In the Matter of William J. Torre(075524)

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
In the Matter of William J. Torre, an Attorney at Law (D-77-14) (075524)
Argued September 17, 2015 -- Decided December 16, 2015
RABNER, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this case, the Court considers the discipline to be imposed on an attorney who borrowed $89,250 from an
elderly, unsophisticated client the attorney had known for many years. The loan amounted to about seventy percent
of the client’s life savings. The terms of the promissory note the attorney prepared were sparse and unfair, the debt
was unsecured, and counsel did not advise his client in writing beforehand that it was desirable to seek independent
legal advice about the transaction. Counsel repaid only a fraction of the loan during the client’s lifetime.
Respondent William J. Torre, of Hasbrouck Heights, was admitted to practice law in New Jersey in 1984.
M.D. had been a friend of respondent’s family for many years. Respondent became M.D.’s attorney in the early
1990s when he prepared wills for her and her husband. Respondent provided other general legal services to M.D.
and M.D. relied on respondent and his office staff for additional help, such as running errands and paying bills. In
2008, M.D. was eighty-six years old, lived alone as a widow, and was legally blind. Although mentally alert, she
was unsophisticated about financial matters. On June 18, 2008, M.D. signed a power of attorney in favor of
respondent. She also executed a new will that respondent prepared, which named him the executor of her estate.
On June 23, 2008, respondent told M.D. about his personal financial difficulties and she offered to help.
Respondent prepared a note that M.D. signed the next day. The unsecured note provided for M.D. to lend
respondent $89,250 -- about seventy percent of her total assets -- at an interest rate of ten percent. The note was to
be paid in full by August 31, 2008. On June 25, 2008, respondent took M.D. to the bank and she withdrew $89,000.
M.D. also paid a $250 fee, which was included in the loan amount. Respondent deposited the funds in his personal
account later the same day. In his testimony, respondent claimed that before M.D. executed the note, he told her she
“should get the advice of an attorney, [and] [s]he didn’t want to hear it.” Respondent did not give M.D. written
advice on that subject. He also never got written consent from her about the terms of the transaction or his personal
role in it.
Respondent at first made only two payments on the loan: $2,500 on May 6, 2009, and $7,500 on June 2,
2009. M.D. ultimately retained another attorney to try to collect the overdue balance. On July 10, 2009, the
attorney filed a complaint in Superior Court. A default judgment was entered against respondent on November 30,
2009 in the amount of $90,720. M.D. had filed a grievance against respondent on November 9, 2009. She passed
away the following month, before the DEC investigator could meet with her. In January 2011, respondent made one
more payment on the note of $9,516.30, representing the proceeds from a short sale of a vacation home he owned.
While preparing for a hearing on the complaint in 2011, respondent claimed he discovered a letter in a
storage facility dated June 25, 2008 -- one day after the note was signed. The letter, from respondent to M.D.,
stated, “[y]ou have been advised to seek independent counsel due to the conflict of interest as I cannot provide
advice for the reasons hereinbefore stated.” In the last paragraph, respondent asked M.D. to sign the letter to
acknowledge her “understanding of the conflict of interest and [her] right to seek independent counsel.” Only
respondent’s signature appears on the letter.
The letter prompted the case to be transferred to the OAE for further investigation, and the DEC complaint
was administratively dismissed. The OAE conducted a forensic exam of respondent’s computer system to try to
determine when the letter was created, but the investigation was inconclusive. Respondent testified that he did not
know if the letter had been sent to M.D. In any event, he conceded that even if the letter had been mailed after the
note was signed, it still failed to satisfy RPC 1.8(a).
1
The OAE filed a two-count complaint in January 2013. Count one charged respondent with a conflict of
interest relating to the loan, in violation of RPC 1.8(a). Count two focused on the June 25, 2008 letter and charged
respondent with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of RPC 8.4(c).
A District Ethics Committee panel concluded that respondent violated RPC 1.8(a). It found that the terms of the
loan transaction “were not fair and reasonable to the Grievant” and “were not transmitted to her in writing”; that
“she was not advised in writing of the desirability of seeking independent legal counsel”; and that she “did not give
informed consent to the terms of the transaction.” The panel determined that the allegations relating to the June 25,
2008 letter had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. After weighing the aggravating factors of the
transaction and various mitigating factors, the panel recommended that respondent be censured.
