentencing,
the court determines that this factor applies, it must address both general and specific deterrence. If it also finds
mitigating factor eight, it must explain how it reconciles those two findings. Finally, the court should explain in
greater detail its assessment of the weight assigned to each aggravating and mitigating factor, and its balancing of
those factors as they apply to Fuentes. (pp. 26-29)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, defendant’s sentence is VACATED, and the
matter is REMANDED to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the Court’s opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and ALBIN, and JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ
(temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) did
not participate.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-18 September Term 2012
070729
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REINALDO FUENTES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued September 9, 2013 – Decided January 7, 2014
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Rochelle M.A. Watson, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, argued the cause for
appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney).
Joie D. Piderit, Acting Assistant Prosecutor
Special Deputy Attorney General argued the
cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey,
Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney; Ms. Piderit and Brian D. Gillet,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).
JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, the Court reviews a sentencing judge’s
application of the aggravating and mitigating factors prescribed
in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). Defendant Reinaldo Fuentes
admitted to killing his roommate, Adrian Bentazos, in an
altercation that he claimed was precipitated by Bentazos’
attempt to sexually assault him while defendant was sleeping.
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In accordance with his plea agreement with the State, defendant
pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(c), and
the other charges pending against him were dismissed.
Consistent with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced
to a twenty-year term of incarceration. The sentencing court
initially found only one statutory aggravating factor, the need
to deter defendant and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9)
(aggravating factor nine). It applied three mitigating factors:
the absence of a prior record of delinquency or criminal
activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) (mitigating factor seven); that
defendant’s conduct was a result of circumstances unlikely to
recur, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) (mitigating factor eight); and
that the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive
hardship to himself or his dependents, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11)
(mitigating factor eleven). The court found that the single
aggravating factor substantially outweighed the mitigating
factors. In a supplemental sentencing hearing, the court
amended its findings to add a second aggravating factor, the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the role of the
actor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) (aggravating factor one), but did
not alter defendant’s sentence. The Appellate Division
affirmed.
We reverse, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand this
matter for resentencing. We hold that the sentencing court did
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not adequately explain its findings with respect to aggravating
factors one and nine, or its balancing of the aggravating and
mitigating factors pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). We
do not constrain the sentencing court from finding any statutory
aggravating or mitigating factor on resentencing. We caution,
however, that an application of aggravating factor one must be
premised upon factors independent of the elements of the crime
and firmly grounded in the record. Further, any determination
that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight are
applicable to the same case should be specifically explained in
the court’s statement of reasons. To achieve the Legislature’s
goal of avoiding sentencing disparity, and to ensure fair and
effective appellate review, sentences imposed pursuant to plea
agreements must be thoroughly explained on the record at the
sentencing hearing.
I.
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on July 1, 2009, New Brunswick
police were dispatched to an apartment that had been shared by
defendant, then twenty years old, and Bentazos. They were
summoned by Bentazos’ friend, who stated that when he arrived at
the apartment to help Bentazos move his belongings out of the
residence, he found Bentazos in a bedroom, unresponsive. The
responding officers found the body of a man later identified as
Bentazos lying face up on a bed in a rear bedroom. Although he
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was fully clothed, his pants were unbuttoned and his zipper was
pulled down, exposing his genitals. The officers noted that
Bentazos had two stab wounds to his abdomen and multiple head
contusions. A search of the apartment revealed a broken and
bloodstained knife, a damaged and bloodstained car stereo
amplifier and a broken mirror, as well as a small amount of
packaged cocaine.
After investigating the scene, the New Brunswick police
traced the victim’s cellphone, which was not found at the crime
scene, to an address later identified as the home of defendant’s
girlfriend. There, Bentazos’ friend spotted defendant and
identified him to the officers as the victim’s roommate. Police
called the victim’s cellphone, which rang in defendant’s shirt
pocket. The officers approached defendant and told him that
they needed to speak with him about a homicide investigation.
Defendant agreed to speak with the police, was transported to
police headquarters and was advised of his rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966). He subsequently confessed to police that he had
killed Bentazos.
