Citation Numbers: 47 N.J.L. 251
Judges: Scudder
Filed Date: 6/15/1885
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/9/2022
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Complaint was made before the defendant, a justice of the peace, at Long Branch, against the prosecutor under section 7 of the act concerning disorderly persons, for disturbing the exercises of a public school, giving annoyance to the children attending such school and the teacher therein. On conviction, he was sentenced to be committed to the county jail for five days. This writ has been brought to reverse the conviction. The jurisdiction of the justice is denied because of certain alleged changes made in the law.
The general law, which is applicable by its terms to all justices of the peace, says that any person who shall commit the acts complained of in this action shall be deemed and adjudged
The answer to the objection under this law is that the Long Branch district is not, and was not when this conviction took place, a city in this state, but is governed by a special commission, four members of which are elected by the people and three appointed by the justice of the Supreme Court holding the Circuit for that county. Other places in the state are governed by commissioners elected by the people, and have never been recognized as cities. The act passed in 1885, authorizing such districts to become cities by a popular vote, (Pamph. L. 1885, oh. 50,) shows that these are distinguished
The next law to which we are referred is that relating to the classification of cities, passed in 1882. Pam/ph. L., p. 47. We will not stop to consider the objections made to this law, but examine its terms here quoted. The classification of cities of the fourth class “ shall consist of cities of this state bounding upon the Atlantic Ocean and being seaside or summer resorts.” Long Branch is not a city within this description. There are such cities, but Long Branch is not a city.
As the law now exists, there is no doubt that the justice of the peace who adjudged this conviction had equal authority with the police justice at Long Branch.
The case shows that there was doubt about his jurisdiction, for the prosecutor was first arrested on complaint before this same justice, who discharged him for want of jurisdiction. He was then arrested and taken before the police justice, who also held that he had no jurisdiction. A second time the complaint was made before the same justice of the peace, who held, tried and convicted him. He has .the right to complain of such blundering, by which he was taken before different magistrates in succession, but if he is guilty of a criminal offence he should not escape punishment because of these arrests. He was discharged on formal objections to the jurisdiction of the court, not in a trial on the merits. He was not subjected to a double conviction, for in neither case was he again arrested until he had been discharged from the previous complaint. In civil cases the court will take a second arrest for the same cause of action to be lawful, unless the contrary appears from the facts and circumstances of the case. Peltier v. Receivers, &c., 2 Green 391. If the complaints are obviously oppressive and vexatious, the justice may give relief either by discharging the accused or holding him on his own recognizance, as the facts may warrant. No reason appears to doubt the justice or regularity of the conviction, and it will be affirmed. It has been decided, where the sentence is manifestly illegal, that there is no power to pass a proper sen