The DRB agreed with the panel’s findings. The DRB found that respondent engaged in a conflict of
interest “without observing the safeguards of RPC 1.8(a).” The Board also found insufficient evidence that
respondent fabricated the June 25, 2008 letter and dismissed the RPC 8.4(c) charge. Seven members concluded that
respondent should be censured. Two members, in dissent, voted to impose a three-month suspension in light of the
“lopsided, risky, and unfair” nature of the transaction, their belief “that respondent knew, all along, that he could not
repay” the loan, and respondent’s lack of remorse.
Before the Supreme Court, respondent again acknowledged that he violated RPC 1.8(a). He asked the
Court to adopt the recommendations of the DEC and the DRB and censure him. The OAE urged that respondent be
suspended for three months.
HELD: Respondent caused substantial harm to a vulnerable, eighty-six-year-old victim. The egregious
circumstances of this case warrant a one-year suspension to protect the public, guard against elder abuse by lawyers,
and help preserve confidence in the bar.
1. Lawyers are “required to maintain the highest professional and ethical standards” in their dealings with clients.
In re Smyzer, 108 N.J. 47, 57 (1987) (citing In re Gavel, 22 N.J. 248, 262 (1956)). An attorney’s duty of loyalty is
to the client, and not the lawyer’s personal financial interests. When a lawyer has an economic stake in a business
transaction with a client, self-interest can undermine the attorney’s objectivity. In re Doyle, 146 N.J. 629, 643
(1996). Because clients place trust in their attorney, and often believe their lawyer has greater expertise in financial
matters than they do, “a lawyer must take every possible precaution” to ensure that the “client is fully aware of the
risks inherent in the proposed transaction and of the need for independent and objective advice.” Smyzer, supra, 108
N.J. at 55. RPC 1.8 is designed to protect clients in a number of ways. It specifically tries to insert independent
legal counsel into the transaction to get the client unvarnished, unbiased, independent advice. (pp. 8-9)
2. Respondent properly concedes that he violated RPC 1.8(a). The terms of the unsecured note were neither fair nor
reasonable; respondent did not advise M.D. in writing to seek advice from an independent attorney; and M.D. did
not give informed consent in writing. The discipline imposed in cases in which an attorney borrowed money from a
client and violated RPC 1.8(a) has ranged from an admonition to a short suspension. This case, however, presents
two egregious circumstances: the level of harm respondent caused and the vulnerability of the victim. Respondent
caused substantial harm on two levels. The financial harm M.D. suffered is all too apparent. She lost nearly seventy
percent of her life savings through an unsecured loan. The transaction caused M.D. emotional turmoil as well. She
was undoubtedly distressed when she realized that she had wrongly placed her trust in a long-time counselor.
Respondent victimized a vulnerable, elderly client, and has demonstrated no remorse. (pp. 10-13)
3. The Court considers respondent’s conduct against the backdrop of the serious and growing problem of elder
abuse. As the population ages, and more people suffer health problems, it is not uncommon for family members to
seek the appointment of a guardian to oversee the finances of an incapacitated loved one. Others, like M.D., turn to
family or professionals for help and execute powers of attorney in favor of a relative, friend, or trusted lawyer. In
those situations, the vast majority of attorneys perform honorably and act in a manner consistent with the highest
ethical standards. But regrettably, as more seniors have needed help to manage their affairs, allegations of physical
and financial abuse have also increased. (pp. 13-14)
4. The attorney disciplinary system is not designed to punish lawyers. Its goals are to protect the public and
preserve the public’s confidence in the bar. The imposition of discipline in a particular case is meant to foster
continued faith in the legal profession as a whole. Because the conflict in this case resulted in substantial harm to a
2
vulnerable, elderly victim, the Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one
year. In a case like this, if there were clear and convincing proof that an attorney knew at the time he borrowed
money from a trusting client that he would not repay it, disbarment would be appropriate. See In re Wolk, 82 N.J.
326, 335 (1980); see also In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 453 (1979). The discipline imposed today is meant to provide
notice to attorneys that serious consequences will result from this form of misconduct. (pp. 15-16)
So Ordered.
JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON and SOLOMON and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily
assigned) join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate.
3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-77 September Term 2014
075524
IN THE MATTER OF
WILLIAM J. TORRE,
An Attorney at Law
Argued September 17, 2015 – Decided December 16, 2015
On an Order to show cause why respondent
should not be disbarred or otherwise
disciplined.