The medical examiner’s autopsy of Bentazos revealed
evidence of blunt and sharp force traumatic injuries to the
victim’s head, and stab wounds to his neck, back and abdomen.
The autopsy determined the cause of death to be homicide.
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II.
Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), third-degree possession of a weapon for
an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d), fourth-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), and third-degree
possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10(a)(1). The grand jury found as an aggravating factor that
defendant committed the offense “in an outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible, or inhuman manner in that it involved torture,
depravity of the mind, or an aggravated assault on the victim,”
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) (incorrectly cited in the indictment
as N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(4)(c)).
On July 2, 2010, defendant agreed to plead guilty to first-
degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), pursuant to
a plea agreement negotiated by his counsel and the State. In
accordance with the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss
all other charges and to recommend a twenty-three year sentence.
Despite his stated intention to plead guilty, defendant did not
provide an adequate factual basis for his plea at his initial
plea hearing on July 2, 2010. There, defendant admitted to
inflicting the injuries that caused Bentazos’ death in a fight
on July 1, 2009, and to striking Bentazos with an amplifier
after Bentazos threatened to kill him with a knife, but did not
expressly acknowledge stabbing the victim. Defendant agreed
5
that his conduct was reckless and that it demonstrated an
extreme indifference to the value of human life, but he
suggested that he had not exceeded the reasonable bounds of
self-defense and did not consider himself guilty. Defense
counsel acknowledged that defendant failed to provide an
adequate factual basis for his guilty plea, and the court did
not accept the plea during the first plea hearing.
On July 27, 2010, the trial court held a second plea
hearing. This time, defendant provided a factual basis for his
guilty plea that satisfied the court. He stated that in the
early morning of July 1, 2009, he was awakened by Bentazos,
whose pants were pulled down. According to defendant, Bentazos
grabbed defendant’s neck and threatened to rape him. Defendant
told the court that when he stood up to defend himself, Bentazos
grabbed a knife, so defendant struck Bentazos repeatedly and
excessively with an amplifier, wrested the knife away from
Bentazos and used it to stab him twice. Defendant admitted that
he was aware that Bentazos was clearly in need of medical
attention, but that he did not call police or an ambulance.
Responding to his counsel’s questions, defendant agreed that he
had acted recklessly and with extreme indifference to human
life, that he had not acted in self-defense but “out of extreme
annoyance,” and that his actions both threatened and caused the
victim’s death. After acknowledging his understanding of the
6
plea form, his sentencing exposure and the immigration
consequences of his plea, defendant pled guilty to aggravated
manslaughter.
Following his plea, defendant gave a presentence interview
in the presence of his counsel. During the interview, which was
summarized in the presentence report that was part of the
sentencing record, defendant substantially repeated the account
of his offense that he had provided to the court at his second
plea hearing. He placed greater emphasis, however, on the
conduct by the victim that, by defendant’s account, prompted the
attack. Defendant stated that he was sleeping when Bentazos,
whom he had considered to be “like a brother,” woke him up and
grabbed him by the throat. He said that Bentazos’ pants were
unzipped and lowered to the knees, and that Bentazos attempted
to sexually assault him. According to defendant, he resisted
Bentazos’ advances, and then Bentazos grabbed a knife and
threatened to kill him. Defendant said that he took the car
stereo amplifier and hit Bentazos several times with it. He
said that he then took the knife from Bentazos, who was dazed
and bloody, and stabbed him twice in the abdomen, at which point
Bentazos fell onto the bed.
On October 12, 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to
twenty years’ imprisonment subject to the eighty-five percent
parole ineligibility period prescribed by the No Early Release
7
Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, with a five-year period of
parole supervision as well as statutory fines and penalties.
The court noted the statutory sentencing range of ten to thirty
years for the first-degree offense of aggravated manslaughter.
It acknowledged that defendant had no juvenile adjudications,
prior arrests or adult criminal history, and that he had a one-
year-old daughter. The sentencing court commented, however, on
the defendant’s admission that he had both struck the victim
with an amplifier and stabbed him several times.
