Gnall v. Gnall (073321)

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
Elizabeth Gnall v. James Gnall (A-52-13) (073321)
Argued November 12, 2014 -- Decided July 29, 2015
FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers the analysis that a trial court must employ in awarding alimony, and
whether a bright line rule, based on the length of the parties’ marriage, can properly exist as the basis for
distinguishing between an award of permanent alimony and limited duration alimony.
The parties were married for almost fifteen years when plaintiff Elizabeth Gnall filed a complaint for
divorce. Although the parties had three minor children and substantial assets, the litigation focused on the amount
and type of spousal support that plaintiff, who had left her job as a computer programmer to care for the parties’
children, would receive from defendant James Gnall, who was the sole wage earner, and made over $1 million
annually.
In addressing plaintiff’s request for alimony, the trial judge considered the requisite statutory factors for
alimony stated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), and made specific findings of fact relating to each factor. The judge found
that permanent alimony was not appropriate due to the relatively young age of the parties, their educational levels,
and the duration of the marriage. The court noted that while the marriage certainly was not short-term, neither was
it a twenty-five to thirty-year marriage. The court also stated that the parties were not married long enough to
warrant holding defendant responsible for maintaining the marital lifestyle for plaintiff. The court therefore
awarded plaintiff limited duration alimony in the amount of $18,000 per month, for a period of eleven years.
Plaintiff appealed the award, contending that she was entitled to permanent alimony based on the length of
the marriage and her diminished employability since she had been at home caring for the parties’ children since
1999. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for an evaluation of an award of permanent alimony. The
court stated that a fifteen-year marriage is not short-term, further stating that this conclusion precludes an award of
limited duration alimony. 432 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 2013).
Defendant sought review of that determination by petition for certification, which was granted by the
Court. 217 N.J. 52 (2014).
HELD: In determining a request for alimony, all of the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-23(b) must be
considered; the duration of the marriage is only one such factor. The Appellate Division erroneously created a
bright-line rule that a fifteen-year marriage requires an award of permanent alimony, contrary to the need to consider
all of the statutory factors. The trial court also improperly relied upon the duration of the marriage over the other
statutory factors in determining that, since the marriage was not one of twenty-five to thirty years, permanent
alimony was not warranted, and therefore awarded limited duration alimony.
1. Findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.
The court on appeal will not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial court unless they are
manifestly unsupported by, or inconsistent with, competent, relevant and reasonable credible evidence such that they
offend the interests of justice. (pp. 14-15)
2. Whether alimony should be awarded is governed by the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). When
determining whether alimony is appropriate, the trial court is required to make findings of fact and state specific
reasons in support of its conclusion, and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions. (pp. 15-17)
3. New Jersey recognizes four types of alimony that may be awarded upon a final judgment of divorce: permanent
alimony, rehabilitative alimony, limited duration alimony, and reimbursement alimony. The trial court is required to
assess first the availability of permanent alimony. If the court determines that permanent alimony is not warranted,
the court must state specific findings and reasons for its conclusion. Only then can the court make specific findings
on the applicability of the three other types of alimony to determine which one, or combination thereof, is warranted
by the parties’ circumstances and the nature of the case. (p. 18)
4. Permanent alimony is intended to allow the dependent spouse to live the same lifestyle to which he or she
became accustomed during the marriage. The court has broad discretion when awarding permanent alimony
because no two cases are alike. When determining the amount of an award, the court must evaluate the actual needs
of the dependent party and the actual means of the other party. (pp. 18-19)
5. Limited duration alimony is intended to address a dependent spouse’s needs following a shorter-term marriage
where permanent or rehabilitative alimony would be inapplicable or inappropriate, but where economic assistance
for a limited time would be just. Where all other statutory factors are equal, the duration of the marriage marks the