Maureen G. Bauman, Deputy Ethics Counsel,
argued the cause on behalf of the Office of
Attorney Ethics.
Raymond F. Flood argued the cause for
respondent (Flood & Basile, attorneys).
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This disciplinary matter involves an attorney who borrowed
$89,250 from an elderly, unsophisticated client the attorney had
known for many years. The loan amounted to about seventy
percent of the client’s life savings. The debt was unsecured,
and counsel repaid only a fraction of it during the client’s
lifetime.
Counsel prepared a promissory note to record the loan’s
sparse and unfair terms, but he did not advise his client in
writing beforehand that it was desirable to seek independent
1
legal advice about the transaction. Counsel admits that he
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, see RPC 1.8(a), and
does not challenge the Disciplinary Review Board’s (DRB)
determination that he be censured. The Office of Attorney
Ethics (OAE) requests that a three-month suspension be imposed.
Because of the egregious circumstances this case presents,
we impose an even lengthier period of suspension. Respondent
caused substantial harm to a vulnerable, eighty-six-year-old
victim. A one-year suspension is warranted to protect the
public and guard against elder abuse by lawyers, and to help
preserve confidence in the bar. We also note that misconduct of
this nature will result in serious consequences going forward.
I.
Respondent William J. Torre, of Hasbrouck Heights, was
admitted to practice law in New Jersey in 1984. M.D. had been a
friend of respondent’s family for many years and was a customer
at his parents’ laundromat. Respondent became M.D.’s attorney
in the early 1990s when he prepared wills for her and her
husband. Respondent provided other general legal services to
M.D. in the years since. Over time, M.D. also relied on
respondent and his office staff for additional help. They paid
her monthly bills and ran occasional errands for her.
2
In 2008, M.D. was eighty-six years old. She lived alone as
a widow and was legally blind. Although mentally alert, she was
unsophisticated about financial matters.
M.D. signed a power of attorney in favor of respondent on
June 18, 2008. She also executed a new will that respondent
prepared, which named him the executor of her estate.
Days later, on June 23, 2008, respondent told M.D. about
his personal financial difficulties. He mentioned mounting
tuition bills and mortgage payments. According to respondent’s
testimony before the District Ethics Committee (DEC), M.D. asked
if she could help. In response, respondent said he needed about
$100,000, and M.D. agreed to lend him money.
Respondent prepared a note that M.D. signed the next day,
June 24, 2008. The note provided for M.D. to lend respondent
$89,250 -- about seventy percent of her total assets. The note
listed an interest rate of ten percent and was to be paid in
full by August 31, 2008.
The note was unsecured. Respondent testified that he and
M.D. did not discuss any collateral for it. According to
respondent, he intended to pay the money back on time and
considered refinancing his home and a vacation property.
Respondent took M.D. to the bank the following day, June
25, 2008, and she withdrew $89,000. M.D. also paid a $250 fee,
3
which was included in the loan amount. Respondent deposited the
funds in his personal account later the same day.
In his testimony, respondent claimed that before M.D.
executed the note, he told her she “should get the advice of an
attorney, [and] [s]he didn’t want to hear it.” Respondent did
not give M.D. written advice on that subject. He also never got
written consent from her about the terms of the transaction or
his personal role in it.
Respondent testified that M.D. asked him to make changes to
her will several months later. He said he declined to do so
because he was a creditor. Respondent instead drove M.D. to
Paul A. Dykstra, Esquire, on October 15, 2008, and brought a
copy of her existing will and the note. When the two were
alone, Dykstra tried to question M.D. about the note and “she
kind of cut [him] off.” According to Dykstra, M.D. was aware of
the amount of the note, fully expected that respondent would
repay her, and “fully trusted him.” When Dykstra pointed out
that the note was past due, “she got a little upset because she
said she didn’t want to talk about the note.”
Dykstra prepared a new will for M.D. When they discussed
her assets, M.D. explained that she had sufficient money to take
care of the specific bequests but “wasn’t 100 percent sure of
what she had.” She added that respondent “took care of that”
and again noted that she trusted him.
4
Respondent at first made only two payments on the loan:
$2,500 on May 6, 2009, and $7,500 on June 2, 2009. M.D.
ultimately retained another attorney to try to collect the
overdue balance. On July 10, 2009, the attorney filed a
complaint in Superior Court. A default judgment was entered
against respondent on November 30, 2009 in the amount of
$90,720.