Applying the statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a) and (b), the trial court found a single aggravating factor,
aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and assigned it
“substantial weight.” The court identified three mitigating
factors. It accorded “substantial weight” to mitigating factor
seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), and “moderate weight” to
mitigating factor eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Finally, the
trial court found mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(11), but did not identify the weight given to that factor.
It did, however, acknowledge defendant’s status as the father of
a young child, and the consequent hardship to defendant’s
family. The trial court determined that although the mitigating
factors outnumbered the single aggravating factor, they were
substantially outweighed by the strength of the aggravating
factor. Noting the presumption of reasonableness afforded to a
8
negotiated plea, the trial court found the sentence to be within
the statutory range and consistent with the law and the
interests of justice.
Nine days later, the trial court held a second sentencing
hearing to state its finding with respect to an additional
factor, aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), which it
had intended to address in the first hearing, but had
inadvertently omitted. The court noted that the nature of the
offense should not be used to support an application of
aggravating factor one, but that defendant’s role and the nature
of his attack could be considered in the sentencing. The court
accorded moderate to significant weight to aggravating factor
one. It found that defendant had repeatedly stabbed the victim
and had continued to beat the victim “well beyond any self-
defense suggested.” The court characterized the defendant as
using excessive force. It then reiterated its findings as to
aggravating factor nine and mitigating factors seven, eight and
eleven, and did not amend defendant’s twenty-year sentence.
Defendant appealed his sentence. He argued that the trial
court’s finding as to aggravating factor one entailed
impermissible “double-counting” of an element of the offense of
aggravated manslaughter, that the court’s recitation of the
details of the attack was inconsistent with the factual basis of
defendant’s guilty plea, that the trial court gave improper
9
weight to aggravating factor nine, and that the court had
improperly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors of
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b). The State countered that the
court’s findings with respect to aggravating factors one and
nine were fully supported by the record, and that the finding as
to aggravating factor one did not involve impermissible double-
counting of the elements of aggravated manslaughter. The
Appellate Division rejected defendant’s arguments, and affirmed
his sentence by an order dated April 17, 2012.
We granted defendant’s petition for certification. State
v. Fuentes, 212 N.J. 431 (2012).
III.
Defendant argues that the trial court should not have
applied aggravating factor one, that it improperly weighed
aggravating factor nine and that it improperly balanced the
aggravating and mitigating factors. He contends that
aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), should not apply
to his case because his offense, prompted by an attempted sexual
assault, was not among the most serious offenses in its class.
He also claims that aggravating factor one could not apply
because a jury could have convicted him of passion provocation
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2), had the case been tried.
Defendant disputes the trial court’s conclusion that, because he
repeatedly struck and stabbed the victim instead of using only
10
the measure of force necessary to defend himself, aggravating
factor one was implicated in this case. Defendant also asserts
that the trial court predicated its finding of aggravating
factor one, in part, on the fact that the victim died,
notwithstanding the fact that the death of the victim is an
element of aggravated manslaughter.
Defendant contends that the trial court found two statutory
factors that are incompatible: aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(9), which may only be given substantial weight if
there is a need for specific deterrence of defendant himself,
and mitigating factor eight, requiring a finding that
defendant’s conduct was “the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Defendant further argues that,
in light of his lack of a criminal record, the court’s
application of mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7),
contravenes its conclusion that there is a need for deterrence
in this case. Finally, defendant contests the trial court’s
balancing of the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b) factors, given the
number of aggravating and mitigating factors found by the court
and the weight accorded to each factor.
The State argues that the trial court properly considered
each of the statutory factors, and that it appropriately
balanced them in accordance with 2C:44-1(a) and (b). It
characterizes the trial court’s application of aggravating
11
factor one as consistent with the grand jury’s finding of an
aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) when it
indicted defendant. The State cites crime scene photographs,
which do not appear to have been part of the record before the
sentencing court, as well as other evidence, to show that
defendant’s offense was particularly brutal. It dismisses the
significance of defendant’s self-defense justification as a
factor in sentencing, arguing that defendant received the
benefit of that justification when the charge was amended from
first-degree murder to aggravated manslaughter by virtue of the
plea agreement, and that defendant admitted to recklessly
causing the victim’s death under circumstances “manifesting
extreme indifference to human life.” N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1).
