State v. Dion E. Robinson (076267) (Atlantic County and Statewide)

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
State v. Dion E. Robinson (A-40-15) (076267)
Argued January 4, 2017 -- Decided May 1, 2017
Patterson, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal as of right, the Court considers whether the protective sweep exception to the warrant
requirement applies to a police officer’s search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment in the wake of a traffic stop.
After observing a driving pattern he considered unsafe in an area associated with drug activity, Officer Ceci
conducted a motor vehicle stop. The driver was defendant Dion Robinson, the front seat passenger was Catilya
Carson, the left-rear-seat passenger was Marcus Sanders, and the right-rear-seat passenger was Terron Henderson.
Officer Ceci asked defendant for his license, registration, and insurance. Defendant misidentified himself,
stated that his license was suspended, and provided the registration and insurance. Henderson misidentified himself
as defendant. Carson and Sanders accurately identified themselves and presented identification cards but no driver’s
licenses. Defendant said that the car was owned by his friend, but that he did not know the friend’s name.
Officer Ceci was advised by the dispatcher that defendant and Henderson each had an outstanding warrant
and that defendant was known to carry weapons. Officer Ceci confirmed that information and found that Henderson
also had a “caution for weapons.” He called for backup; a sergeant and three officers joined him at the scene.
The officers directed defendant and Henderson out of the car, handcuffed them, and arrested them. A
search incident to arrest revealed no weapons on either. Some of the officers were assigned to watch defendant and
Henderson, who stood handcuffed on the side of the highway and were not permitted to return to the vehicle.
Next, the officers detained, but did not arrest, Carson and Sanders, on whom the officers found no
weapons. Carson and Sanders were then directed to stand on the side of the road, monitored by officers. Officer
Ceci did not observe Carson or Sanders make any motion that suggested that either was reaching for a weapon,
attempting to hide any object, or resisting the directions of the officers. Carson and Sanders were not allowed access
to the vehicle. They were not licensed drivers and would not have been permitted to drive the vehicle home.
Officer Ceci then conducted a sweep of the interior of the vehicle to check for weapons. He searched the
front-seat passenger area, where Carson had left her purse. When he touched the bottom of the purse, Officer Ceci
felt the outline of a handgun, which he retrieved and brought to his patrol vehicle. He then asked the other officers
to place Carson and Sanders in custody, summoned a tow truck, and applied for a search warrant.
Defendant was charged with two weapons offenses, hindering apprehension, and four drug offenses, which
were the subject of the outstanding warrant. Defendant moved to suppress the handgun found by Officer Ceci
during his search of the car. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the traffic stop was properly based on the
officer’s articulable and reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed traffic offenses and that the search
constituted a reasonable and lawful protective sweep. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to second-
degree unlawful possession of a handgun and third-degree possession of a CDS.
Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The majority of the Appellate
Division panel concluded that Officer Ceci’s search of the motor vehicle was not a lawful protective sweep and
reversed the trial court’s determination. 441 N.J. Super. 33, 46-47 (App. Div. 2015). The panel rejected the State’s
assertion that the community-caretaking exception governs this case and noted that the “plain-feel” doctrine was
irrelevant. One member of the panel dissented, finding that the search was justified as both a valid protective sweep
and an exercise of police community-caretaking functions. The State appealed as of right. R. 2:2-1(a)(2).
1
HELD: Although the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that there was a weapon in the vehicle, the five
officers’ swift and coordinated action eliminated the risk that any of the four occupants would gain immediate access to
the weapon. Accordingly, the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement does not govern this case. The
community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is irrelevant. However, the inevitable discovery exception
to the exclusionary rule may be pertinent to this case.
1. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution
guarantee “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures,” and set forth the requirements for warrants. Warrantless searches are permissible only if
justified by one of the few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. It is the
State’s burden to prove that a warrantless search falls within one or more of those exceptions. (pp. 16-17)
2. The protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In
Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may initiate an investigatory stop in the presence of “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
Id. at 21. Terry stops are narrowly drawn to permit a reasonable search for weapons. (pp. 17-19)
3. The United States Supreme Court applied the protective sweep exception to an automobile setting in Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). The Court adopted that standard in State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 48 (1990), but
rejected the State’s claim that the search reviewed in that case was a valid protective sweep. In State v. Gamble, the
Court upheld an automobile search as a lawful protective sweep. 218 N.J. 412, 431-33 (2014). (pp. 19-22)
4. Long and the Court’s opinions in Lund and Gamble define the standard for a valid protective sweep of an
automobile following a traffic stop: the State must present specific and articulable facts that, considered with the
rational inferences from those facts, warrant a belief that an individual in the vehicle is dangerous and that he or she
may gain immediate control of weapons. The protective sweep exception in the automobile setting does not turn
solely on the potential presence of a weapon in a vehicle. Instead, it addresses the imminent danger to police when a
driver or passenger will be permitted access to a vehicle that may contain a weapon or may be in a position to evade
or overpower the officers at the scene. That standard governs this appeal. (p. 22)
5. In light of Officer Ceci’s observations of defendant’s driving, there were specific and articulable facts giving rise
to reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed motor vehicle violations and that the traffic stop was therefore
lawful. However, Officer Ceci’s search of the car was not a valid protective sweep. There is no doubt that Officer
Ceci’s concerns that defendant and Henderson could be armed were justified, but Officer Ceci addressed the
potential danger with prompt and effective action. None of the four occupants was given an opportunity to return to
the car or was in a position to gain access to any weapon. The record did not reveal specific and articulable facts
that, at the time of Officer Ceci’s search of the vehicle, would reasonably warrant the conclusion that any of the
vehicle’s four occupants was potentially capable of gaining immediate control of weapons. The search of the car
was not within the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement. (pp. 23-25)
6. This case does not fit within the narrow parameters of the community-caretaking doctrine as applied to the search
of a motor vehicle. There was no potential threat to any person’s safety warranting application of the doctrine at the
time that the search took place. The Court does not reach the “plain-feel” exception. (pp. 25-28)
7. In light of the officers’ continued control over the vehicle, their reasonable concern that one or more occupants
could have been armed, and the uncertain status of the vehicle’s owner, it may have been inevitable that the handgun
would have been discovered. Consequently, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is
potentially relevant to this case. The Court explains that exception and provides guidance for evaluating its
applicability on remand, but offers no view on the resolution of any issues raised on remand. (pp. 28-32)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED
to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-40 September Term 2015
076267
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DION E. ROBINSON (a/k/a
QUANTAE MASON ALBERT
MITCHELL),
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued January 4, 2017 – Decided May 1, 2017
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, whose opinion is reported at 441
N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 2015).
Jane C. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellant (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney).
Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Amira R. Scurato, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus
curiae Seton Hall University School of Law
Center for Social Justice.
Rebecca J. Livengood argued the cause for
amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal
Director, attorney; Ms. Livengood, Mr.
Barocas, Alexander R. Shalom, and Jeanne M.
LoCicero, on the brief).
1
JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under federal and New Jersey search-and-seizure
jurisprudence, a police officer’s warrantless search of the
passenger compartment of a vehicle, following a lawful traffic
stop, is a constitutional protective sweep when the
circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a driver
or passenger “is dangerous and may gain immediate access to
weapons.” State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 432 (2014) (citing
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481, 77
L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1220 (1983); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 48
(1990)). A protective sweep, permitted in order to “ferret out
weapons that might be used against police officers,” id. at 433
(quoting State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 129 (2010)), “must be
cursory and limited in scope to the location where the danger
may be concealed,” ibid.
In this appeal as of right, the Court considers whether the
protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement applies to
a police officer’s search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment
in the wake of a traffic stop. The officer conducted a brief
conversation with defendant, who was the driver, and his three
passengers; the vehicle’s occupants responded to the officer’s
questions with confusing and evasive answers. The officer then
learned from his department’s dispatcher and a law enforcement
database that defendant and one passenger had outstanding
2
warrants and were known to carry weapons. He requested backup
and was promptly joined by four other officers. The five
officers removed the four occupants from the vehicle and frisked
them for weapons. They arrested and handcuffed defendant and
one passenger and monitored the other passengers outside of the
vehicle. None of the four resisted the officers or sought
access to the vehicle. The police officer who had conducted the
traffic stop then searched the interior of the vehicle. The
officer lifted one passenger’s purse to search the seat,
recognized that a weapon was contained in the purse, and
retrieved a handgun.
Charged with the unlawful possession of a handgun,
defendant moved to suppress the weapon on the ground that it was
the product of an unconstitutional search. The trial court
denied the motion to suppress. A divided Appellate Division
panel reversed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Robinson,
441 N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 2015). A majority of the panel
held that the motor vehicle search did not constitute either a
protective sweep or an exercise of the police officer’s
community-caretaking function. The dissenting judge opined that
the circumstances warranted a protective sweep of the vehicle
for the officers’ safety and that the community-caretaking
exception to the warrant requirement also justified the search.
3
We conclude that although the circumstances gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that there was a weapon in the vehicle, the
five officers’ swift and coordinated action eliminated the risk
that any of the four occupants would gain immediate access to
the weapon. Accordingly, we hold that the protective sweep
exception to the warrant requirement does not govern this case.
We also concur with the Appellate Division majority’s
determination that the community-caretaking exception to the
warrant requirement is irrelevant. However, because the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule may be
pertinent to this case, we conclude that a remand is necessary.
We therefore modify and affirm the Appellate Division’s
judgment. We remand this matter to the trial court to determine
whether to apply the inevitable discovery exception.
I.
We derive our summary of the facts from the record
presented to the trial court during the suppression hearing.
Officer Vincent Ceci of the Galloway Township Police Department
was the sole witness at that hearing.
Shortly after midnight on April 5, 2012, Officer Ceci,
driving a marked patrol car, observed a 2008 Mitsubishi Gallant
leave the driveway of a motel and proceed westbound on Route 30.