M.D. filed a grievance against respondent on November 9,
2009. She passed away the following month, before the DEC
investigator could meet with her.
In January 2011, respondent made one more payment on the
note of $9,516.30. The amount represented the proceeds from a
short sale of a vacation home respondent had owned.
A member of the District IIB Ethics Committee investigated
the grievance, which led to the filing of a complaint that
alleged unethical conduct. While preparing for a hearing on the
complaint in 2011, respondent claimed he discovered a letter in
a storage facility dated June 25, 2008 -- one day after the note
was signed. The letter, from respondent to M.D., stated, “[y]ou
have been advised to seek independent counsel due to the
conflict of interest as I cannot provide advice for the reasons
hereinbefore stated.” In the last paragraph, respondent asked
M.D. to sign the letter to acknowledge her “understanding of the
5
conflict of interest and [her] right to seek independent
counsel.” Only respondent’s signature appears on the letter.
The arrival of the letter prompted the case to be
transferred to the OAE for further investigation. (The DEC
complaint was administratively dismissed.) The OAE conducted a
forensic exam of respondent’s computer system to try to
determine when the letter was created, but the investigation was
inconclusive.
Respondent testified that he did not know if the letter had
been sent to M.D. In any event, he conceded that even if the
letter had been mailed after the note was signed, it still
failed to satisfy RPC 1.8(a).
The OAE filed a two-count complaint in January 2013. Count
one charged respondent with a conflict of interest relating to
the loan, in violation of RPC 1.8(a). Count two focused on the
June 25, 2008 letter and charged respondent with conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in
violation of RPC 8.4(c).
A panel of the District IIA Ethics Committee conducted a
hearing at which respondent and others testified. The panel
concluded that respondent violated RPC 1.8(a). It found that
the terms of the loan transaction “were not fair and reasonable
to the Grievant” and “were not transmitted to her in writing”;
that “she was not advised in writing of the desirability of
6
seeking independent legal counsel”; and that she “did not give
informed consent to the terms of the transaction.”
Based on the record before it, the panel found that the
allegations relating to the June 25, 2008 letter had not been
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The panel weighed the aggravating factors of the
transaction and various mitigating factors, including
respondent’s “apparently good reputation and character, the lack
of any prior disciplinary history, and his service to the
community.” The panel ultimately recommended that respondent be
censured.
The DRB agreed with the panel’s findings. The DRB found
that respondent engaged in a conflict of interest “without
observing the safeguards of RPC 1.8(a).” The Board also found
insufficient evidence that respondent fabricated the June 25,
2008 letter and dismissed the RPC 8.4(c) charge.
Seven members of the DRB concluded that respondent should
be censured, after they reviewed with care multiple prior
disciplinary cases. Two members, in dissent, voted to impose a
three-month suspension in light of the “lopsided, risky, and
unfair” nature of the transaction, their belief “that respondent
knew, all along, that he could not repay” the loan, and
respondent’s lack of remorse.
7
Before this Court, respondent again acknowledges that he
violated RPC 1.8(a). He asks the Court to adopt the
recommendations of the DEC and the DRB and censure him. The OAE
urges that respondent be suspended for three months.
II.
Lawyers are “required to maintain the highest professional
and ethical standards” in their dealings with clients. In re
Smyzer, 108 N.J. 47, 57 (1987) (citing In re Gavel, 22 N.J. 248,
262 (1956)). At all times, an attorney’s duty of loyalty is to
the client, and not the lawyer’s personal financial interests.
When a lawyer has an economic stake in a business transaction
with a client, self-interest can undermine the attorney’s
objectivity. In re Doyle, 146 N.J. 629, 643 (1996). It can
also impair the “undivided loyalty” that lawyers owe their
clients. In re Wolk, 82 N.J. 326, 333 (1980).
For those reasons, this Court has “[r]epeatedly . . .
warned attorneys of the dangers of engaging in business
transactions with their clients.” Doyle, supra, 146 N.J. at
643. Such transactions “are subject to close scrutiny and the
burden of establishing fairness and equity . . . rests upon the
attorney.” In re Gallop, 85 N.J. 317, 322 (1981).
Because clients place trust in their attorney, and often
believe their lawyer has greater expertise in financial matters
than they do, “a lawyer must take every possible precaution” to
8
ensure that the “client is fully aware of the risks inherent in
the proposed transaction and of the need for independent and
objective advice.” Smyzer, supra, 108 N.J. at 55. In short,
“an attorney has a duty to explain carefully, clearly, and
cogently why independent [legal] advice is needed.” Doyle,
supra, 146 N.J. at 643.
