State v. Daryel Rawls (072388)

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
State of New Jersey v. Daryel Rawls (A-18-13) (072388)
Argued April 1, 2014 -- Decided September 15, 2014
FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether a defendant who is released on bail on one indictment, but
subsequently incarcerated on a later indictment, is entitled to jail credit against the former indictment under Rule
3:21-8.
On August 8, 2010, a state trooper stopped defendant for speeding. As defendant pulled over, the trooper
observed items being thrown out of the passenger side window. The trooper retrieved a plastic bag from the right
lane containing 146 packets of heroin and another small bag containing a white powder. The trooper arrested
defendant and his passenger. A Union County Grand Jury subsequently indicted defendant on multiple narcotics
offenses. Defendant made bail and remained free until October 17, 2010, when he was arrested in Ocean County on
unrelated drug charges. Because defendant did not make bail on the new charges, he remained incarcerated in
Ocean County.
On March 21, 2011, 155 days after his Ocean County arrest, defendant entered a guilty plea to one of the
Union County offenses and, on that same day, the Union County trial court revoked his bail. In exchange for
defendant’s guilty plea, the State dropped the remaining charges and recommended that the court sentence defendant
to a six-year extended term of incarceration as a repeat drug offender with a thirty-month parole disqualifier. At his
subsequent sentencing hearing, defendant received fifty-three days of jail credit. This total included eleven days
between defendant’s Union County arrest and release on bail, and forty-two days between the date defendant was
originally scheduled for sentencing and the actual date of sentencing.
Defendant subsequently sought jail credit for the 155 days he was incarcerated between his Ocean County
arrest and his plea hearing when his bail was revoked in Union County. The court acknowledged that defendant was
entitled to the eleven days of jail credit that he had received for the time period from his Union County arrest until
his release on bail, and ruled that defendant was entitled to 130 days of jail credit for the time between the date he
entered his guilty plea until his original sentencing date. However, the court denied defendant’s motion seeking 155
days of additional jail credit concluding that the facts were distinguishable from those present in State v. Hernandez,
208 N.J. 24 (2011) because neither of the defendants in Hernandez had made bail, whereas defendant had made bail
in Union County. Moreover, the judge rejected defendant’s reliance on footnote twenty of the Hernandez opinion,
describing that part of the opinion as dicta.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion for jail credit. On appeal, the
Appellate Division affirmed the trial court order denying defendant’s motion. This Court granted certification. 216
N.J. 6 (2013). This Court also granted the motion of the Attorney General for leave to appear as amicus curiae.
HELD: A defendant who is released on bail on one indictment, but subsequently incarcerated on a later indictment, is
entitled to receive jail credit against the former indictment under Rule 3:21-8 and State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24(2011).
1. Rule 3:21-8 mandates that all defendants receive jail credit, or pre-sentence credit on the term of a custodial
sentence, for any time served in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of that sentence. Jail
credit, applied to the front end of a defendant’s sentence, reduces the overall length of a defendant’s sentence and
prevents the double punishment that would result if the time spent in custody before sentencing did not count toward
the sentence. (pp. 9-10)
1
2. Prior to the Hernandez decision, New Jersey’s courts interpreted Rule 3:21-8 as allowing jail credit only for
confinement that was “directly attributable” to the underlying offense. Therefore, if a defendant was detained pre-
sentence for multiple offenses, he or she would only be entitled to jail credit toward one of them. Since Hernandez,
however, Rule 3:21-8 requires that a defendant receive jail credit on each case, even though the charges are not
directly responsible for his or her incarceration. (pp. 11-12)
3. Hernandez encompassed appeals from two consolidated cases. In each case, the defendant had been charged with
crimes in multiple counties. Each defendant was awarded some jail credit, but both defendants argued that the credit
had been applied incorrectly and did not have the appropriate effect on the overall length of their sentences. In
evaluating their claims, this Court rejected the idea that jail credit should depend on immaterial factors such as
whether charges are consolidated in a single indictment, the order in which multiple indictments are tried, or,
significantly, whether bail is revoked. Moreover, in footnote twenty of the opinion, the Court posited that under the
“directly attributable” approach, if the charges to which jail credits are applied happen to be the charges that are
dismissed as part of a plea agreement, then the defendant would not receive any credit for the time he spent in pre-
sentence custody. (pp. 12-15)
4. The case here is directly within the purview of Hernandez, in which the Court held that the issue of jail credit