defining distinction as to whether permanent or limited duration alimony is warranted. Limited duration alimony
may not be awarded where permanent alimony is warranted. (pp. 19-20)
6. Rehabilitative alimony is a short-term award intended to provide financial support to a spouse while he or she
prepares to reenter the workforce through training or education in order to improve earning capacity and prepare for
economic self-sufficiency. The fourth type of alimony, reimbursement alimony, is awarded to a spouse who has
made financial sacrifices, resulting in a temporarily reduced standard of living, to allow the other spouse to secure
an advanced degree or professional license and thereby enhance the parties’ future standard of living. Both
rehabilitative and reimbursement alimony can be awarded separately, or in combination with another type of
alimony. (pp. 20-22)
7. The trial court, in determining that permanent alimony was unwarranted, failed to consider and weigh all of the
statutory factors. Instead, the court based its decision to preclude permanent alimony solely on the length of the
marriage, noting that the parties were married for nearly fifteen years, rather than twenty-five or thirty years. The
trial court improperly weighed the duration of the marriage over the other statutory factors, and determined, in
effect, that permanent alimony awards are reserved for long-term marriages of twenty-five years or more. However,
no rule exists precluding an award of permanent alimony unless a marriage of that length is shown. (pp. 24-25)
8. The Appellate Division, in declaring a fifteen-year marriage not to be short term and thereby precluding an award
of limited duration alimony, inadvertently created a bright-line rule for an award of permanent alimony by failing to
clarify that its statement constituted an assessment of the specific facts of this case, rather than a rule of general
application. The court’s determination erroneously removes consideration of the other statutory factors for alimony
where a marriage reaches the fifteen year mark. This is contrary to the requirement that all statutory factors must be
considered and given due weight. (pp. 25-26)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court
for new findings of fact and a new determination of alimony.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON and SOLOMON;
and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-52 September Term 2013
073321
ELIZABETH GNALL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES GNALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued November 12, 2014 – Decided July 29, 2015
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at 432 N.J. Super. 129 (2013).
Donald P. Jacobs argued the cause for
appellant (Budd Larner, attorneys; Barry L.
Baime, of counsel).
Dale Elizabeth Console argued the cause for
respondent.
Paris P. Eliades, President, argued the
cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar
Association (Mr. Eliades, Brian M. Schwartz,
Ulrichsen Rosen & Freed, and Szaferman,
Lakind Blumstein & Blader, attorneys; Ralph
J. Lamparello, of counsel; Mr. Lamparello,
Mr. Schwartz, Derek M. Freed, and Brian G.
Paul, on the brief).
Sheryl J. Seiden argued the cause for amicus
curiae The New Jersey Chapter of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
(Ceconi & Cheifetz, Einhorn Harris Ascher
Barbarito & Frost, Adinolfi & Goldstein, and
Fox Rothschild, attorneys; Cary B. Cheifetz,
President, of counsel; Ms. Seiden, Mr.
Cheifetz, Bonnie C. Frost, Ronald G.
1
Lieberman, and Eric S. Solotoff, on the
brief).
John E. Finnerty, Jr., argued the cause for
amicus curiae Matrimonial Lawyers Alliance
(Finnerty Canda & Drisgula, Laufer, Dalena,
Cadicina, Jensen & Boyd, and Snyder & Sarno,
attorneys; Mr. Finnerty, Laurence J. Cutler,
and John J. Trombadore, on the brief).
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, the Court examines a trial court’s award of
limited duration alimony and determines whether it was
appropriate for the Appellate Division to reverse and remand for
an award of permanent alimony, when, in doing so, it created a
bright-line rule regarding permanent alimony awards.
This case stems from a divorce, that ended an almost
fifteen-year marriage. Litigation proceedings focused on the
amount and type of spousal support plaintiff Elizabeth Gnall
would receive from defendant James Gnall. James was the sole
wage earner of the family, making over $1,000,000.00 annually,
while Elizabeth stayed home to raise their three children.
The trial judge considered the thirteen statutorily defined
factors regarding alimony, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), and made
specific findings of fact relating to each factor. The judge
found, among other considerations, that permanent alimony was
not appropriate due to the relatively young age of the parties,
their educational levels, and the duration of the marriage. The
judge determined that the marriage “certainly was not short-
2
term, but neither [was it] a twenty-five to thirty-year
marriage.” Moreover, the judge determined that “the parties
were not married long enough” for James to be held responsible
for Elizabeth’s ability to maintain their marital lifestyle.