Officer Ceci knew the motel to be in an area associated with
drug activity.
4
As the vehicle proceeded westbound, the driver activated
his right turn signal and drove onto the shoulder of the road as
if preparing to turn right toward a store, then returned to the
travel lane. Approaching an intersection, the driver again
activated his right turn signal, but aborted his right turn and
quickly crossed back into a westbound travel lane. Officer Ceci
considered the driving pattern a “little suspicious” and
“unsafe.” He noticed the “silhouette” of an object hanging and
swaying several inches below the rearview mirror. He considered
the object to be a potential impediment to the driver’s view of
the road. The object was later identified as an air freshener.
After the car turned onto the northbound lanes of the
Garden State Parkway, Officer Ceci conducted a motor vehicle
stop. He recalled that the lighting in the area was dim, and
that his patrol car’s mounted lights provided the only
illumination of the scene. Officer Ceci approached the car’s
passenger side. He observed that there were four people in the
car and that none of the four was wearing a seatbelt. It would
later be determined that the driver was defendant Dion E.
Robinson, the front-seat passenger was Catilya Carson, the left-
rear-seat passenger was Marcus Sanders, and the right-rear-seat
passenger was Terron Henderson.
Officer Ceci asked defendant for his license, registration,
and insurance. Defendant misidentified himself as Henderson,
5
stated that his license was suspended, and provided the
registration and insurance. Officer Ceci asked the passengers
for identification. Henderson misidentified himself as
defendant and stated that there was alcohol in the plastic cup
that he was holding. Carson and Sanders accurately identified
themselves and presented New Jersey identification cards but no
driver’s licenses.
Officer Ceci asked defendant where the group was going.
Defendant responded that they were returning from Atlantic City
and had been on the way to Sanders’ home to drop him off when
they were stopped. Sanders provided his address. In Officer
Ceci’s view, defendant’s statement that he and his passengers
were en route from Atlantic City to Sanders’ residence was
inconsistent with the location in which the officer initially
spotted the car and with the direction in which the vehicle was
traveling. Officer Ceci inquired as to who owned the car, and
defendant said that it was owned by his friend, but that he did
not know the friend’s name. The passengers did not identify the
vehicle’s owner.
Ten minutes after commencement of the motor vehicle stop,
Officer Ceci was advised by the Galloway Police Department’s
dispatcher that defendant “had an outstanding NCIC hit [--]
warrant for a drug offense.” The reference to an “NCIC hit”
denoted the National Crime Information Center, “a computerized
6
database of criminal justice information available to law
enforcement agencies nationwide.” State v. Sloane, 193 N.J.
423, 433 (2008); see FBI, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Crime
Info. Ctr., https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm. By
accessing the NCIC database from his patrol car, Officer Ceci
confirmed that defendant had an outstanding warrant and a
suspended license.
The dispatcher communicated to Officer Ceci a caution that
defendant was known to carry weapons. Officer Ceci did not
ascertain the precise source from which the dispatcher obtained
that information, but surmised that it derived from the New
Jersey Judiciary’s Automated Complaint System (ACS), which
maintains “a history of all the warrant activity for a
complaint.” ACS-Automated Complaint Sys., N.J. Courts,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ito/acs.html. The dispatcher
also advised the officer that Henderson had an outstanding
traffic warrant. The NCIC database included a “caution for
weapons” regarding Henderson.
Informed that two of the four occupants of the vehicle had
outstanding warrants and were known to carry weapons, Officer
Ceci called for backup. Sergeant Baccardi and three other
uniformed officers, each driving a patrol car, joined Officer
Ceci at the scene.
7
Directed by Sergeant Baccardi, the officers decided to
treat the situation as a “high-risk motor vehicle stop,”
utilizing procedures designed to minimize the risk of a violent
incident. The officers directed defendant and Henderson out of
the car, handcuffed them, and arrested them. A search incident
to arrest revealed no weapons on either defendant or Henderson.
Some of the officers were assigned to “essentially watch over”
defendant and Henderson, who stood handcuffed on the side of the
highway and were not permitted to return to the vehicle.
Next, the officers detained, but did not arrest, Carson and
Sanders.1 The officers patted them down and found no weapons.
Carson and Sanders were then directed to stand on the side of
the road, monitored by officers. Officer Ceci did not observe
Carson or Sanders make any motion that suggested that either was
reaching for a weapon, attempting to hide any object, or
resisting the directions of the officers. Carson and Sanders
were not allowed access to the vehicle. As Officer Ceci
observed, they were not licensed drivers and would not have been
permitted to drive the vehicle home.
Sergeant Baccardi then directed Officer Ceci to conduct a
sweep of the interior of the vehicle to check for weapons.
1 Officer Ceci testified that one of the other officers
mistakenly handcuffed Carson but that Ceci informed the officer
that Carson was not under arrest and the officer immediately
removed the handcuffs.