The State counters defendant’s assertion that the death of the
victim, an element of defendant’s offense, was improperly
double-counted in the court’s application of aggravating factor
one. It argues that the cruel nature of defendant’s attack, not
its fatal result, prompted the sentencing court’s finding with
respect to this factor.
The State further argues that the sentencing court’s
finding as to aggravating factor nine was properly premised on a
need for specific, as well as general, deterrence. It contends
that defendant needs to be specifically deterred from reacting
violently to an unwanted sexual advance. The State argues that
12
the need for public safety and deterrence increases
proportionately with the seriousness of the offense, and
accordingly the first-degree offense of aggravated manslaughter
requires substantial deterrence. It argues that the court’s
balancing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, which
generated a sentence in the middle of the statutory range for
this first-degree crime, was proper.
IV.
Appellate courts review sentencing determinations in
accordance with a deferential standard. The reviewing court
must not substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing
court. State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989). The
appellate court must affirm the sentence unless (1) the
sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and
mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based
upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) “the
application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes
the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial
conscience.” State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984). When
the trial court fails to provide a qualitative analysis of the
relevant sentencing factors on the record, an appellate court
may remand for resentencing. State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363
(1987). An appellate court may also remand for resentencing if
the trial court considers an aggravating factor that is
13
inappropriate to a particular defendant or to the offense at
issue. State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621, 628 (1990).
A sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement is presumed
to be reasonable because a defendant voluntarily “[waived] . . .
his right to a trial in return for the reduction or dismissal of
certain charges, recommendations as to sentence and the like.”
State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 140 (App. Div. 1980); see
also State v. Spinks, 66 N.J. 568, 573 (1975) (stating that “an
appellate court should ordinarily defer to the presumed
reasonableness of a bargained sentence”). Even a sentence
recommended as part of a plea agreement, however, may be vacated
if it does not comport with the sentencing provisions of our
Code of Criminal Justice. See State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 292
(1987) (noting that sentencing standards “apply as well to
sentences that result from guilty pleas, including those guilty
pleas that are entered as part of a plea agreement”).
In devising the sentencing scheme set forth in the Code,
the Legislature’s “‘dominant, if not paramount, goal . . . [was]
uniformity in sentencing.’” State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485
(2005) (quoting State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 352 (2000)).
To minimize sentencing disparity, the drafters of our Code
replaced “the unfettered sentencing discretion of prior law with
a structured discretion designed to foster less arbitrary and
more equal sentences.” Ibid. (quoting Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at
14
345) (internal quotations omitted). The framers of the Code
sought to “establish uniformity by both structuring and
standardizing the sentencing courts’ discretion.” State v.
Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 400 (1989).
To that end, the Code, our case law and the court rules
prescribe a careful and deliberate analysis before a sentence is
imposed. The foundation of that analysis is a thorough
understanding of the defendant and the offense. Although a
court sentencing a defendant based upon a guilty plea must be
careful not to impose a sentence for an offense beyond the scope
of the plea, it is not limited only to the factual admissions
that comprise the basis for the plea. Sainz, supra, 107 N.J. at
293. Instead, “[a]t sentencing there should be presented ‘the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and
characteristics.’” State v. Marzolf, 79 N.J. 167, 176 (1979)
(quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S. Ct.
1079, 1083, 93 L. Ed. 1337, 1342 (1949)); accord Natale, supra,184 N.J. at 472. The court evaluates “a range of information
unconstrained by evidential considerations.” State v. Randolph,
210 N.J. 330, 348 (2012) (citing Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at
486). Thus, the sentencing court gathers information necessary
to assess the defendant’s history and characteristics, and to
understand the nature and circumstances of his or her crime.