cannot turn on issues such as whether the judge, prosecutor, bail unit, or defendant moved to revoke bail on the first
matter after the defendant was arrested on the second or subsequent charge. Although the underlying facts of the
instant case differ from the facts presented in Hernandez, that case was not limited to its facts. Footnote twenty of
the Hernandez opinion is not dicta. It instructively set forth a hypothetical situation where a defendant posts bail on
earlier cases, but is unable to post bail on an additional case. In any event, the Court reminds appellate and trial
courts that they must consider themselves bound by its pronouncements, whether classified as dicta or not. (pp. 16-
17)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the trial court for
the application of 155 days of additional jail credit.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and PATTERSON; and JUDGES
RODRÍGUEZ and CUFF (both temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-18 September Term 2013
072388
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARYEL RAWLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued April 1, 2014 – Decided September 15, 2014
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Brian F. Plunkett, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney).
Sara B. Liebman, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Grace H.
Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
attorney).
Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney
General, argued the cause for amicus curiae
Attorney General of New Jersey (John J.
Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney).
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue on appeal is whether a defendant who is released
on bail on one indictment, but subsequently incarcerated on a
later indictment, is entitled to jail credit against the former
1
indictment under Rule 3:21-8 (Credit for Confinement Pending
Sentence).
Defendant Daryel Rawls was indicted on drug-related charges
in Union County, made bail, but was later arrested for unrelated
offenses in Ocean County. Defendant spent 155 days in Ocean
County custody before he pled guilty to his Union County charges
and his bail was formally revoked. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion to receive jail credit for this period toward
his Union County sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that a
direct application of State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011),
mandates that defendant receive a 155-day jail credit toward his
Union County sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the Appellate Division and remand to the trial court to apply
155 days of additional jail credit.
I.
On August 8, 2010, a vehicle driven by defendant was pulled
over by a New Jersey State Police Trooper for speeding. As
defendant was pulling over, the trooper observed items being
thrown out of the passenger side window. The trooper retrieved
a plastic bag from the right lane containing 146 folds of heroin
and another small bag containing a white powder. He then
arrested defendant and his passenger, Terrance Bryant. After
obtaining a search warrant, the trooper found a partially smoked
2
marijuana cigar and two open containers of vodka inside the
vehicle.
A Union County Grand Jury indicted defendant and his
passenger on third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous
substance (CDS), contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-
degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); and fourth-
degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1).
Defendant made bail on the Union County charges on August
18, 2010. He remained free until October 17, 2010 when he was
arrested in Ocean County on unrelated drug charges, which he
allegedly committed while released on bail. At the time of
defendant’s arrest, his Union County bail was not revoked.
Defendant was charged in Ocean County with second-degree
conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, or dispense drugs,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:35-5(a)(1); first-degree leader
of narcotics trafficking network, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3;
and two counts of second-degree manufacturing, distributing or
dispensing heroin/cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1),
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2). Because defendant did not make bail on
those new charges, he remained incarcerated in Ocean County.
Subsequently, on March 21, 2011, 155 days after his Ocean
County arrest, defendant pled guilty in Union County to third-
3
degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute. On that
same day, the trial court formally revoked defendant’s bail.
In exchange for defendant’s guilty plea, the State dropped
the remaining charges and recommended that the court sentence
defendant to a six-year extended term of incarceration as a
repeat drug offender with a thirty-month parole disqualifier.
The sentence was to run concurrently with any sentence imposed
for violation of the parole he was then serving. Defendant was
sentenced on September 9, 2011, according to the terms of his
plea agreement. At sentencing, defendant received fifty-three
days of jail credit. This total included eleven days between
defendant’s Union County arrest and release on bail, and forty-
two days between the date defendant was originally scheduled for
sentencing and the actual date of sentencing.