8
After searching the driver’s seat and adjacent areas, Officer
Ceci searched the front-seat passenger area, where Carson had
left her purse. Officer Ceci testified that he did not see a
weapon when he initially noticed the purse. When he picked up
the purse to check the area under it, however, Officer Ceci
“could see and feel a very heavy object in there and . . . could
almost see like, like a heavy object on the bottom.” He stated
that when he touched the bottom of the purse, he “definitely
could feel the outline of a handgun.” Officer Ceci immediately
reached into the purse and retrieved a handgun. He brought it
to his patrol vehicle and “made it safe.” He then asked the
other officers to place Carson and Sanders in custody because
“we needed to figure out what was going on.”
Officer Ceci then “attempted to get consent to search the
car from [defendant]”; however, that effort evidently failed
because the officers decided to seek a search warrant. With
five officers on the scene and the four individuals secured,
Officer Ceci concluded that it would be safe to summon a tow
truck and impound the vehicle pending an application for a
search warrant.2 The vehicle was towed from the scene. The
2 Asked about steps that he would have taken had he not
impounded the car, Officer Ceci said that he would have tried to
contact the registered owner to determine whether any of the
occupants were authorized to take custody of the car. He said
that the occupants would not have any reason to return to the
car except “to retrieve belongings, if they had any,” and
9
officers later applied for a search warrant, which was granted.
The officers searched the car pursuant to the warrant and found
no weapons or other contraband.
II.
Defendant was charged with second-degree unlawful
possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(b)(1); second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted
person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7; and third-degree hindering
apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4).3 He was also charged with
four counts involving possession and distribution of a
controlled dangerous substance (CDS), the offenses that were the
subject of the warrant that was outstanding on the date of the
traffic stop.
Defendant moved to suppress the handgun found by Officer
Ceci during his search of the car. He argued that the traffic
stop was unconstitutional because he violated no laws and that,
given the number of officers on the scene and the occupants’
cooperation with those officers’ directions, there was no reason
suggested that if he had not found a gun in Carson’s purse,
Carson would have been permitted to retrieve her purse.
3 Henderson and Carson were charged with second-degree unlawful
possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1)
and fourth-degree obstructing administration of law, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1(b). Henderson was also charged with second-degree
possession of a weapon by a convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7.
10
to conduct a protective sweep. The State contended that the
officer’s search of the vehicle was a valid protective sweep.4
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Finding the testimony of Officer Ceci to be consistent,
credible, and reliable, the court concluded that the traffic
stop was properly based on the officer’s articulable and
reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed traffic
offenses. The trial court held that the search constituted a
reasonable and lawful protective sweep, which was warranted by
officer safety concerns in light of the alerts that Officer Ceci
received regarding the potential presence of weapons and his
interactions with defendant and his passengers. The court made
no findings regarding any steps that the officers would have
taken with respect to the vehicle or Carson’s purse had Officer
Ceci not located the handgun in the purse.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to two
offenses: second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun and
third-degree possession of a CDS. He was sentenced to a five-
year prison term with a three-year period of parole
ineligibility on the handgun charge and a five-year prison term
4 The State did not contend that the search in this case was
constitutional pursuant to the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement under the then-prevailing standard of State
v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), overruled by State v. Witt,
223 N.J. 409 (2015) (applying prospectively).
11
with a two-and-a-half-year period of parole ineligibility for
the CDS possession charge, to run concurrently with the sentence
for the weapons charge.
Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion
to suppress. The majority of the Appellate Division panel
concluded that Officer Ceci’s search of the motor vehicle was
not a lawful protective sweep and reversed the trial court’s
determination. Robinson, supra, 441 N.J. Super. at 46-47. The
majority reasoned that even if the dispatch reports on prior use
of weapons by defendant and Henderson gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion that there was a weapon in the car, those reports
would not justify the search as a protective sweep. Id. at 40.
The panel noted that defendant and Henderson were arrested,
handcuffed, and secured, and thus posed no threat that would
warrant a sweep of the car. Id. at 42-43. The majority found
no specific, articulable facts to support the conclusion that
either Carson or Sanders was dangerous, or that either passenger
was in a position to gain access to a weapon in the car. Id. at
42-45. The panel rejected the State’s assertion that the
community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement
governs this case and noted that, in the absence of an
applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the “plain-
feel” doctrine was irrelevant. Id. at 41 n.5, 46-47.
12
One member of the Appellate Division panel dissented from
the panel’s judgment, finding that the search was justified as
both a valid protective sweep and an exercise of police
community-caretaking functions. Id. at 51-54. The dissenting
judge considered the search in this case to be warranted by
factors such as the NCIC warning that defendant and Henderson
might be armed and the group’s presence late at night at “a
motel in an area notorious for drugs.” Id. at 50-51. The judge
concluded that Carson and Sanders “posed a potential threat to
the officers if permitted to return to the car to obtain their
belongings” and noted that Officer Ceci indicated that they
would have been allowed to retrieve their belongings had the car
not been impounded. Id. at 51-52. The judge also found that
the police officers’ community-caretaking function independently
justified the officers’ search of the car. Id. at 53-54.