15
To minimize disparity, a sentencing court exercises its
discretion in the structured setting prescribed by the Code.
Our statutes provide a “‘general framework to guide judicial
discretion in imposing sentences’ to ensure that similarly
situated defendants [do] not receive dissimilar sentences.”
Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 485 (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J.
369, 375 (1984)). When an ordinary term of incarceration is
warranted, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) prescribes statutory ranges for
that term based upon the degree of the offense: ten to twenty
years for a first-degree crime, five to ten years for a second-
degree crime, three to five years for a third-degree crime, and
up to eighteen months for a fourth-degree crime. N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(a)(1)-(4).
As it determines a defendant’s term of incarceration within
the statutory range for each degree of offense, the sentencing
court must first identify whether any of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)’s
thirteen aggravating factors and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)’s thirteen
mitigating factors apply. Each factor found by the trial court
to be relevant must be supported by “competent, reasonably
credible evidence.” Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 363. The court
must then balance the relevant aggravating factors and
mitigating factors. The sentencing court does more than
quantitatively compare the number of pertinent aggravating
factors with the number of applicable mitigating factors; the
16
relevant factors are qualitatively assessed and assigned
appropriate weight in a case-specific balancing process. Kruse,
supra, 105 N.J. at 363; State v. Denmon, 347 N.J. Super. 457,
467-68 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 41 (2002).
Having balanced the relevant factors, the sentencing court
does not set the term of incarceration in accordance with an
“inflexible rule.” Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 488. Instead,
one “reasonable” approach for sentencing judges is to use “the
middle of the sentencing range as a logical starting point for
the balancing process.” Ibid. So, for example, “if the
aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise, the
midpoint will be an appropriate sentence.” Ibid. Moreover,
“reason suggests that when the mitigating factors preponderate,
sentences will tend toward the lower end of the range, and when
the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward
the higher end of the range.” Ibid.At the time of sentencing, the court must “state reasons
for imposing such sentence including . . . the factual basis
supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating
factors affecting sentence.” R. 3:21-4(g); see also N.J.S.A.
2C:43-2(e) (requiring sentencing court to provide statement on
record of “factual basis supporting its findings of particular
aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence”). A clear
explanation “of the balancing of aggravating and mitigating
17
factors with regard to imposition of sentences and periods of
parole ineligibility is particularly important.” State v.
Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 565-66 (1989) (citing State v. Baylass,
114 N.J. 169, 173-74 (1989); Kruse, supra, 105 N.J. at 359-60).
That explanation should thoroughly address the factors at issue.
As this Court has noted, “[a]lthough our case law does not
require that trial courts explicitly reject every mitigating
factor argued to the court,” such a practice is encouraged, as
it “not only ensures consideration of every factor but also
demonstrates to defendants and the public that all arguments
have been evaluated fairly.” State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601,
609 (2010).
A careful statement of reasons also facilitates appellate
review. The trial court’s explanation of its reasoning “is
important for meaningful appellate review of any criminal
sentence challenged for excessiveness,” because the appellate
court “is expected to assess the aggravating and mitigating
factors to determine whether they ‘were based upon competent
credible evidence in the record.’” Id. at 608 (quoting Roth,
supra, 95 N.J. at 364). A clear and detailed statement of
reasons is thus a crucial component of the process conducted by
the sentencing court, and a prerequisite to effective appellate
review.
V.
18
This appeal centers upon the trial court’s application of
two of the statutory factors, aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(1), and aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(9). We consider each in turn.
Aggravating factor one requires the trial court to consider
“[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of
the actor therein, including whether or not it was committed in
an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.” N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(1). When applying this factor, “the sentencing court
reviews the severity of the defendant’s crime, ‘the single most
important factor in the sentencing process,’ assessing the
degree to which defendant’s conduct has threatened the safety of
its direct victims and the public.” State v. Lawless, 214 N.J.
594, 609 (2013) (quoting Hodge, supra, 95 N.J. at 379). As the
Court has held, “[t]he paramount reason we focus on the severity
of the crime is to assure the protection of the public and the
deterrence of others. The higher the degree of the crime, the
greater the public need for protection and the more need for
deterrence.” State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996).