Therefore, the trial court awarded Elizabeth limited duration
alimony, in the amount of $18,000 per month, for a period of
eleven years.
Elizabeth appealed the award, arguing that she was entitled
to permanent alimony due to the length of the marriage, as well
as her diminished employability. The Appellate Division
reversed and remanded the case for an award of permanent
alimony, reasoning that a fifteen-year marriage is “not short-
term,” therefore precluding “consideration of an award of
limited duration alimony.” Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129(App. Div. 2013).
James appealed to this Court, arguing that the Appellate
Division erred in reversing the trial court’s decision and
improperly created a bright-line rule regarding the length of
marriage in an alimony case.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Appellate
Division’s judgment and remand to the trial court for new
findings of fact and a new determination of an alimony award.
We find that the Appellate Division effectively created a
bright-line rule that fifteen-year marriages require permanent
3
alimony awards which is contrary to the legislative intent
underlying N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.
I.
James and Elizabeth Gnall met in 1985 while they were both
pursuing bachelor’s degrees at the State University of New York
in Buffalo. The couple was engaged eight years later, and
married on June 5, 1993. The couple began to experience marital
differences in October 2007, and on March 10, 2008, Elizabeth
filed a complaint for divorce.
At the time of their marriage, Elizabeth had obtained a
bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and a master’s
degree in computer science. Initially, Elizabeth worked as a
computer programmer on the foreign exchange sales desk at
Goldman Sachs in New York City. Following that job, Elizabeth
worked in a similar position at Banker’s Trust through 1999.
James obtained an accounting degree in 1989, and then
earned his Certified Public Accountant license. In June 2003,
he obtained a job at Deutsche Bank, where he is currently
employed as Chief Financial Officer of the bank’s Finance
Division in America.
After the birth of their first child, the Gnalls hired a
nanny, and Elizabeth continued to work full-time. However, in
1999, the parties decided it would be best if Elizabeth stopped
4
working in order to remain at home to care for the children
full-time.
James and Elizabeth have three children, who, at the time
the judgment of divorce was entered, were twelve, eleven, and
eight years old. Pursuant to their custody agreement, Elizabeth
is the primary caretaker of the children. James has parenting
time every other weekend, and sees the children occasionally on
Wednesday nights for dinner.
After 1999, James was the sole wage earner. James’s total
compensation was $751,000 in 2005, $1,001,000 in 2006,
$1,075,000 in 2007, and $1,800,000 in 2008. The parties owned
several vehicles throughout the course of their marriage,
including a 1998 Nissan Maxima and a 2007 Cadillac Escalade.
James and Elizabeth frequently vacationed, both with and without
their children. Those vacations included trips to Disneyworld
and renting oceanfront mansions in North Carolina.
In 2006, Elizabeth faced serious health issues and
underwent brain surgery. She has since been able to resume a
normal life with only some minor facial paralysis.
A.
The trial took place over eighteen non-consecutive days
beginning on April 8, 2009, and concluding on May 19, 2010.
Both James and Elizabeth testified. Lifestyle expert Rufino
Fernandez, Esq., testified on Elizabeth’s behalf about the
5
economic valuation of assets and the marital standard of living.
Fernandez analyzed the expenses and assets of the parties from
2004 through 2007 and authored a report, which was admitted into
evidence. Fernandez testified that with the three children,
Elizabeth would need $24,252 per month to maintain the marital
lifestyle. However, on cross-examination, Fernandez admitted
that this evaluation of the marital lifestyle was based on the
whole family, not just Elizabeth and the three children.
Adjusting for James’s absence, the ordinary expenses for the
family should be $18,578.
Each party also presented an expert witness to testify
about Elizabeth’s future employability. Dr. Charles Kincaid
testified on behalf of Elizabeth, and Dr. David Stein testified
on behalf of James. Both experts concluded that Elizabeth would
be most successful pursuing a career in the computer field.
Each expert however testified to a different potential starting
salary.
Dr. Stein opined that Elizabeth could obtain an entry-level
position earning between $58,000 and $69,000. According to Dr.
