State v. Singletary

Jacobs, J.,

concurring. After thoroughly interrogating a prospective juror on the voir dire, the trial court concluded that he was qualified to serve. Accordingly, it exercised its broad discretionary powers in refusing to discharge him for cause. It did so well knowing that if the defendant still harbored doubts as to the juror’s ability to function impartially the defendant could discharge him peremptorily. The defendant did just that and as a result the juror did not participate in the trial. After a full and fair trial the defendant was found guilty of armed robbery. He now seeks a retrial though he makes no semblance of showing that the jury which convicted him was not truly an impartial one or that its verdict was in anywise unjust or not in conformity with the evidence. It appears clear to me that under these circumstances a retrial would needlessly burden the administration of justice and would grossly disserve the interests of society. See Patterson v. State, 239 Ga. 409, 238 S. E. 2d 2 (1977):

The conduct of the voir dire is within the discretion of the trial court, and the court’s rulings are proper absent some manifest abuse of discretion. Welch v. State, 237 Ga. 665(5), 229 S. E. 2d 390 (1976) ; Gatlin v. State, 236 Ga. 707(2), 225 S. E. 2d 224 (1976). Whether to strike a juror for cause lies within the discretion of the court. Welch, supra 237 Ga. at 671, 229 S. E. 2d 390. We have carefully reviewed the record and fail to find any abuse of discretion. These two allegedly biased jurors did not sit on the jury which convicted appellant, nor has he shown that he was prejudiced or harmed because he used peremptory strikes to eliminate the two challenged jurors. See People v. Silvola, Colo., 547 P. 2d 1283(9) (1976), cert. den. 429 U. S. 886, 97 S. Ct. 238, 50 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1976). [238 S. E. 2d at 5]

In granting the defendant Singletary’s request for a new trial the Appellate Division, by a divided vote, relied heavily upon State v. Jackson, 43 N. J. 148 ,(1964), which is readily distinguishable. There the trial court refused to discharge a prospective juror though it appeared that he was a close friend of a principal witness for the State and that the defendant could not excuse him since he had already exhausted his peremptory challenges. As a result the juror actually served and participated in rendering the guilty verdict which produced the defendant’s death sentence. In the opinion for a unanimous Court I pointed out that it would run counter to human nature to expect the juror to pass impartially on matters of credibility between his close friend and the defendant. His very presence on the jury tainted its verdict and the appearance of justice as well as its actuality cried out for the setting aside of the verdict and death sentence. Surely no time need be spent on the patent differentiations between Jackson and the case at hand where, after fair trial, the defendant Singletary was found guilty by an impartial jury which carried no suggestion of taint.

The Appellate Division placed reliance on Wright v. Bernstein, 23 N. J. 284 (1957), which is also readily distinguishable. There a new trial was ordered where it appeared that a juror, who had failed to disclose on the voir dire that his mother was a party to a pending lawsuit, actually participated in the trial and in the verdict for the plaintiffs. That was an automobile accident ease and the juror mistakenly thought that he was being asked whether any member of his family was engaged in similar automobile accident litigation. In fact his mother had fallen in a store and was suing its owner. I dissented from the grant of a new trial because the record established that the juror had acted honestly and impartially and there had been no showing whatever of harm or prejudice. See Wright v. Bernstein, 23 N. J. at 297-301; cf. Meszaros v. Gransamer, 23 N. J. 179, 184 (1957). Though the dissenting opinion was filed over two decades ago, time and experience have simply served to reinforce its thesis. In view of the larger implications in the ready granting of retrials, I take the liberty of now repeating its concluding paragraph in full:

The uneontroverted circumstances establish that [the juror’s] statement, though inadvertently inaccurate, was not actually harmful or prejudicial and in nowise impaired the complete fairness of the trial nor the justness of the verdict. If the controlling test of substantial justice is to have any significant meaning, then the course which should be taken in the instant matter seems reasonably clear. See Meszaros v. Gransamer, supra [23 N. J. at 189-190] :

“Throughout history the ever present goal has been to attain a better system of justice which affords to every person a fair, inexpensive and speedy trial, unshackled by needless technicality and formalism. This goal is frustrated by every new trial for a procedural error which did not impair the fairness of the first trial nor the justness of the original verdict. In this day there should be ready recognition of the absence of justification for such new trial except in the unusual instance where it is really essential to insure future observance of a prescribed practice safeguard or the vindication of a fundamental principle. It will not suffice that we have solemnly set forth in a formal practice rule (R. R. 1:5-3(6)) that a new trial will not be granted ‘unless a denial of the relief sought appears to the court to be inconsistent with substantial justice’; as Professor Sunderland properly pointed out almost 30 years ago, we must go further and always interpret and apply the rule with sympathetic understanding that trial procedure is not the end in itself but is merely the vehicle for attaining justice:

‘The problem of prejudicial error is a problem in professional psychology. No rules can be framed which will solve it, for rules can only be drawn in general terms, and it is in the interpretation of the rules that the difficulty comes * * * The only permanent and effective cure for technicality in this respect is a better conception of the purpose of all procedure. In England in the year 1924 not a single case from the King’s Bench Division was reversed for error in admitting or excluding evidence. That simple fact explains why the intricacies of practice no longer annoy the English lawyer. And it explains the success of the whole judicial establishment. Procedure has become a practical means to an end. Its rules are no more exacting than efficiency requires. * * Every judgment which is reversed merely because obtained contrary to rules, shows a failure of the courts to serve the main purpose of their existence.’ 8underland, ‘The Problem of Appellate Review,’ 5 Texaisi A. Rev. 126, 146 (1927), as quoted in 7 Moore, supra, at 1002.” [23 N. J. at 300-301]

I join Justice P ashman’s opinion and vote to reinstate the defendant Singletary’s conviction.

Justice Sohreiber joins in this opinion.