Following his sentencing, defendant filed a motion for
additional jail credits for the time he had spent incarcerated
in the Ocean County jail. He sought jail credit for the 155
days he was incarcerated between his October 17, 2010 Ocean
County arrest and his March 21, 2011 plea hearing when his bail
was revoked in Union County.1
1 In the same motion, Rawls requested that the court fix a
clerical error. The court had originally scheduled his
sentencing for July 29, 2011, and awarded jail credit through
July 28th. When the court postponed sentencing until September
9th, however, it did not adjust Rawl’s jail credits accordingly.
4
The sentencing judge acknowledged that defendant was
entitled to the eleven days of jail credit that he had received
for the time period from his August 8, 2010 Union County arrest
to his August 18, 2010 release on bail. He then ruled that
defendant was entitled to 130 days of jail credit, beginning on
March 21, 2011, when defendant entered his guilty plea and his
bail was revoked on the Union County charges, until July 28,
2011, defendant’s original sentencing date.
However, the sentencing judge denied defendant’s motion
seeking 155 days of additional jail credit. He determined that
the facts were distinguishable from the facts present in
Hernandez because neither of the defendants in Hernandez had
made bail, whereas the defendant in this case had made bail in
Union County. Moreover, regarding footnote twenty of Hernandez,
supra, 208 N.J. at 48 n.20, the judge rejected defendant’s
reliance on it and described it as dicta.2
The court granted this part of the motion, and found that the
failure to consider the scheduling change was an oversight.
2 Footnote twenty of Hernandez, supra:
Under the State’s interpretation of the
rule, and one which flows from the principle
that a defendant should receive credits only
against a sentence for which the
incarceration was “directly attributable,”
assume a defendant like Rose is “bailed out”
or released on the first arrest after two
days, and the second after [ten] days, and
then is arrested again and remains in
custody for six months before disposition by
5
Defendant appealed, because he only challenged the denial
of jail credits as part of his sentence, it was heard on March
6, 2013, as part of the Excessive Sentence Oral Argument (ESOA)
calendar before a panel of two Appellate Division judges. On
the same day, the Appellate Division issued its order, and
directed as follows:
Having considered the record and argument of
counsel, and it appearing that the issues on
appeal relate solely to the sentence
imposed, we affirm the order denying
defendant’s motion for additional jail
credits for the period of time between
October 17, 2010 and March 21, 2011.
This Court granted defendant’s petition for certification.
216 N.J. 6 (2013). We thereafter granted leave to the Attorney
General to appear as amicus curiae.
II.
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied him
155 days of jail credit. He emphasizes that under Hernandez,
this Court held that defendants who could not post bail should
serve the same amount of time as defendants who are able to post
bail. Defendant further asserts that the Hernandez Court made
clear that the total amount of time a defendant is required to
plea. If he pleads to the first crime and
the others are dismissed, he would be
entitled to two days credit if bail is not
revoked, notwithstanding negotiations to
dispose of all charges.
[208 N.J. at 49 n.20.]
6
serve should not depend on irrelevant concerns or happenstance,
such as whether a defendant has charges contained in a single
indictment or several, or whether or not he moves to revoke
bail. Defendant maintains that Rule 3:21-8, as interpreted by
Hernandez, supra, requires that a defendant receive jail credit
even towards charges that are not directly attributable to his
or her incarceration.
Petitioner contends that the trial court denied his motion
for jail credit on the ground that he had posted bail on the
Union County charges, which were unrelated to the Ocean County
charges. Therefore, according to defendant, the trial court
applied jail credit on a directly attributable basis, which is
the approach specifically invalidated by Hernandez.
Defendant points to footnote twenty of Hernandez, where the
Court addressed in a hypothetical situation facts nearly
identical to the instant case. There, the defendant posted bail
on earlier charges, but not later charges. In that footnote,
the Court stated that the defendant would be entitled to jail
credit toward both sets of charges. Here, defendant argues that
the trial court was bound by all of this Court’s pronouncements,
whether classified as dicta or not.