When it assesses whether a defendant’s conduct was
especially “heinous, cruel, or depraved,” a sentencing court
must scrupulously avoid “double-counting” facts that establish
the elements of the relevant offense. See State v. Yarbough,
19
100 N.J. 627, 645 (1985); Kromphold, supra, 162 N.J. at 353. As
this Court observed:
[In Yarbough], we recognized that facts that
established elements of a crime for which a
defendant is being sentenced should not be
considered as aggravating circumstances in
determining that sentence. We reasoned that
the Legislature had already considered the
elements of an offense in the gradation of a
crime. If we held otherwise, every offense
arguably would implicate aggravating factors
merely by its commission, thereby eroding
the basis for the gradation of offenses and
the distinction between elements and
aggravating circumstances. In the same
manner, double-counting of elements of the
offenses as aggravating factors would be
likely to interfere with the Code’s
dedication to uniformity in sentencing.
[Kromphold, supra, 162 N.J. at 353 (internal
citation omitted).]
In appropriate cases, a sentencing court may justify the
application of aggravating factor one, without double-counting,
by reference to the extraordinary brutality involved in an
offense. See O’Donnell, supra, 117 N.J. at 217. In O’Donnell,
supra, the Court held that “cruel” conduct may give rise to an
aggravating factor in a manslaughter sentencing when the
defendant intended “‘to inflict pain, harm and suffering – in
addition to intending death.’” Id. at 217-18 (quoting State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 208 (1987)); see also State v. Soto, 340
N.J. Super. 47, 54-55, 71-72 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170
N.J. 209 (2001) (affirming application of aggravating factor one
20
when trial court noted protracted suffering inflicted and brutal
killing of victim); State v. Mara, 253 N.J. Super. 204, 214
(App. Div. 1992) (affirming sentencing court’s finding that
aggravating factor one applied when, in aggravated assault case,
“the serious injuries were far in excess of that required to
satisfy” statutory elements). A sentencing court may consider
“aggravating facts showing that [a] defendant’s behavior
extended to the extreme reaches of the prohibited behavior.”
State v. Henry, 418 N.J. Super. 481, 493 (Law Div. 2010) (citing
State v. Taylor, 226 N.J. Super. 441, 453 (App. Div. 1988)).
In the present aggravated manslaughter case, the State was
required to prove that “[t]he actor recklessly cause[d] death
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human
life.” N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). Thus, the sentencing court’s
application of aggravating factor one must be based on factors
other than the death of the victim and the circumstances
essential to support a finding that the defendant has acted with
extreme indifference to human life. Such a finding requires a
nuanced analysis of the defendant’s offense, clearly explained
so that an appellate court may be certain that the sentencing
court has refrained from double-counting the elements of the
offense. As the Appellate Division held in State v. Briggs,
effective appellate review cannot be achieved when there is
uncertainty “whether the court meant that [the defendant’s
21
killing of the victim] was unusually brutal or cruel in nature.”
349 N.J. Super. 496, 505 (App. Div. 2002). As the panel noted,
“[i]f the court meant that the aggravating factor was applicable
because a death resulted from defendant’s conduct, it erred in
applying the factor, since the death of the victim cannot be
double counted as an aggravating factor in a manslaughter case.”
Ibid. (citing Towey, supra, 244 N.J. Super. at 593 (“Both the
victim’s death and the recklessness of defendant’s conduct were
elements of the offense to which defendant pled guilty and,
thus, should not have been considered as aggravating factors in
imposing the base term.”)).
The sentencing court must not only ensure that facts
necessary to establish the elements of the defendant’s offense
are not double-counted for purposes of sentencing, but that its
assessment of the “nature and circumstances of the offense”
fairly reflects the record before it. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).