Stein, Elizabeth would need only eight to twelve weeks to update
her skills due to both her mathematics background and her
experience as a software engineer. Finally, Dr. Stein opined
that if Elizabeth was motivated to work, her salary would
rapidly increase to the national average of other computer
6
programmers, making on average $80,000 to $94,000 annually, up
to a maximum of $120,000.
Dr. Kincaid testified that Elizabeth would be successful as
a software engineer or a computer systems analyst. However, Dr.
Kincaid concluded that Elizabeth would need at least one to two
years of retraining before being able to obtain any job in the
computer field, because she had been out of the field for some
time, and would need to relearn software languages. Dr. Kincaid
then opined that after retraining, Elizabeth would be able to
obtain a job making between $50,623 and $56,765. Both experts
testified that Elizabeth indicated she wanted to focus on her
children instead of going back to work immediately.
Elizabeth sought employment as a math teacher following the
divorce. She began to take online courses to obtain her
teaching license in New Jersey, reasoning that the online
program gave her flexibility to take care of her children.
Elizabeth stated that the teaching position would allow her to
have a similar schedule to her children so she could continue to
care for them.
B.
The trial court, in a written opinion addressed six issues:
(1) alimony; (2) custody and parenting time; (3) child support;
(4) insurance coverage; (5) distribution of assets; and (6)
counsel fees. This appeal centers only on the issue of alimony.
7
We do not comment on the trial court’s findings regarding the
other five issues.
In determining the alimony award, the court first reviewed
the general summary of the parties’ marriage. The court then
addressed each of the thirteen factors set forth in N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(b). The trial court found that although the marriage
lasted fifteen years, the case was not a permanent alimony case,
but rather one requiring limited duration alimony. The court
reasoned that the parties were relatively young with at least
twenty-three career years before them, both were well educated,
in good health, and were either employed or employable at good
salaries that could support excellent lifestyles for themselves
and their children.
The trial court determined that the marriage “certainly was
not short-term, but neither [was it] a twenty-five to thirty-
year marriage.” Moreover, the court determined that “the
parties were not married long enough” for James to be held
responsible for Elizabeth’s ability to maintain their marital
lifestyle. Therefore, the court ultimately ordered limited
duration alimony in the amount of $18,000 per month from October
2010 through September 2021, the year the youngest child will
reach the age of majority.
II.
8
In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the
trial court’s award of limited duration alimony and remanded the
case for an award of permanent alimony. Gnall v. Gnall, 432
N.J. Super. 129, 156 (App. Div. 2013). The panel concluded that
the trial court failed to make the specific statutory findings
for all of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c). Ibid.The Appellate Division further found that the trial court failed
to consider all of the evidence of the marital enterprise,
including Elizabeth’s likely inability to achieve a lifestyle
close to that of the marital standard while living on her own.
In making its determination, the Appellate Division stated:
We do not intend to draw specific lines
delineating “short-term” and “long-term”
marriages in an effort to define those cases
warranting only limited duration rather than
permanent alimony. We also underscore it is
not merely the years from the wedding to the
parties’ separation or commencement of divorce
that dictates the applicability or
inapplicability of permanent alimony.
Nevertheless, we do not hesitate to declare a
fifteen-year marriage is not short-term, a
conclusion which precludes consideration of an
award of limited duration alimony.
[Id. at 153 (emphasis added).]
The panel rejected Elizabeth’s assertions that the trial
judge abused his discretion when considering the marital
standard of living. Id. at 156. However, the panel directed
that on remand, the judge should make findings regarding
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(8), “the opportunity for future
9
acquisitions of capital assets and income.” Id. at 157.
Moreover, the Appellate Division concluded that the trial court
erred when imputing a full-time salary to Elizabeth, because the
parties did not anticipate that she would immediately resume
employment. Id. at 160. The panel therefore instructed that
the remand judge address the date of imputation based on the
cost and time required for Elizabeth’s retraining. Id. at 160-
61. Finally, the panel mandated that if alimony was amended,
then the child support amount should also be reanalyzed. Id. at
162.
On September 24, 2013, James filed a petition for
certification, challenging only the issue of alimony. This
Court granted certification on January 21, 2014. Gnall v.