The State argues that the trial court properly applied
Hernandez. The State maintains that the facts and circumstances
surrounding defendant’s pre-sentence incarceration were
7
distinguishable from those of the Hernandez defendants. In the
instant case, defendant was released on bail on his Union County
charges before the police arrested him again for new offenses
that he committed in Ocean County while on bail. The State
emphasizes that, by contrast, the Hernandez defendants were
continuously incarcerated from the date of their initial arrest
until they were sentenced. The State further submits that
footnote twenty of Hernandez is nothing more than an attempt by
the majority to illustrate their overall reasoning that jail
credits must be awarded uniformly, and is not meant to be
binding on the facts in this case.
The State maintains that the position taken by defendant
rewards those who commit multiple offenses and violate the terms
of their bail. The State urges this Court to “clarify”
Hernandez, supra, by holding that where a defendant is released
on bail and then commits a separate and new offense, for which
he is incarcerated, he is only entitled to jail credit for time
in custody during the second incarceration on the new offense.
The Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae, supports
the arguments advanced by defendant. The Attorney General
asserts that defendant should receive 155 more days of jail
credit. The Attorney General argues that a literal reading of
Rule 3:21-8 militates toward such a ruling. In particular, the
Attorney General submits that jail credit cannot be contingent
8
on whether bail is revoked on the pending charges. Rather, a
defendant is entitled to jail credit on each charged offense
until the first sentence is imposed. Furthermore, the Attorney
General asserts that it does not matter to an incarcerated
defendant that he or she may have posted bail on a previous
charge. The Attorney General maintains that to deny credit for
this period of incarceration simply because bail was not
administratively revoked is contrary to Hernandez.
III.
Rule 3:21-8 states that, “[t]he defendant shall receive
credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time served
in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the
imposition of sentence.” This credit for pre-sentence custody
is commonly called “jail credits.” Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J.
at 36 (citing Richardson v. Nickolopoulos, 110 N.J. 241, 242
(1988)). “When the Rule preconditions for the application of
jail credits are satisfied, the award of such credits is
mandatory, not discretionary.” Id. at 37 (citing State v.
Hemphill, 391 N.J. Super. 67, 70 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
192 N.J. 68 (2007)).
Jail credits are “day-for-day credits.” Ibid. (citing
Buncie v. Dep’t of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 214, 217 (App. Div.
2005), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 606 (2006)). They are applied
to the “front end” of a defendant’s sentence. Ibid. (citing
9
Booker v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 136 N.J. 257, 263 (1994)).
Accordingly, jail credit reduces both the defendant’s overall
sentence and any term of parole ineligibility by one day. Ibid.(citing State v. Mastapeter, 290 N.J. Super. 56, 64 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 146 N.J. 569 (1996)); see also State v. Rippy,
431 N.J. Super. 338, 348 (App. Div. 2013) (“Jail credits are
applied to the ‘front end’ of a sentence and reduce a parole
ineligibility term that is part of a sentence.”) (citing
Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 37), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 284(2014).
Jail credits also serve important policy goals. “Jail
credits were conceived as a matter of equal protection or
fundamental fairness[.]” Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 36
(citing Richardson, supra, 110 N.J. at 250 n.2). Without jail
credit, a defendant would serve “double punishment” because the
time spent in custody before sentencing would not count toward
the sentence. Ibid. (citation omitted). In addition, wealthy
defendants who could post bail would serve less total time than
poor defendants who could not post bail and remained in pre-
sentence custody.
IV.
Before Hernandez, supra, New Jersey courts interpreted Rule
3:21-8 “to allow jail credits only for ‘such confinement as
is attributable to the arrest or other detention resulting
10
from the particular offense.’” Id. at 36 (quoting State v.
Black, 153 N.J. 438, 456 (1998) (internal quotations and
citation omitted)).