In Jarbath, supra, this Court considered the application of
aggravating factor one in the setting of a second-degree
manslaughter case arising from the death of the defendant’s
infant son. 114 N.J. at 398. It concluded that the trial
court’s application of aggravating factor one “conflict[ed] with
[its] acceptance of [the defendant’s] version that she dropped
the child accidentally,” and that the State’s proffer of a
different version of the death on appeal did not justify the
22
sentencing court’s reliance on this factor. Id. at 404. Any
determination that the defendant’s conduct was “especially
heinous, cruel, [or] depraved” must be fully grounded in the
record before the sentencing court. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).
These principles do not necessarily bar the application of
aggravating factor one to this or any other defendant convicted
of aggravated manslaughter. In some settings, a court may
identify competent, reasonably credible evidence that the
defendant’s offense was “committed in an especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner,” or that the evidence otherwise
justifies application of aggravating factor one, without double-
counting the elements of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).
It is for the sentencing court to determine on remand whether
this is such a case.
Moreover, a finding of aggravating factor one is not
precluded because defendant could have been convicted of passion
provocation manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2), had he been
tried. Given defendant’s guilty plea, no factfinder has
determined whether the evidence warrants a conviction for
passion provocation manslaughter, so defendant’s argument is
premised upon speculation. The possibility that a jury could
have convicted defendant of passion provocation manslaughter in
a hypothetical trial does not preclude application of
aggravating factor one to defendant.
23
In this case, the court failed to adequately explain its
application of aggravating factor one to defendant. Its
supplemental statement of reasons disclosed only that
aggravating factor one was given moderate to significant weight,
that defendant stabbed the victim several times and continued to
beat him well beyond what was necessary for self-defense, and
that defendant used excessive force. The court neither
discussed in detail the circumstances of the offense nor
identified the facts in the record -- distinct from the facts
necessary to prove the elements of aggravated manslaughter –-
that supported its finding.
Because the application of factor one was not supported by
competent and credible evidence in the record, defendant must be
resentenced. On remand, the sentencing court may apply
aggravating factor one only if there is credible evidence in the
record to support the finding. In its statement of reasons, the
court should provide a detailed explanation of its findings with
respect to this and any other factor applied.1
1
Contrary to the State’s position, the grand jury’s application
of the aggravating factor set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c)
does not govern the sentencing court’s consideration of
aggravating factor one. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) requires a
determination that “[t]he murder was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim.” If a jury
convicts a defendant at trial under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or
(2) and finds that one of the aggravating factors prescribed in
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4) applies, the sentencing court must
24
VI.
Aggravating factor nine invokes “[t]he need for deterring
the defendant and others from violating the law.” N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(9). The sentencing court’s determination is a
“qualitative assessment” of the risk of recidivism, but “also
involve[s] determinations that go beyond the simple finding of a
criminal history and include an evaluation and judgment about
the individual in light of his or her history.” State v.
Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006). “Deterrence has been
repeatedly identified in all facets of the criminal justice
system as one of the most important factors in sentencing,” and
“is the key to the proper understanding of protecting the
public.” Megargel, supra, 143 N.J. at 501 (citing State in the
Interest of C.A.H. and B.A.R., 89 N.J. 326, 334 (1982)).
“[D]emands for deterrence are strengthened in direct proportion
sentence the defendant to a term of life imprisonment without
parole. This case was never tried, and no such determination
was made. Moreover, nothing in the statutory text or
legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) suggests that
sentencing courts should rely upon grand jury findings regarding
the N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4) aggravating factors in balancing the
aggravating and mitigating factors for purposes of sentencing.
Not only is the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1)
distinct from that of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c), but the record
before the sentencing court is necessarily different from that
considered by a grand jury, including the presentence report
prepared in accordance with Rule 3:21-2. See Randolph, supra,210 N.J. at 348 (2012). Accordingly, the grand jury’s finding
of an aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(4)(c) does
not compel the sentencing court to apply N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).
Moreover, the grand jury record is not before us.