Gnall, 217 N.J. 52 (2014).
III.
A.
Defendant James Gnall asks this Court to reverse the
Appellate Division’s judgment and affirm the trial court’s award
of limited duration alimony.
First, James argues that the Appellate Division improperly
created a bright-line rule, stating that any marriage lasting
fifteen years or more is considered “long-term.” James suggests
that this bright-line rule inappropriately establishes the
10
length of the marriage as the most important factor in an
alimony determination, contrary to both statutes and case law.
James further argues that an award of permanent alimony in
this case is punishment, contrary to the mandate in Mani v.
Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 80 (2005) and improperly gives Elizabeth a
windfall.
James also argues that the Appellate Division did not give
due deference to the trial court’s findings of fact. James
maintains that the court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding limited duration alimony to Elizabeth, and that the
court properly evaluated all of the criteria set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.
In response, Elizabeth urges this Court to affirm the
decision of the Appellate Division. In support of her position,
Elizabeth first maintains that the Appellate Division did not
create a bright-line rule. Instead, she argues that the
questioned language is dicta, and is consistent with N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(c). Elizabeth emphasizes that the overarching theme of
the Appellate Division’s decision was that there is no exact
science to awarding alimony, and the court should account for
all factors relevant to the determination, particularly her
inability to maintain a lifestyle close to the marital lifestyle
without James’s economic assistance.
11
Elizabeth asserts that the Appellate Division properly held
the duration of the marriage in equal regard to all of the other
factors. She further claims that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 requires the
court to consider permanent alimony first and only turn to a
consideration of limited duration alimony once it has concluded
that permanent alimony is not appropriate.
Elizabeth stresses that the parties’ fifteen-year marriage
was “long-term,” or at least on the cusp of long-term, and
therefore, an evaluation should first be undertaken as to
whether permanent alimony is appropriate. She also argues that
the ages of the children should play an important role in
deciding the type of alimony because she has the primary
responsibility for them, and defendant only has parenting time
every other weekend.
Finally, Elizabeth reiterates that James earns between $1.5
million and $2.1 million annually, and that his financial
success is a product of their marriage and partnership. She
emphasizes that her role as caretaker of the parties’ children
will detract from her employability and argues that when the
youngest child goes to college -- the same time that the alimony
ends -- she will be at a significant financial disadvantage.
B.
This Court granted motions on behalf of the Matrimonial
Lawyers Alliance, the New Jersey Chapter of the American Academy
12
of Matrimonial Lawyers, and the New Jersey State Bar Association
to argue as amici curiae.
The Matrimonial Lawyers Alliance (MLA) urges this Court to
affirm the Appellate Division’s decision to remand the case to
the trial court for further analysis of the statutory factors
under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. The MLA recommends that this Court
require trial courts to analyze the marital relationship and
arrangements made during the marriage, focusing on the impact
those decisions would have on the economic positions of each
spouse at the end of the relationship. Next, the MLA argues
that guidance is needed to ensure that trial courts concentrate
on the importance of the parties’ lifestyle and whether the
parties are able to maintain a reasonable lifestyle in the
future. Finally, the MLA argues that the Appellate Division did
not create a bright-line rule because each alimony case is
different and an alimony decision is based upon a multitude of
factors.
The New Jersey Chapter of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers (NJAAML) asserts that “actual economic
dependency” has been the threshold for an award of alimony.
Therefore, the NJAAML stresses that consideration of economic
dependency is important, particularly in light of studies
showing a decline in the standard of living for women post-
divorce.
13
Finally, the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) urges
this Court to affirm the Appellate Division’s decision. The
NJSBA relies on public policy considerations and concludes that
the statutory scheme of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 requires courts to
analyze particular facts in order to craft an alimony award that
is “fit, reasonable and just” given the “circumstances of the
parties and the nature of the case.” Moreover, the NJSBA argues
that the Appellate Division did not create a bright-line rule
because the court did not require the trial court to enter a
judgment for permanent alimony. Instead, the NJSBA argues the
Appellate Division instructed the trial court only to perform an
evaluation of the required factors to determine if an award of
permanent alimony is appropriate.