In other words, if a defendant were detained pre-
sentence for multiple offenses, he or she would only be entitled
to jail credit toward one of them, namely, the offense to which
his or her incarceration was “directly attributable.” See,
e.g., Carreker, supra, 172 N.J. at 115 (“Generally [jail credit]
applies to confinement attributable to the offense that gave
rise to the sentence.”); Black, supra, 153 N.J. at 456-57 (“New
Jersey courts have adopted a negative view of [giving an inmate
jail credit against more than one sentence].”); Hemphill, supra,391 N.J. Super. at 70 (“The credit is only permissible for a
period of incarceration attributable to the crime for which the
sentence is imposed.”); State v. Hill, 208 N.J. Super. 492, 495
(App. Div.) (“[Rule 3:21-8] only applies to confinement directly
attributable to the particular offense giving rise to the
initial incarceration.”), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 412 (1986).
Pre-Hernandez courts held, however, that judges could award jail
credit toward more than one sentence in the interests of
“fairness, justice, and fair dealings.” Hernandez, supra, 208
N.J. at 37 (citing Hemphill, supra, 391 N.J. Super. at 70).
The Hernandez Court held that a defendant is entitled to
“credits against all sentences ‘for any time served in custody
11
in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition
of sentence’ on each case.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting
R. 3:21-8). Therefore, as interpreted by Hernandez, Rule 3:21-8
requires that a defendant receive jail credit even though the
charges are not directly responsible for his or her
incarceration.
V.
A.
Hernandez encompassed two consolidated cases. In the
first, the defendant, Andrea Hernandez, committed several armed
robberies in Passaic County. Id. at 28-29. She was arrested
and charged on October 25, 2006. Id. at 29 n.1. On January 23,
2007, while Hernandez was incarcerated awaiting disposition of
the Passaic County charges, Ocean County authorities charged her
with burglary based on an earlier, unrelated incident. Id. at
29. Hernandez pled guilty to the Ocean County charges. Ibid.
On August 24, 2007, the Ocean County trial court sentenced her
to three years’ incarceration, to run concurrently to any
Passaic County sentence she might receive. Ibid. The court
awarded 213 days of jail credit for time served from January 23
to August 23, 2007. Ibid.
On October 4, 2007, Hernandez pled guilty to the Passaic
County charges. Id. at 30. The Passaic County trial court
imposed an aggregate twenty-year sentence subject to the No
12
Early Release Act (NERA). Ibid. It awarded ninety days of jail
credit from Hernandez’s October 25, 2006, Passaic County arrest
to January 22, 2007, the day she was moved to the Ocean County
jail and the day before she was charged in Ocean County. Ibid.
The court also awarded 161 days of gap-time credit from her
August 24, 2007, Ocean County sentencing to January 31, 2008,
the day before her Passaic County sentencing. Ibid. The court
denied Hernandez’s request to receive jail credit toward her
Passaic County sentence from the date of her Ocean County
“arrest” to her Ocean County sentencing. Ibid.
In the second case, defendant Derrick Wayne Rose committed
multiple offenses in Union County. Id. at 31. He allegedly
sold cocaine and heroin to undercover police officers on May 4,
2006, and on August 14, 2006, he allegedly sold crack cocaine to
another undercover police officer. Ibid. Rose was not arrested
at the time. Ibid. On January 26, 2007, the defendant was
arrested for committing a theft. Ibid.
Rose entered into a plea agreement to resolve all of the
charges. Id. at 32. On January 18, 2008, pursuant to the
agreement’s terms, the trial court imposed two concurrent five-
year sentences subject to three years of parole ineligibility on
the drug charges and a consecutive four-year sentence on the
theft charge. Ibid. The court did not award any jail credit
13
for the two drug offenses,3 but awarded 357 days of jail credit
for the theft offenses, from Rose’s January 26, 2007, arrest to
January 17, 2008, the day before sentencing. Id. at 33.
In the Appellate Division, Hernandez noted that the trial
court had applied jail credit for time served from her Ocean
County sentence that was not subject to NERA, but not toward her
twenty-year Passaic County sentence that was subject to NERA.
Id. at 33-34. As a result, the jail credit had no effect on the
amount of time she would serve in prison. Ibid.