The State appealed the Appellate Division’s decision as of
right. R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We granted the motions of the American
Civil Liberties Union – New Jersey (ACLU) and Seton Hall
University School of Law Center for Social Justice to appear as
amicus curiae.
III.
The State argues that under the totality of the
circumstances presented in this case, the police officers had an
objectively reasonable basis to search the vehicle for a weapon.
13
The State invokes the following factors to justify the search:
the dispatcher’s report of defendant’s and Henderson’s warrants
and a caution for weapons; the evasive and inconsistent
responses of the vehicle’s occupants; the occupants’ purported
uncertainty about the name of the car’s owner; the location of
the car at a motel associated with drugs; the late hour; the
absence of a valid driver’s license; the presence of alcohol;
and the failure of the occupants to use seatbelts. The State
contends that the search constituted proper community-caretaking
action by the officers. It argues that Officer Ceci lawfully
determined the presence of the handgun pursuant to the “plain-
feel” doctrine. The State asserts that the Court should adopt
the reasoning of the dissenting judge and reverse the panel’s
judgment.
Defendant counters that nothing in the record indicates
that defendant or his passengers were armed, noting that no
witness reported seeing a person with a weapon or furtive
movements in the car. He asserts that the State presented no
evidence that would support a reasonable suspicion that Carson
or Sanders, the only occupants of the car not arrested and
handcuffed, had access to the handgun in Carson’s purse.
Defendant notes that the passengers were detained away from the
vehicle and that the officers were in a position to ensure that
no one would reach the handgun by locking the vehicle and taking
14
the keys. Defendant urges the Court to affirm the Appellate
Division’s judgment.
Amicus curiae the ACLU concurs with defendant’s contention
that the record did not support a reasonable suspicion that
Carson or Sanders presented a danger to the police. The ACLU
disputes the dissenting Appellate Division judge’s conclusion
that reasonable suspicion arises when a motor vehicle stop
occurs in a high-crime location and at a late hour. The ACLU
asserts that, even if the outstanding warrants and evasive
answers of defendant and Henderson were relevant to the inquiry,
any indication that defendant and Henderson were dangerous
cannot be imputed to Carson or Sanders. The ACLU contends that
the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement
would apply only if the police officers intended to allow a
member of the public to have access to the vehicle.
Amicus curiae the Center for Social Justice argues that the
evidence did not substantiate the State’s contention that the
officers reasonably feared that Carson or Sanders could evade
custody and retrieve the handgun from the vehicle, given the
fact that the two passengers had been secured outside the car.
The Center for Social Justice asserts that even if a search of
the car was justified, any such search should have been limited
to a cursory visual inspection, and that officers should have
15
been permitted only a pat-down of containers located in the
vehicle.
IV.
A.
In our review of the trial court’s decision denying the
motion to suppress, we “must uphold the factual findings
underlying the trial court’s decision so long as those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.”
State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quoting State v.
Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). However, “[w]e owe no
deference to a trial or appellate court’s interpretation of the
law, and therefore our review of legal matters is de novo.”
State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015).
B.
1.
We review this appeal in accordance with familiar
principles of constitutional law. The Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution guarantee “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures” and set forth the
requirements for warrants.
Warrantless searches are “permissible only if ‘justified by
one of the few specifically established and well-delineated
16
exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” State v. Witt, 223
N.J. 409, 422 (2015) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586,
598, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160 L. Ed. 2d
128 (2004)). It is the State’s burden to prove that a
warrantless search falls within one or more of those exceptions.
Gamble, supra, 218 N.J. at 425; State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73
(2009); State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 503 (1983).
2.
The State primarily relies on the protective sweep
exception to the warrant requirement. That exception derives
from the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In
Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may initiate
an investigatory stop in the presence of “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at
21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906. When an officer
conducts such a stop, he or she may frisk the individual for
weapons without probable cause for the protection of the police
officer “where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual.” Id. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at
1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909. “Terry stops” are “narrowly drawn
. . . to permit a reasonable search for weapons.” State v.
Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 473 (2017) (omission in original)
17
(quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L.
Ed. 2d at 909).
The Supreme Court applied the Terry doctrine to a search of
a defendant’s home during his arrest in Maryland v. Buie, 494
U.S. 325, 327, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1094-95, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 281-
82 (1990). In Buie, the Court authorized a “protective sweep”
exception to the warrant requirement for a search conducted in
conjunction with an arrest, carefully limiting the search to
“spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an
attack could be immediately launched.” Id. at 334, 110 S. Ct.
at 1098, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 286. The Supreme Court mandated that
the protective sweep be “narrowly confined to a cursory visual
inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding”
and that it last “no longer than is necessary to dispel the
reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than
it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.” Id.
at 327, 335-36, 110 S. Ct. at 1094, 1099, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 281,
287.