IV.
A.
The general rule is that findings by a trial court are
binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12
(1998). We defer to the credibility determinations made by the
trial court because the trial judge “hears the case, sees and
observes the witnesses, and hears them testify,” affording it “a
better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the
veracity of a witness.” Id. at 412 (citing Pascale v. Pascale,
113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988)).
14
If the trial court’s conclusions are supported by the
evidence, we are inclined to accept them. Ibid. We do “not
disturb the ‘factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial
judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of
justice.’” Ibid. (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors
Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). “Only when the trial
court’s conclusions are so ‘clearly mistaken’ or ‘wide of the
mark’” should we interfere to “ensure that there is not a denial
of justice.” N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196
N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)).
When analyzing whether permanent alimony is appropriate,
the trial court is required to make findings of fact and to
state specific reasons in support of its conclusion. R. 1:7-
4(a). Failure to make explicit findings and clear statements of
reasoning “‘constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the
attorneys, and the appellate court.’” Curtis v. Finneran, 83
N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of
Adjustment of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)).
The trial judge is required to “state clearly its factual
findings and correlate them with the relevant legal
conclusions.” Id. at 570.
15
Our analysis of this appeal requires that we examine the
different types of alimony and the analysis required by a trial
court before deciding an award of alimony.
B.
Alimony relates to support and standard of living; it
involves the quality of economic life to which one spouse is
entitled, which then becomes the obligation of the other.
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501-02 (1982); see also Khalaf
v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 67 (1971). Whether alimony should be
awarded is governed by distinct, objective standards defined by
the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). When alimony is
requested, the statute requires that the court consider and make
specific findings regarding:
(1) The actual need and ability of the
parties to pay;
(2) The duration of the marriage or civil
union;
(3) The age, physical and emotional health
of the parties;
(4) The standard of living established in
the marriage or civil union and the
likelihood that each party can maintain
a reasonably comparable standard of
living;
(5) The earning capacities, educational
levels, vocational skills, and
employability of the parties;
16
(6) The length of absence from the job
market of the party seeking
maintenance;
(7) The parental responsibilities for the
children;
(8) The time and expense necessary to
acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking
maintenance to find appropriate
employment;
(9) The history of the financial or non-
financial contributions to the marriage
or civil union by each party including
contributions to the care and education
of the children and interruption of
personal careers or educational
opportunities;
(10) The equitable distribution of property
ordered;
(11) The income available to either party
through investment of any assets held
by that party;
(12) The tax treatment and consequences to
both parties of any alimony award;
(13) Any other factors which the court may
deem relevant.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).]
17
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c)1 requires that the court make “specific
findings on the evidence” regarding the statutory factors
relevant to the particular alimony award.
C.
New Jersey recognizes four separate types of “final award”
alimony that may be ordered in the final judgment of divorce.
They are permanent alimony, rehabilitative alimony, limited
duration alimony, and reimbursement alimony. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.
Permanent alimony is to be assessed first and if the trial court
determines that an award of permanent alimony is not warranted,
then the court must make specific findings, based on the
evidence, setting out the reasons. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c). Only
then shall the court “make specific findings” on the
applicability of the three remaining authorized alimony awards
to discern which one, or any combination of the three, is
“warranted by the circumstances of the parties and the nature of
the case.” N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(f).
i.
The first type of alimony to be considered is permanent
alimony. The concept of permanent alimony stems from the well-
1 N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c) was amended on September 10, 2014 to
specify that “[f]or any marriage or civil union less than 20
years in duration, the total duration of alimony shall not,
except in exceptional circumstances, exceed the length of the
marriage or civil union. . . .” The amendment is not applicable
to this case.
18
established common law principle that a husband has a duty to
support his wife after a divorce or separation. Bonanno v.
Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 273 (1950). The purpose of this type of
alimony is to allow the dependent spouse to live the same
lifestyle to which he or she grew accustomed during the
marriage. Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 26 (2000).