Similarly, Rose noted that the trial court had applied all
of his jail credit toward his four-year theft sentence instead
of his five-year drug sentence that was subject to a three-year
parole disqualifier. Id. at 35. Rose argued that drug-
treatment programs are often contingent on the availability of
parole, so the court’s allocation of jail credit would harm his
eligibility for those programs. Ibid. He also argued that
after he served his three-year period of parole ineligibility,
he would be eligible for parole on the four-year sentence with
or without jail credit. Ibid. As a result, the jail credit had
no effect on the amount of time he would actually serve. Ibid.
B.
3 The Court noted that Rose was actually awarded one day of jail
credit for his May 4, 2007, offense. This was apparently a
mistake, because the judgment reflected an “arrest” on that date
that never occurred. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 33.
14
This Court’s decision in Hernandez rejected the idea that
jail credit should depend on immaterial factors like whether
charges are consolidated in a single indictment, the order in
which multiple indictments are tried, or, significantly, whether
bail is revoked. Id. at 47-48. It also clarified that because
jail credit has always applied toward the aggregate sentence of
an indictment, Hernandez “essentially impacts only cases
involving defendants sentenced to custodial terms on multiple
indictments.” Id. at 48 n.19. In addition, in footnote twenty
of its opinion, the Court posited the following hypothetical:
Under the State’s interpretation of the
rule, and one which flows from the principle
that a defendant should receive credits only
against a sentence for which the
incarceration was “directly attributable,”
assume a defendant like Rose is “bailed out”
or released on the first arrest after two
days, and the second after [ten] days, and
then is arrested again and remains in
custody for six months before disposition by
plea. If he pleads to the first crime and
the others are dismissed, he would be
entitled to two days credit if bail is not
revoked, notwithstanding negotiations to
dispose of all charges.
[Id. at 48 n.20.]
In other words, under the “directly attributable” approach, if
the charges to which jail credits are applied happen to be the
charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement, then the
defendant would not receive any credit for the time he spent in
pre-sentence custody.
15
VI.
Here, defendant made bail on his Union County charges on
August 18, 2010. He was free until October 17, 2010, when he
was arrested in Ocean County on unrelated drug charges.
Defendant did not make bail on his Ocean County charges, and
therefore, remained incarcerated in Ocean County. On March 21,
2011, 155 days after his Ocean County arrest, defendant pled
guilty to the Union County charges and on that same day, his
bail was revoked.
Contrary to the State’s assertion that Hernandez must be
clarified, this case falls directly under its purview. This
Court explicitly declared that “[t]he issue of credits simply
cannot turn on such happenstance.” Id. at 48. We also
expressly included the revocation of bail as an example of
happenstance, stating that jail credit could not “depend on
whether the judge, prosecutor, bail unit, or even the defendant
moved to revoke bail on the first matter after the defendant was
arrested on the second or subsequent charge.” Id. at 44.
Although the underlying facts of the instant case differ from
the Hernandez defendants, we did not limit the Hernandez
decision to its facts. Rather, our holding in Hernandez, supra,
encompasses the instant case and does not distinguish based on
bail status.
16
Footnote twenty of the Hernandez opinion is not dicta. It
instructively set forth a hypothetical situation where a
defendant posts bail on earlier cases but is unable to post bail
on an additional case, similar to the instant case. We
reiterate that “[a]ppellate and trial courts consider themselves
bound by this Court's pronouncements, whether classified as
dicta or not.” State v. Dabas, 215 N.J. 114, 136-37 (2013).
Therefore, pursuant to Hernandez, defendant is entitled to
jail credit toward his Union County case for the 155 days from
his October 17, 2010, Ocean County arrest to his March 21, 2011,
Union County plea, when his bail was revoked.
VII.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. We
remand to the trial court to apply 155 days of additional jail
credit.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and
PATTERSON, and JUDGES RODRÍGUEZ and CUFF (both temporarily
assigned) join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
17
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-18 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARYEL RAWLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED September 15, 2014
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Fernandez-Vina
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST REVERSE/REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X
JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (t/a) X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 7
1