RPC 1.8 attempts to implement those important principles.
The rule provides that
[a] lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire
an ownership, possessory, security or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms in which
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner than can be understood by
the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of
the desirability of seeking and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent legal counsel of the client’s
choice concerning the transaction; and
(3) the client gives informed consent, in
a writing signed by the client, to the
essential terms of the transaction and the
lawyer’s role in the transaction, including
whether the lawyer is representing the client
in the transaction.
[RPC 1.8(a) (emphasis added).]
The rule is designed to protect clients in a number of ways. It
specifically tries to insert independent legal counsel into the
9
transaction to get the client unvarnished, unbiased, independent
advice.
III.
Respondent properly concedes that he violated RPC 1.8(a).
The terms of the unsecured note were neither fair nor
reasonable; respondent did not advise M.D. in writing to seek
advice from an independent attorney; and M.D. did not give
informed consent in writing. As the DEC panel noted,
respondent’s violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct was
far from technical. Had he followed RPC 1.8(a), it is hard to
imagine that any lawyer would have advised M.D. to place her
life savings at risk and lend her lawyer a substantial amount of
money with no security or collateral to protect her.
We therefore turn to consider the proper level of
discipline. As this Court observed in Doyle, supra, nearly
twenty years ago, “in cases involving conflicts of interest,
absent egregious circumstances or serious economic injury to the
clients involved, a public reprimand [generally] constitutes
appropriate discipline.” 146 N.J. at 642 (citing In re
Berkowitz, 136 N.J. 134, 148 (1994)).
The DRB reviewed a number of cases in which an attorney
borrowed money from a client and violated RPC 1.8(a). The
discipline imposed in those matters ranged from an admonition to
a short suspension. See, e.g., In re Strait, 205 N.J. 46910
(2011) (reprimanding attorney who used companion credit card
linked to client’s account and ran balance up to more than
$49,000); In re Moeller, 201 N.J. 11 (2009) (suspending for
three months attorney who borrowed $3,000 from client and had
prior disciplinary record); In re Frank J. Jess, DRB 96-068
(June 3, 1996) (admonishing attorney who borrowed $30,000 from
clients to satisfy gambling debt).1 This case, however, presents
two egregious circumstances: the level of harm respondent
caused and the vulnerability of the victim.
Respondent caused substantial harm on two levels. The
financial harm M.D. suffered is all too apparent. She lost
nearly seventy percent of her life savings through an unsecured
loan. See Doyle, supra, 146 N.J. at 642 (“When an attorney’s
conflict of interest causes serious economic injury to clients,
. . . we have imposed a period of suspension.”) (citing cases).
The transaction caused M.D. emotional turmoil as well.
Months afterward, she declined to discuss the loan at length
with a new attorney because she was upset. She was undoubtedly
distressed when she realized that she had wrongly placed her
trust in a long-time counselor. Rather than be able to enjoy
1
DRB decisions are available on a website that Rutgers School of
Law – Newark maintains. See Decisions of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, Disciplinary Review Board, Rutgers School of Law –
Newark, http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb; see also
Disciplinary Review Board, New Jersey Courts,
http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/Search.aspx.
11
her twilight years in peace, she was forced to file a lawsuit to
try to recoup her life savings.
In addition, respondent victimized a vulnerable, elderly
client. At age eighty-six, M.D. had lost most of her eyesight
and was increasingly dependent on others. Although mentally
alert, she was unsophisticated about her finances. She relied
on respondent and his staff to pay her bills and assist with
other matters. Just days after M.D. gave respondent power of
attorney, he offered his longstanding client a proposal that any
reasonable attorney would have cautioned against: an unsecured
loan with little prospect of repayment.
The DEC also observed a lack of remorse. The panel noted
that respondent “testified in a detached fashion, exhibited no
real remorse, did not express an intent on his part to pay the
amount due on the note to [M.D.’s] estate, or to somehow ‘make
it right.’”
At oral argument before the Court, respondent left a
similar impression. He initially described what occurred as a
“mistake.” When pressed, he admitted his conduct was “wrong.”
He also did not know the amount of the judgment he owed.