This Court has recognized that the protective sweep
authorized in Buie is “aligned with an evolution of familiar
principles adhered to in this State, which provide law
enforcement officers with critical safety tools to perform their
oft-dangerous tasks.” Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 116. We have,
however, limited the protective sweep of a home to settings in
18
which “(1) police officers are lawfully within private premises
for a legitimate purpose, which may include consent to enter;
and (2) the officers on the scene have a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing
a danger.” Id. at 102. This Court has also imposed strict
constraints on the duration and scope of the protective sweep in
the residential setting. Ibid.; accord State v. Cope, 224 N.J.
530, 548 (2016).
The United States Supreme Court applied the protective
sweep exception to the warrant requirement to an automobile
setting in Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S. Ct. at 3481, 77
L. Ed. 2d at 1220. There, the Court authorized a circumscribed
search of an automobile’s passenger area to protect the safety
of officers:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of
an automobile, limited to those areas in which
a weapon may be placed or hidden, is
permissible if the police officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant” the officer in believing
that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect
may gain immediate control of weapons.
[Ibid. (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21,
88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906).]
In Lund, this Court adopted the constitutional standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Long and applied that
standard in rejecting the State’s claim that a police officer’s
19
search of a vehicle was a valid protective sweep. Lund, supra,
119 N.J. at 48-50. The search reviewed in Lund occurred after
an officer, while approaching a car during a traffic stop,
observed the driver reach toward the back seat and then also
observed a jacket stuffed into the back seat. Id. at 41. The
officer asked for the driver’s license and registration and
observed that the driver appeared nervous. Ibid. The officer
removed the occupants from the vehicle and patted them down, but
found no weapons. Id. at 41-42. He then returned to the car,
pulled the jacket from the back seat, and found a towel
protruding from the seat. Id. at 42. Beneath the towel, the
officer found a large envelope containing cocaine. Ibid. This
Court held that those circumstances did not give rise to “a
specific particularized basis for an objectively reasonable
belief that the defendants were armed and dangerous.” Id. at
48. Accordingly, the Court held that the cocaine located during
the search should be suppressed. Ibid.
In the distinct factual setting of Gamble, supra, this
Court upheld an automobile search as a lawful protective sweep.
218 N.J. at 431-33. There, two anonymous 9-1-1 calls to police
-- the first reporting “shots fired” and the second stating that
a man was sitting in a tan van with a gun in his lap -- prompted
a police officer to conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle
matching the second caller’s description. Id. at 418-19.
20
Weapons drawn, two officers approached the van; one officer
observed the defendant driver and his passenger “moving
frantically inside the vehicle, as if trying to hide something.”
Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks removed). When the lead
officer ordered the occupants from the vehicle, the passenger
complied, but the defendant aborted his exit from the vehicle
and tried to return to the driver’s seat. Id. at 419-20. The
officer struck the defendant, pulled him from the van, frisked
him for weapons, and transferred him to the custody of the
backup officer. Id. at 420. The lead officer then returned to
the van, searched it, and found a handgun and shell casings.
Ibid.
The Court held that “[a]n officer lawfully stopping a
vehicle may conduct a protective frisk of the passenger
compartment if he has a reasonable suspicion that the individual
is dangerous and may gain immediate access to weapons.” Id. at
431-32 (citing Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S. Ct. at
3481, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220; Lund, supra, 119 N.J. at 48).
Gamble reiterated a court’s obligation to determine, in a fact-
sensitive inquiry, “whether the totality of the circumstances
provided the officer with an articulable and particularized
suspicion that the individual was involved in criminal activity,
within the context of the officer’s relative experience and
knowledge.” Id. at 432. The Court noted that in light of the
21
defendant’s conduct and the officers’ failure to find a weapon
on the person of either occupant, “[t]he risk to officers and
public safety, which underpinned this Court’s holding in
Davila,” was “equally present” in that case. Id. at 433.
Concluding that the sweep was warranted by concerns of officer
safety and appropriately constrained to the passenger
compartment, the Court upheld its constitutionality. Ibid.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Long and this Court’s
opinions in Lund and Gamble thus define the standard for a valid
protective sweep of an automobile following a traffic stop: the
State must present specific and articulable facts that,
considered with the rational inferences from those facts,
warrant a belief that an individual in the vehicle is dangerous
and that he or she “may gain immediate control of weapons.”
Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S. Ct. at 3481, 77 L. Ed. 2d
at 1220; see also Gamble, supra, 218 N.J. at 431-32. The
protective sweep exception in the automobile setting does not
turn solely on the potential presence of a weapon in a vehicle.
Instead, it addresses the imminent danger to police when a
driver or passenger will be permitted access to a vehicle that
may contain a weapon or may be in a position to evade or
overpower the officers at the scene. See Gamble, supra, 218
N.J. at 431-32; Lund, supra, 119 N.J. at 48. That standard
governs this appeal.
22
As a threshold matter, the record contains sufficient
credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding that, in
light of Officer Ceci’s observations of defendant’s driving,
there were specific and articulable facts giving rise to
reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed motor vehicle
violations and that the traffic stop was therefore lawful. See
Gamble, supra, 218 N.J. at 431 (holding that circumstances
created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop); State v.
Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 512 (2003) (same).
We disagree, however, with the trial court’s conclusion
that Officer Ceci’s search of the car was a valid protective
sweep. There is no doubt that Officer Ceci’s concerns that
defendant and Henderson could be armed were justified. Prompted
by the dispatcher, the officer properly relied on information
provided by the NCIC database, which is used nationwide to
protect police officers “who are at risk when they approach
individuals during a traffic stop.” Sloane, supra, 193 N.J. at
434 (citing United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280-81 (7th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that concerns for officer safety warrant
criminal history check during traffic stop)). The setting in
which the stop took place -- late at night in an area known for
crime -- and the evasive and contradictory comments of defendant
and Henderson provided further support for a reasonable
suspicion that a weapon was present. Moreover, the fact that no
23
weapons were found when defendant and Henderson were frisked did
not obviate the need for concern. See Gamble, supra, 218 N.J.
at 432-33 (“The officers’ reasonable concerns for their safety
and the safety of others did not evaporate when they failed to
find a weapon on either defendant or his passenger.”).
Officer Ceci, however, addressed the potential danger with
prompt and effective action. Because Officer Ceci summoned four
backup officers, the officers outnumbered the occupants of the
vehicle. The officers arrested, frisked, handcuffed, and took
into custody the two individuals with outstanding warrants,
defendant and Henderson. They directed Carson and Sanders, who
were cooperative, to an area away from the vehicle and carefully
monitored them. The officers thus assumed and maintained
control of the vehicle and the scene. In light of that prudent
police work, none of the four occupants was given an opportunity
to return to the car. None was in a position to gain access to
any weapon -- the handgun in the vehicle, or the officers’
service weapons -- as might have happened had Officer Ceci
attempted to conduct the traffic stop alone, or with a single
partner. In short, the record did not reveal specific and
articulable facts that, at the time of Officer Ceci’s search of
the vehicle, would reasonably warrant the conclusion that any of
the vehicle’s four occupants was potentially capable of gaining
24
“immediate control of weapons.” Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1049,
103 S. Ct. at 3481, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220.
Accordingly, we conclude that the search of the car was not
within the protective sweep exception to the warrant
requirement.
3.
The dissenting judge in the Appellate Division panel stated
that the search of the vehicle was independently justified by a
second exception to the warrant requirement: the community-
caretaking doctrine. We briefly address that conclusion.
The community-caretaking doctrine originated in the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). There, the
Supreme Court stated that local police officers frequently
“engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as
community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute.” Id. at 441, 93 S. Ct. at
2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 715. The Supreme Court upheld the search
of the trunk of an impounded car that revealed evidence of a
police officer’s involvement in a murder because the search was
not conducted to investigate the murder but to secure the
officer’s service revolver after he was in an alcohol-related
accident. Id. at 436-37, 93 S. Ct. at 2525-26, 37 L. Ed. 2d at
25
712. The Court held that because of the potential risk to the
public “if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the
vehicle,” the search was a reasonable exercise of the police
community-caretaking function. Id. at 447, 93 S. Ct. at 2531,
37 L. Ed. 2d at 718.
The Supreme Court has also authorized, on community-
caretaking grounds, a search of an impounded vehicle in
accordance with routine procedures, without a specific
indication that a weapon might be found. South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1000, 1005 (1976).
In State v. Hill, this Court cited Cady and Opperman for
the principle that the police community-caretaking role may
justify the warrantless search of an impounded vehicle. 115
N.J. 169, 176-78 (1989). The Court recently observed that its
application of the community-caretaking doctrine in Hill was
“only in the ‘impounded automobile’ context” and that “[u]nder
our state law jurisprudence -- outside of the car-impoundment
context -- warrantless searches justified in the name of the
community-caretaking doctrine have involved some form of exigent
or emergent circumstances.” State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 318,
326 (2013); see also Bogan, supra, 200 N.J. at 78-80 (upholding
constitutionality of officer’s entry into apartment when, after
reports that child had been sexually assaulted in apartment,
26
officers heard adult male voice and observed another child in
residence who stated he was home alone); State v. Diloreto, 180
N.J. 264, 271, 280-81 (2004) (noting that although community-
caretaking doctrine “is not limitless,” it justified search of
individual, whose name matched that of “endangered” person on
NCIC alert list, found asleep in car with engine running).
This case does not fit within the narrow parameters of the
community-caretaking doctrine as applied to the search of a
motor vehicle. When Officer Ceci conducted his search, no
member of the public was imperiled by the presence of the
handgun in the car. The officers had not contacted a tow
operator to begin the process of impounding the car. They had
not authorized the vehicle’s owner or occupants -- or anyone
else -- to drive it away from the scene. They maintained
complete control of the vehicle. There was, in short, no
potential threat to any person’s safety warranting application
of the community-caretaking doctrine at the time that the search
took place.5
5 Because Officer Ceci was not lawfully in the passenger
compartment when he picked up the purse and noted the presence
of the handgun, we do not reach the issue of whether the “plain-
feel” exception recognized in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993), applies to this
case. See State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 104 (2016) (“Plain
view, in most instances, will not be the sole justification for
a seizure of evidence because police must always have a lawful
reason to be in the area where the evidence is found.”); State
v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 341 (2010) (finding plain view exception
27
We therefore concur with the Appellate Division majority
that Officer Ceci’s search was not justified under the
community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.