When awarding permanent alimony, courts have great judicial
discretion, because “no two cases are alike.” Bonanno, supra, 4
N.J. at 273. When determining the amount of alimony to be
awarded, courts are instructed to evaluate the actual needs of
the wife and the actual means of the husband, along with
the physical condition and social position of
the parties, the husband’s property and income
(including what he could derive from personal
attention to business), and also the separate
property and income of the wife. Considering
all these, and any other factors bearing upon
the question, the sum is to be fixed at what
the wife would have [expected] as support, if
[she were still] living with her husband.
[Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 119 N.J. Eq. 27, 29
(E. & A. 1935).]
ii.
The second type is limited duration alimony. This type of
alimony was created as a remedy in order to address a dependent
spouse’s post-divorce needs following “shorter-term marriage
where permanent or rehabilitative alimony would be inappropriate
or inapplicable but where, nonetheless, economic assistance for
19
a limited period of time would be just.” J.E.V. v. K.V., 426
N.J. Super. 475, 485-86 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Cox v. Cox,
335 N.J. Super. 465, 477 (App. Div. 2000)).
Limited duration alimony is not to be awarded in
circumstances where permanent alimony is warranted. Cox, supra,335 N.J. Super. at 477. “All other statutory factors being in
equipoise, the duration of the marriage marks the defining
distinction between whether permanent or limited duration
alimony is warranted and awarded.” Id. at 483.
iii.
The third type of alimony is rehabilitative alimony.
Rehabilitative alimony is a short-term award for the purpose of
financially supporting a spouse while he or she prepares to
reenter the workforce through training or education. Lepis v.
Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 162 (1980). It is an award “from one party
in a divorce [to] enable [the] former spouse to complete the
preparation necessary for economic self-sufficiency.” Hill v.
Hill, 91 N.J. 506, 509 (1982). The objective of rehabilitative
alimony is to assist the dependent spouse in obtaining gainful
employment so as to “enhance and improve the earning capacity of
the economically dependent spouse.” Cox, supra, 335 N.J. Super.
at 475.
An award of rehabilitative alimony is appropriate where “a
spouse who gave up or postponed her own education to support the
20
household requires a lump sum or a short-term award to achieve
economic self-sufficiency.” Mahoney, supra, 91 N.J. at 504.
Rehabilitative alimony is not an exclusive remedy, and may, in
the appropriate circumstance, be awarded in addition to
permanent alimony. Hughes v. Hughes, 311 N.J. Super. 15, 32
(App. Div. 1998).
iv.
Finally, courts may consider a fourth type of alimony,
reimbursement alimony. Reimbursement alimony was created to
help combat the concept that professional degrees and licenses
are “property” subject to equitable distribution at the
termination of a marriage. See Mahoney, supra, 91 N.J. 500-01;
see also Hill, supra, 91 N.J. 509-10. Reimbursement alimony is
awarded appropriately to a spouse who has made financial
sacrifices, resulting in a temporarily reduced standard of
living, in order to allow the other spouse to secure an advanced
degree or professional license to enhance the parties’ future
standard of living. Mahoney, supra, 91 N.J. at 500-01; N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(e).
Reimbursement alimony is limited to “monetary contributions
made with the mutual and shared expectation that both parties to
the marriage will derive increased income and material
benefits.” Mahoney, supra, 91 N.J. at 502-03. Like
rehabilitative alimony, reimbursement alimony can be awarded on
21
its own or in combination with another type of alimony.
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(f).
V.
We now turn to the facts of this case and consider whether
the Appellate Division erred in reversing and remanding the
limited duration alimony award and directing the trial court to
consider permanent alimony. We find that the trial court did
not consider and weigh all of the necessary factors required by
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 in determining that permanent alimony was
unwarranted but, instead, based its decision solely on N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(b)(2). We further conclude that in reversing the
Appellate Division inadvertently created a bright-line rule
requiring an award of permanent alimony.
The trial court made the following findings under N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(b):
(1) The court imputed $65,000 to Elizabeth
annually, reasoning that she is now
capable of earning between $61,200 and
$94,000, as per the experts’ opinions.
(2) The court found that “the marriage [was]
one of just under fifteen years.”