25
to the gravity and harmfulness of the offense.” C.A.H., supra,
89 N.J. at 337.
For purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), deterrence
incorporates two “interrelated but distinguishable concepts,”
the sentence’s “general deterrent effect on the public [and] its
personal deterrent effect on the defendant.” Jarbath, supra,114 N.J. at 405 (citing C.A.H., supra, 89 N.J. at 334-45). In
the absence of a finding of a need for specific deterrence,
general deterrence “has relatively insignificant penal value.”
Ibid. (citing State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 520 (1989)). In
weighing the applicability of aggravating factor nine, the
sentencing court accordingly focuses on the need to deter the
individual defendant “from violating the law.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(9).
In this case, the question of specific deterrence is
complicated by the trial court’s finding of mitigating factor
eight, which requires the sentencing court to conclude that the
offense at issue was “the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Defendant contends that a
sentencing court may never apply aggravating factor nine and
mitigating factor eight in the same case, or, in the
alternative, that a sentencing court may never give substantial
weight to aggravating factor nine when mitigating factor eight
is also being applied.
26
Because N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1’s statutory language does not
suggest, and we have never held, that aggravating factor nine
and mitigating factor eight are inherently incompatible, we do
not adopt such an inflexible rule. Although the cases cited by
defendant, State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90 (App. Div. 2009),
certif. denied, 201 N.J. 156 (2010), Briggs, supra, 349 N.J.
Super. 496, and State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div.
1996), illustrate that aggravating factor nine and mitigating
factor eight rarely apply in the same sentencing, they do not
hold that the two factors are irreconcilable. In L.V., supra,
the Appellate Division panel found no “overwhelming need to
deter” the mentally disabled defendant, who gave birth after
being sexually assaulted by her father and then threw the infant
out the window at her father’s direction. 410 N.J. Super. at
111 (emphasis omitted). Reasoning that the defendant was
unlikely to “find herself in the same situation again,” the
court discounted specific deterrence in sentencing the
defendant. Ibid. Briggs, supra, in which the defendant stabbed
her former husband during an argument while both were
intoxicated, similarly involved an offender deemed by the court
to be unlikely to offend again. 349 N.J. Super. at 498-99, 505.
When remanding for resentencing, the panel in Powell, supra,noted that specific deterrence was not a consideration because
27
the “defendant was unlikely to commit another crime.” 294 N.J.
Super. at 567.
In exceptional cases, even if the record demonstrates that
the offense at issue arose in circumstances unlikely to recur,
thus supporting a finding as to mitigating factor eight, a
defendant could nonetheless pose a risk of recidivism, requiring
specific deterrence within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(9). While such a case will be rare, we decline to hold
that aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight can
never apply in the same sentencing.
We also decline to find that aggravating factor nine is
inappropriate in a case in which the defendant had no prior
record, and the sentencing court accordingly applies mitigating
factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). Neither the statutory
language nor the case law suggest that a sentencing court can
find a need for deterrence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) only
when the defendant has a prior criminal record.
As with aggravating factor one, the sentencing court’s
reasons for applying aggravating factor nine are insufficiently
explained, and the application of this factor is not supported
by competent and credible evidence in the record. If the court
determines when it resentences defendant that aggravating factor
nine applies, it should address both general and specific
deterrence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). If it finds both
28
aggravating factor nine and mitigating factor eight, the
sentencing court should explain how it reconciles those two
findings. Finally, the court should explain in greater detail
its assessment of the weight assigned to each aggravating and
mitigating factor, and its balancing of those statutory factors
as they apply to defendant. To avoid disparity in sentencing as
the Legislature intended, to facilitate fair and effective
appellate review, and to ensure that the defendant, the State
and the public understand the reasons for the sentence, a trial
court should explain its analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1’s
aggravating and mitigating factors with care and precision.
VII.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed,
defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court for resentencing, consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and ALBIN, and
JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE
PATTERSON’s opinion. JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) did not
participate.
29
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-18 SEPTEMBER TERM 2012
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REINALDO FUENTES,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED January 7, 2014
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Patterson
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
REVERSE/
CHECKLIST VACATE/
REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (t/a) X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) ----------------------- --------------------
TOTALS 5
30