Respondent confirmed that he had made no recent payments and
represented that, although he had accumulated $25,000, he was
waiting to pay off the judgment all at once on the advice of
counsel. In other words, respondent made few loan repayments
12
during M.D.’s life, and none in the four and one-half years
leading up to his appearance before the Court.
After oral argument, the Court asked respondent to
represent when he would turn over the $25,000 to M.D.’s estate
and when he would pay the remainder owed. Respondent paid the
estate $25,000 on October 15, 2015 and advised that he had
“formulated a schedule” to pay the note in full with interest by
December 2017. He later provided a copy of the schedule.
IV.
We consider respondent’s conduct against the backdrop of
the serious and growing problem of elder abuse. The State’s
population is steadily aging. From 2000 to 2010, the number of
people in our State age sixty-five and older grew by 6.5 percent
-- faster than the total population. See N.J. Dep’t of Labor
and Workforce Dev., Census 2010 Highlights 53,
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/content/njsdc/AFF/2010High
lights.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2015). As of 2012, seniors
accounted for 14.1 percent of the State’s total population, or
1.25 million. N.J. Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev.,
Population and Labor Force Projections for New Jersey: 2012 to
2032 8, http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/content/njsdc/2015
Projections%202032.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2015); N.J. Dep’t
of Labor and Workforce Dev., Projections of Total Population by
Age and Sex: New Jersey, 2012 to 2032,
13
http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/dmograph/lfproj/sptab2.htm
(last visited Dec. 9, 2015). The Department of Labor and
Workforce Development projects that the State’s elderly
population will grow to 21.8 percent of the total population by
the year 2032. Population and Labor Force Projections for New
Jersey: 2012 to 2032, supra, at 8.
As the population ages, and more people suffer health
problems, it is not uncommon for family members to seek the
appointment of a guardian to oversee the finances of an
incapacitated loved one. In recent years, judges in New Jersey
have appointed more than 2,000 guardians annually, see New
Jersey Courts, Guardianship Support, http://www.judiciary.state.
nj.us/guardianship (last visited Dec. 9, 2015), a number that is
expected to grow. Others, like M.D., turn to family or
professionals for help and execute powers of attorney in favor
of a relative, friend, or trusted lawyer.
In those situations, the vast majority of attorneys perform
honorably and act in a manner consistent with the highest
ethical standards. But regrettably, as more seniors have needed
help to manage their affairs, allegations of physical and
financial abuse have also increased. See Naomi Karp & Erica
Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National Survey of Court
Practices, AARP Pub. Policy Inst. 4 (June 2006), http://assets.
aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/2006_14_guardianship.pdf.
14
V.
The attorney disciplinary system is not designed to punish
lawyers. Its goals are to protect the public, In re
Witherspoon, 203 N.J. 343, 358 (2010), and preserve the public’s
confidence in the bar, In re Cohen, 220 N.J. 7, 11 (2014). The
imposition of discipline in a particular case, thus, is meant to
foster continued faith in the legal profession as a whole.
Because the conflict in this case resulted in substantial
harm to a vulnerable, elderly victim, we find that respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for one year. In
doing so, we take into account that respondent has no prior
disciplinary history and consider the favorable character
evidence presented by four witnesses at the DEC hearing.
Respondent represented to the Court that he would satisfy
the judgment against him in full by December 2017. We direct
that he provide quarterly updates about the status of upcoming
payments.
Until now, few reported disciplinary cases have involved
harm to vulnerable, elderly victims. As with all matters, each
case of this type must be decided on its own merits. Some may
call for less discipline; others will justify an even longer
suspension or disbarment. Indeed, in a case like this, if there
were clear and convincing proof that an attorney knew at the
time he borrowed money from a trusting client that he would not
15
repay it, disbarment would be appropriate. See Wolk, supra, 82
N.J. at 335; see also In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 453 (1979).
The discipline imposed today is meant to provide notice to
attorneys that serious consequences will result from this form
of misconduct.
VI.
For the reasons outlined above, respondent is suspended
from the practice of law for one year.
JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON and SOLOMON and JUDGE
CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s
opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate.
16
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. D-77 SEPTEMBER TERM 2014
DISPOSITION Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Should
Not be Disbarred or Otherwise Disciplined
IN THE MATTER OF
WILLIAM J. TORRE,
An Attorney at Law
DECIDED December 16, 2015
OPINION BY Chief Justice Rabner
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST SUSPEND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-
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VINA
JUSTICE SOLOMON X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 6