C.
Our determination that this case is not within the
protective sweep or community-caretaking exceptions to the
warrant requirement does not end the analysis. In light of the
officers’ continued control over the vehicle, their reasonable
concern that one or more occupants could have been armed, and
the uncertain status of the vehicle’s owner, it may have been
inevitable that the handgun would have been discovered as
officers engaged in constitutional law enforcement practices.
Consequently, the inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule is potentially relevant to this case.
The inevitable discovery exception derives from the
principle that “the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule
are not served by excluding evidence that, but for the
misconduct, the police inevitably would have discovered.” State
v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 237 (1985); see also Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 442-44, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2508-09, 81 L. Ed. 2d
377, 386-87 (1984) (recognizing inevitable discovery exception
appropriate when police officer lawfully approached vehicle to
question occupants and then looked through window to see plastic
bags suspected to contain drugs in plain view).
28
under Fourth Amendment). In Sugar, supra, this Court
acknowledged that “[b]ecause satisfaction by the State of the
exception’s requirements involves proof of hypothetical
independent sources of obtaining the evidence, the exception’s
application is sometimes problematical.” 100 N.J. at 237.
Because “[t]he State itself is directly responsible for the
loss of the opportunity lawfully to obtain evidence,” it must
“make a strong showing that, by the admission of the evidence,
it is in no better position than it would have enjoyed had no
illegality occurred.” Id. at 239-40. The Court, therefore,
required the State to prove inevitable discovery by clear and
convincing evidence, a higher standard than that imposed by
federal law. Compare id. at 240 (“The State must show by clear
and convincing evidence that had the illegality not occurred, it
would have pursued established investigatory procedures that
would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the
controverted evidence, wholly apart from its unlawful
acquisition.”), with Nix, supra, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S. Ct. at
2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387-88 (imposing preponderance of evidence
standard on prosecution).
The suppression hearing record is insufficient for this
Court to determine whether the inevitable discovery exception
applies. That record, for example, does not reveal the steps
that Officer Ceci and his colleagues would have taken had they
29
not found the gun and impounded the vehicle to seek a warrant.
The trial court made no findings as to how the officers would
have handled the vehicle, Carson’s purse, and any items within
it, had Officer Ceci not discovered the weapon.6
An expanded record, however, may support an application of
the inevitable discovery exception in this case. By virtue of
the NCIC notification for weapons and outstanding warrants, the
officers were alerted to the potential presence of a weapon.
Other than defendant’s statement that the car was owned by a
friend whom he could not name, the officers had no information
about the relationship between the occupants and the vehicle’s
owner. The State may wish to argue that it would be justified
in conducting a search prior to releasing the vehicle to the
owner, or someone designated by the owner. See Cady, supra, 413
U.S. at 436-37, 93 S. Ct. at 2525-26, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 712
(upholding search of trunk of impounded car known to contain
weapon); Hill, supra, 115 N.J. at 176-78 (finding that
6 Officer Ceci’s affirmative response to the question whether
Carson “would have been free to retrieve her belongings,
including her purse from the vehicle,” does not clarify what
would have occurred absent the search of the passenger
compartment. The officer did not specify whether he would have
taken the purse from the car in order to return it to Carson --
a measure consistent with the precautions that he and his fellow
officers took to keep the occupants away from the vehicle -- or
allowed her to reenter the vehicle herself to recover it.
30
community-caretaking role may justify search of impounded
vehicle).
Alternatively, had the officers lawfully impounded the car,
the circumstances might have justified an inventory search. See
Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097, 49 L. Ed.
2d at 1005 (identifying protection of inventoried property,
protection of police and other bailees from false claims of
property loss, and safeguarding of police from potential danger
as objectives of inventory search); State v. Mangold, 82 N.J.
575, 577 (1980) (stating constitutional standard for inventory
search after lawful impoundment); State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J.
1, 10-11 (1979) (same).
On remand, the trial court should afford the State an
opportunity to meet its burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the weapon in Carson’s purse inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means. See Sugar, supra, 100 N.J. at
239-40. If the State meets that burden, defendant’s conviction
should not be disturbed. If the State does not meet that
burden, the trial court should enter judgment vacating
defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon. See
State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438, 451 (2015) (rejecting inevitable
discovery exception in absence of evidence that police officers
would have discovered contraband by lawful means); State v.
K.W., 214 N.J. 499, 511 (2013) (finding inevitable discovery
31
exception inapplicable because of wiretap statute’s exclusionary
rule); State v. Worthy, 141 N.J. 368, 390-92 (1995) (same). We
offer no view on the resolution of any issues raised on remand.
V.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is modified and
affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s
opinion.
32