(3) The court noted that both parties were
forty-two years old at the commencement
of the trial. It further found that
Elizabeth underwent serious brain
surgery in November 2006, and although
she suffers residual facial paralysis,
she has made a full recovery to normal
life, including a “serious ice-hockey
avocation.”
22
(4) The court observed that although “[t]he
parties enjoyed a more modest lifestyle
than [James]’s income would dictate,” it
concluded that their lifestyle
constituted that of an “upper middle
class” family.
(5) The court highlighted that Elizabeth has
been a stay-at-home mother for eleven
years, but before that she earned a
master’s degree in computer programming
and she has the ability to reenter that
field with an entry-level salary of
between $61,200 and $94,000. The trial
court noted, however, that Elizabeth has
not tried to attain any employment since
the filing of the divorce papers. On the
other hand, the court emphasized that
James has worked in the financial field
the entire marriage and has income that
steadily increased, culminating in an
annual compensation package in excess of
$1 million.
(6) The court found that Elizabeth has been
absent from the job market for eleven
years, while James never experienced any
absence.
(7) The court observed that Elizabeth was and
continues to remain the primary parent
responsible for the parties’ three
children ages twelve, eleven and eight
years.
(8) The court explained that the parties’
experts differed on Elizabeth’s future
employability and her required
retraining to enter the workforce again.
Specifically, Elizabeth’s expert, Dr.
Kincaid, concluded that she would be best
off re-entering the computer field
following one or two years of additional
education courses. He estimated that she
would make between $61,220 and $67,910
annually. On the other hand, Dr. Stein
23
claimed it would only take Elizabeth six
to twelve weeks to become current in the
field and then she could enter the market
earning an annual salary between $85,000
and $94,000, increasing to $120,000
within a few years.
(9) The trial court described that the
parties, while both highly educated, had
vastly different roles to play in the
marriage. James was the sole breadwinner
of the family while Elizabeth forewent
her career to stay home and care for the
children.
(10) The court noted that the parties agreed
to equally divide the marital assets,
yielding each of them approximately
$750,000.
(11) The court reiterated that the parties
agreed to equally divide the marital
assets, yielding each of them
approximately $750,000.
(12) The court concluded that the alimony paid
to Elizabeth would be taxable to her.
(13) None.
While the trial court identified the marriage as “not
short-term,” it ultimately concluded that consideration of an
award of permanent alimony was obviated by the parties’
relatively young ages and the fact that they were not married
for twenty-five or thirty-years. The trial court therefore, in
effect, determined that permanent alimony awards are reserved
solely for long-term marriages of twenty-five years or more,
excluding consideration of the other factors. No per se rule
exists indicating that permanent alimony is unwarranted unless
24
the twenty-fifth year anniversary has been reached. Therefore,
we find that the trial court improperly weighed duration over
the other statutorily defined factors in determining a long-term
marriage must be twenty-five years or more.
We further conclude that in its disposition of this appeal
the Appellate Division inadvertently created a bright-line rule
for distinguishing between a short-term and long-term marriage
as it pertains to an award of permanent alimony. Although the
Appellate Division stated “we do not intend to draw specific
lines delineating ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ marriages in an
effort to define those cases warranting only limited duration
rather than permanent alimony,” a fair reading of the opinion
may lead to such a conclusion. By not clarifying that the
statement reflected only the fifteen-year marriage in this
particular case, the Appellate Division made a generally
applicable declaration.
Moreover, we note that the final clause of the sentence
affirms that the “not short-term” nature of a fifteen-year
marriage mandates that it cannot be considered for limited
duration alimony. Such a holding removes the other twelve
factors from consideration for alimony awards once a marriage
reaches the fifteen-year mark. Our cases have consistently held
that all thirteen factors must be considered and given due
25
weight, and the duration of marriage is only one factor to be
considered.
VI.
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the
Appellate Division is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
trial court for new findings of fact and a new determination of
alimony.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON
and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
26
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-52 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
ELIZABETH GNALL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES GNALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED July 29, 2015
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Fernandez-Vina
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
REVERSE AND
CHECKLIST
REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X
JUSTICE SOLOMON X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 7